FINANCING FOR SOLUTIONS TO DISPLACEMENT

SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY

MARCH 2021
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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THE REGIONAL DURABLE SOLUTIONS SECRETARIAT (ReDSS)
The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) is a coordination and information hub created in 2015 that acts to catalyse forward thinking and policy development on durable solutions for displacement-affected communities. ReDSS seeks to improve joint learning and programming, inform policy processes, enhance capacity development, and facilitate coordination in the collective search for durable solutions. It is comprised of 14 organisations (ACF, ACTED, CARE International, Concern Worldwide, DRC, IRC, INTERSOS, Mercy Corps, NRC, OXFAM, RCK, Save the Children, World Vision, and LWF) working together to maintain focused momentum and stakeholder engagement towards durable solutions for displacement-affected communities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

Cover Photo: One of many sprawling camps in Mogadishu. Credit: Peter Biro, IRC

Back Cover Photo: A young Somali boy atop a tree overlooking an IDP camp in Mogadishu. Credit: Will Swanson, IRC
## Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Area-Based Approach</td>
<td>An approach that defines an area, rather than a sector or target group, as the main entry point. All stakeholders, services, and needs are mapped and assessed, and relevant actors mobilised and coordinated within it. (ReDSS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Displacement-Affected Communities</td>
<td>All displaced populations (refugee, returnee, IDP), host communities, and local institutions. (ReDSS)</td>
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<td>Durable Solutions</td>
<td>A durable solution is achieved when the displaced no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through return, local integration, or resettlement. (IASC framework)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host Communities</td>
<td>The local, regional, and national governmental, social, and economic structures within which refugees live. (UNHCR). In this report, the term “host population” is defined as non-displaced persons living in the same municipality as IDPs, returnees, and/or refugees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td>Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement)</td>
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<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>A combination of the resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Resources include individual skills (human capital), land (natural capital), savings (financial capital), equipment (physical capital), as well as formal support groups and informal networks (social capital). (DFID)</td>
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<td>Local Integration</td>
<td>Local integration as a durable solution combines three dimensions. First, it is a legal process, whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Second, it is an economic (material) process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living comparable to the host community. Third, it is a social and cultural (physical) process of adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of the host country and live without fear of discrimination. (UNHCR)</td>
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<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
<td>Government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. (OECD)</td>
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<td>Refugee</td>
<td>A person who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country”. (Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A (2), 1951)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
<td>Government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solutions to Displacement</td>
<td>In this report solutions to displacement refer to longer-term approaches to supporting displaced populations, which may include durable solutions, but may also include goals such as greater socio-economic inclusion and/or self-reliance of refugees, and/or transforming the refugee response model towards longer-term more sustainable approaches.</td>
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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre La Faim</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>BRA</td>
<td>Banadir Regional Administration</td>
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<td>BRCiS</td>
<td>Building Resilient Communities in Somalia</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DSI</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Initiative</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Programme</td>
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<td>DSRSG / RC / HC</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Strategy</td>
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<td>DSU</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Unit</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU RE-INTEG</td>
<td>European Union programme for enhancing Somalia responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows</td>
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<td>EUTF</td>
<td>EU Trust Fund for Africa</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member State</td>
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<td>HEA</td>
<td>Household Economy Analysis</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Countries (initiative)</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (of the World Bank)</td>
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<td>iDMC</td>
<td>International Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ILED</td>
<td>Inclusive Local and Economic Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Jubaland Solutions Consortium</td>
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<td>LORA</td>
<td>Local (Re)Integration Assessment</td>
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<td>LWF</td>
<td>Lutheran World Federation</td>
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<td>MOPIED</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, Investments and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Fund</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>RCK</td>
<td>Refugee Consortium of Kenya</td>
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<td>ReDSS</td>
<td>Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat</td>
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<td>REF</td>
<td>Research and Evidence Facility (of the EUTF)</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<td>SDSC</td>
<td>Somaliland Durable Solutions Consortia</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UK FCDO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than one in five Somalis are displaced within or outside the country. Displacement in Somalia is driven both by conflict and disasters, with climate-related disasters the primary driver of the dramatic increase in internal displacement since 2016. Displacement is also a major driver of rapid and haphazard urbanisation. Displacement therefore is not a peripheral challenge for Somalia. Meeting the rights and needs of displaced people, and addressing the root causes of displacement, are fundamental to political, economic, and social progress in Somalia.

Substantial progress has been made in achieving an enabling policy environment for durable solutions under the auspices of the Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) launched in early 2016. International partners have worked closely with the Somali government to establish key policy frameworks and commitments. The DSI hopes to continue to carry through this work by anchoring key rights in legislation.

Political engagement at the highest levels of government, along with technical support, has helped create an enabling policy environment and successfully embedded durable solutions in national development priorities. This is a major achievement in supporting a government-led durable solutions agenda. The establishment of coordination structures and tools that support government leadership, oversight, and the delivery of a whole-of-government approach also represent an important step towards a nationally led durable solutions agenda.

In practice, however, the capacity of government to ensure rights are upheld and aspirations towards durable solutions are realised remains highly constrained. This places constraints on the pace at which durable solutions work can proceed. An opportunistic and multi-level approach is required that targets opportunities at Federal Member State (FMS) and municipal levels, within national-level sectors and programmes, and at national legislative and policy levels on a whole-of-government basis. Moreover, continued investment in the capacity of government at national, FMS level, and municipal level, alongside internationally financed programming, is required in order to ensure that durable solutions are led and owned by national actors.

Somalia also faces profound challenges in financing its development priorities. The scope of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to increase domestic revenues is highly constrained and will continue to rely heavily on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances in the medium term. Somali development ambitions require investment in infrastructure, capacity building, and policy reform, all of which require a transition from humanitarian towards developmental investments and approaches to financing, as well as substantial additional ODA financing. Somalia is currently grappling with two interlinked challenges in achieving this transition and scale-up: 1) resuming relationships with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to increase access to development finance; and 2) reducing aid fragmentation and shifting towards use of country systems in the delivery of aid. Financing for durable solutions falls squarely within this incomplete transition from internationally driven project-based aid towards programmatic and nationally aligned funding and financing.

Since 2016, funding for durable solutions has largely comprised targeted support to the DSI and a number of multi-sectoral, multi-actor durable solutions consortia, Political engagement at the highest levels of government, along with technical support, has helped create an enabling policy environment and successfully embedded durable solutions in national development priorities.
with funding provided by a group of European donors and the UN Peacebuilding Fund. This funding has been catalytic in both establishing an enabling policy environment and demonstrating proof of concept around how durable solutions could be achieved. Multi-year funding, lesson sharing across an overlapping group of donors and partners, and commitments to invest in evidence have played an important role in enabling the relatively rapid evolution of durable solutions programmes in Somalia. Without greater coherence in terms of national-level development priorities, policies, programmes, and timeframes, however, the impact of durable solutions programmes and the return on investments will be limited.

Most of the durable solutions consortia programmes have been designed, funded, and managed largely outside government-led processes. There is also a perception that there is little appetite from development donors to support durable solutions beyond consortia programmes. A Durable Solutions Marker has been introduced to the government Aid Flow Mapping tool, enabling the identification of investments contributing to durable solutions and linking them to the strategic objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP). There is, however, no forward looking prioritised and sequenced plan to guide investments in durable solutions. Despite the existence of a donor working group on durable solutions, funding decisions are reportedly determined on the basis of donor priorities.

Somalia has established a well-functioning pooled funding architecture designed to support the implementation of the NDP, which includes an effective government and donor coordination platform. While a new fund for durable solutions has been mooted, there may be scope to use the existing funding architecture to target financing towards agreed priorities that support durable solutions. It is also possible to use the existing review and sign-off processes to ensure that future durable solutions programmes align with priorities established in the NDP.

The durable solutions agenda in Somalia straddles the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus. Humanitarian assistance is still required for the foreseeable future, and the engagement of development and financing programming has increased. However, longer-term national-level programming and financing approaches will be needed to enable longer term solutions. There are emerging opportunities to pursue a more sustainable and coherent approach to durable solutions within emerging national development programmes and priorities, notably through the national social safety protection system and an emerging multi-stakeholder urbanisation strategy. In the interim, there may be a compelling argument for support to transitional activities that are underwritten by flexible multi-year financing. This could provide practical programming support to displaced communities so they can begin to pursue inclusion and self-reliance. It could also strengthen local and federal-level government capacities to manage durable solutions to displacement and support specific enabling activities.

Somalia aspires to deliver a unified national universal social protection system designed to protect the poor and vulnerable from shocks, and overcome poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion. A national social protection system also provides international actors an opportunity to shift from status-based targeting towards more equitable and inclusive responses.

In the current initial phase of international support to the nascent social protection system, the inclusion of IDPs is not a priority for the two recently created major social protection programmes. Donor support is currently spread across an
array of developmental, durable solutions, and humanitarian cash transfer programmes. Future harmonisation and scale up of these programmes provide critical opportunities to ensure that targeting is calibrated to capture the specific vulnerabilities of displaced people and to negotiate a sustainable financing package. The government has proposed a pooled fund to receive all financial contributions to support the national social protection system in future, which may be implemented by a variety of international partners. The design of a fund could provide an opportunity to address a range of harmonisation and accountability issues, including an approach to financing that aligns with the national budgetary and treasury systems. The fund could also be based on an agreed approach to targeting that ensures the inclusion of marginalised groups, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees.

Urban development in Somalia illustrates the depth and scope of the developmental challenges in Somalia. A coalition of actors committed to understanding and addressing urbanisation challenges in the country is emerging, bringing together the World Bank, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs. In October 2020, this group of actors convened to issue a “Collective roadmap towards a common agenda on urbanisation, land, and displacement in Somalia”. The roadmap identifies a sequenced set of actions over the short, medium, and long term. Durable solutions are an established priority theme in these discussions. This type of convening does not fall within the regular development or humanitarian coordination structures. Instead, it offers an indication of an alternative, more organic nexus approach based on a coalition of interested actors finding common cause in devising solutions to a set of particular problems.

A group of actors committed to understanding and addressing urbanisation challenges offers an indication of an alternative, more organic nexus approach based on a coalition of interested actors finding common cause in devising solutions to a set of particular problems.
While analytical work and reaching consensus on priority issues continues to advance, discussions on sustainable financing for both longer-term urban development ambitions and affordable housing solutions for displaced people are in relatively early stages. In the absence of an agreed strategy and leadership from government, discussions on financing are considered to be somewhat premature. There are opportunities for government to use regulation and tax incentives to improve the quality and accessibility of services to the poorest and most vulnerable, and to incentivise private sector investment with financing instruments. The latter include access to finance and risk guarantees, and leveraging finances from the future increases in land value generated by infrastructure investment. Although in the early stages of implementation, these innovative programmes illustrate the potential for using ODA-funded programming to mobilise alternative sources of financing. They also have the potential to provide sustainable financing for government-led durable solutions in urban settings in Somalia.

At the same time, ad hoc experimentation and piecemeal investments in the provision of shelter for IDPs continue across an array of UN and NGO programmes. This risks further fuelling the status-based separation of IDPs, rent-seeking, land speculation, and cycles of eviction. An interim or transitional strategy to target investments in more sustainable housing solutions for displaced people would help to both reduce the risks of costly short-term shelter investments, and prioritise and sequence investments in a broader framework of ongoing work on secure tenure, infrastructure development, sustainable financing, and institutional capacity strengthening.

Analysis and consensus around the structural barriers to durable solutions in the context of wider development and political challenges in Somalia will be fundamental to this process of integrating durable solutions into the development agenda. Linked to this, agreement on prioritisation and sequencing of necessary reforms, capacity strengthening, and investments will be key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources.
IDP woman in a demolished settlement in Baidoa. She has faced multiple evictions. Credit: NRC
Creating an enabling environment for solutions to displacement

- Strong and committed leadership on durable solutions from the UN, backed with targeted financial and technical support from key donors, has delivered a high return on investment.
- Durable solutions should be considered a long-term undertaking that progresses at different rates within enabling pockets of demand and capacity at municipal, FMS, and federal levels. The durable solutions agenda requires sustained political engagement, advocacy, investments in enabling conditions, programming, and financing at multiple levels. On the side of international actors, the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office has played an important convening role and has helped establish key tools, including the Durable Solutions Marker and the monitoring framework. In future, this continuity of leadership and tools could play a key role in keeping the durable solutions agenda prioritised and on track.

Coherent approaches

- The existing pooled funding architecture provides an opportunity to target funds towards and in support of government-led durable solutions.
- Use of a Durable Solutions Marker in the Aid Information Management System is a valuable tool for promoting awareness and dialogue around durable solutions, and for tracking contributions against national development plans.
- The urbanisation agenda in Somalia provides a good example of actors organically convening across the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus around a shared set of concerns and priorities, within which durable solutions is a prominent priority.

Multi-level progress

- Catalytic funding to support both policy and programmatic work – through area-based programming – has been critical for creating an enabling policy environment, demonstrating proof of concept, and facilitating programmatic learning in durable solutions programming.
- There are opportunities in relation to the scale-up of the national social protection system to ensure that targeting is calibrated to include displaced people and to negotiate sustainable financing packages with donors. Inclusion of displaced people could be considered as a key condition attached to a long-term funding package. The latter could also include the creation of a dedicated financing mechanism through which donors can channel contributions in alignment with government systems.
- A transitional or interim strategy is required to focus and direct programming and financing for housing and shelter for displaced people to ensure programming is connected with a broader framework of ongoing work on secure tenure, infrastructure development, sustainable financing, and institutional capacity strengthening.
**Sequencing investments**

- In the national Durable Solutions Strategy (DSS), there may be a case for clearly identifying specific activities that support further progress in durable solutions but are unlikely to be addressed in the near term by development programming, as well as advocating for transitional funding to support these types of activities.

- Transitional activities might include establishing baseline evidence on: the numbers of displaced people and their specific needs and vulnerabilities; targeted evidence and analysis to inform programme design and targeting; additional costs associated with ensuring displaced people can access services and rights; support to the continued development of policy and legislation; and support to capacity strengthening of government actors, particularly at FMS and municipal levels, to lead and deliver durable solutions.

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**Tactical investments in efficiency, learning, and accountability**

- There is a fundamental gap in the evidence base necessary to define the parameters of durable solutions in Somalia. Without clarity around the numbers, locations, and profiles of displaced people, it is impossible to assess the overall scope and scale of the problem, or to prioritise and target resources effectively into programming. Without a baseline and monitoring of changes against this, it is also impossible to measure progress in achieving durable solutions. A country-wide assessment and profiling of internal displacement would help inform more efficient targeting and sequencing of investments. It also would provide greater clarity as to where the specific needs of displaced people fall across the remits and competencies of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors.
Community discussions in Somalia.
Credit: Axel Fassio, DRC Somalia
INTRODUCTION

This report summarises the findings of research about funding and financing for solutions to displacement in Somalia as part of the ReDSS study entitled, “Re-thinking the displacement financing architecture in the Horn of Africa: What types of financing are required to fund solutions to displacement?”

The research draws on an extensive literature review and 26 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the FGS, FMS governments, UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, and NGOs carried out between 19 October 2020 and 5 November 2020.1

The research uses the terms “solutions to displacement” to describe longer-term approaches to supporting displaced populations, which may include durable solutions but may also include goals such as greater socio-economic inclusion and/or self-reliance of refugees, and/or transforming the refugee response model towards more longer-term sustainable approaches. Where durable solutions are an explicitly stated policy objective, the term “durable solutions” is used.

AIM OF THE STUDY

This is one of three country studies that contributes to the overall study objectives to rethink the displacement financing architecture in the Horn of Africa and make recommendations on the types of financing modalities required to fund solutions to displacement. The logic and contribution of the country case studies is outlined in Figure 1.

Each of the three country studies assesses the enabling conditions for solutions to displacement, including the political, policy, institutional, and financing environment. In each country, a subset of thematic programmatic areas is also investigated. The Somalia study includes a focus on: the inclusion of IDPs in the national social protection system; efforts to provide sustainable housing solutions to IDPs; and a collation of emerging lessons from area-based durable solutions programmes.

FIGURE 1. STUDY RESEARCH LOGIC
DISPLACEMENT CONTEXT

More than one in five Somalis is displaced within or outside the country. In 2019, an estimated 2.6 million Somalis were internally displaced and 905,109 Somalis were refugees registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) outside of Somalia. Displacement is therefore not a peripheral challenge. Meeting the rights and needs of displaced people, along with addressing the root causes of displacement, are fundamental to political, economic, and social progress in Somalia.

Displacement is driven both by conflict and disasters, with climate-related disasters the primary driver of the dramatic increase in internal displacement in Somalia since 2016. From late 2016, two consecutive years of drought drove nearly a million Somalis dependent on agricultural and pastoralism to seek assistance in urban areas, dramatically increasing the number of IDPs (see Figure 2). Moreover, displacement is continuous. In the first half of 2020 alone, an estimated 514,000 people were displaced due to disasters (including flooding, drought, wildfires, and destruction of crops by locusts) and 198,000 people were displaced due to conflict. Forced evictions of IDPs in urban areas is a frequent cause of secondary displacement. In 2019, more than 260,000 people were forcibly evicted, with more than 150,000 in Mogadishu alone.

FIGURE 2. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT TRENDS IN SOMALIA (2015–2019)

Displacement is driven both by conflict and disasters, with climate-related disasters the primary driver of the dramatic increase in internal displacement in Somalia since 2016.
Displacement in Somalia is predominantly urban. One in four city dwellers is an IDP and internal displacement has been a major accelerator of urbanisation. The majority of IDPs live in and around cities mainly in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo, Bossaso, Kismayo, and Burao. An estimated 54% of Somalis already live in urban areas and urbanisation is increasing at a rate of 4.3% annually. In the absence of effective urban planning and infrastructure development, Somali cities are expanding rapidly in haphazard fashion, often with sprawling informal IDP settlements at the margins of urban areas. Displacement in Somalia is also protracted. Many IDPs and returning refugees in urban areas do not plan to return to their places of origin and prefer local integration in the near term. It is worth noting that the total number of IDPs includes a wide range of displacement experiences, from recently displaced people, to those who may have been displaced for many years and may live in similar conditions to the host populations they live alongside. In popular usage, the term “IDP” may also include people who have migrated from rural to urban areas on a voluntary basis.
POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Both the dramatic growth of internal displacement and the slowdown in the voluntary return of refugees have contributed to a shift of emphasis in policy and programming, which now focus on meeting the immediate needs of newly displaced IDPs and finding durable solutions for displacement-affected communities.

The increased prominence of durable solutions on Somali government and international policy agendas has also been driven by concerted action initiated by the UN under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG / RC / HC). Targeted financial and technical support is provided by Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the World Bank, Danida, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK FCDO), and the EU.

The Somalia DSI was launched in early 2016 by the DSRSG / RC / HC and is led by the FGS to support government-led delivery of durable solutions and provide a unifying framework for government and international partners. Recognising that establishing the rights of displaced people is fundamental to durable solutions, international partners have worked closely with the government to develop key policy frameworks and commitments, which they hope to continue to carry through by anchoring key rights in legislation. International partners have also encouraged and supported the FGS to establish institutions and coordination mechanisms to support implementation. As such, the policy and institutional environment for durable solutions in Somalia is relatively advanced.

KEY COMMITMENTS, FRAMEWORKS & MECHANISMS

Key commitments, frameworks, and mechanisms agreed and created since the beginning of the DSI in 2016 include:

- A chapter on durable solutions in the NDP 8
- A Durable Solutions Unit (DSU) at the Ministry of Planning, Investments and Economic Development (MOPEID), with responsibility for the overall coordination of and communications on durable solutions
- A Durable Solutions Secretariat (launched in October 2019), reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister and chaired by MOPIED, that brings together key line ministries to coordinate durable solutions in alignment with the NDP
- A national policy on refugee returnees and IDPs and national eviction guidelines (adopted in November 2019)
- Somali government ratification of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance for IDPs in Africa (known as the Kampala Convention) in November 2019; the convention is a legally binding instrument affirming the rights of IDPs in Africa
- Approval of the NDP 9 (2020–2024), which has a cross-cutting thematic focus on durable solutions, supported by a national DSS to guide implementation of durable solutions activities (agreed later in 2020)
Displacement and durable solutions are no longer considered a marginal theme and the sole concern of humanitarian actors in Somalia. Political engagement at the highest levels of government and technical support through the DSI have helped create an enabling policy environment and successfully embedded durable solutions in national development priorities. This is a major achievement in supporting a government-led durable solutions agenda.

The establishment of coordination structures and tools that support national leadership, oversight, and the delivery of a whole-of-government approach also represent an important step towards a nationally led durable solutions agenda. The design and placement of these mechanisms – within the influential MOPIED and Office of the Prime Minister – is equally significant. This is an important tactical decision to ensure durable solutions are given prominence in planning and prioritisation across key government ministries. The positioning of the DSU and national DSS contrast with the often marginal influence of government refugee coordination bodies at regional levels.

There are many potential benefits to this approach. These include leaving behind some of the negative impacts of the long running and large-scale humanitarian operation, in particular reducing opportunities for rent-seeking, reducing incentives created by assistance to remain in protracted displacement, and achieving greater cost-efficiency and financial sustainability. From the perspective of government, delivery of nationally led development programming is an important opportunity to demonstrate legitimacy and strengthen the fragile social contract. There are also potential losers in this process, and established modes of programming and institutional influence may be resistant to change.

TRANSLATING POLICY INTO ACTION

Translating these policy aspirations into action, however, will be far harder to achieve. The pioneers of the DSI acknowledge that the initiative “has made important progress but impact on the lives of IDPs has been limited”. In Somalia, the DSI has intentionally supported a government-led approach to durable solutions. In practice, government capacity to ensure rights are upheld and aspirations towards durable solutions are realised remains highly constrained. At many levels, the political settlement remains contested. Consequently, the variety of localised ad hoc hybrid governance systems that have emerged in the absence of a functioning central state continue to provide a range of functions, including security, justice, conflict management, and service delivery. These dynamics limit the pace at which durable solutions work can proceed.

To remedy this, an opportunistic and multi-level approach is required. Such an approach should target opportunities at FMS and municipal levels. It should also address national-level sectors and programmes, as well as national legislative and policy levels, aiming for a whole-of-government approach. Moreover, continued investment in the capacity of government at national, FMS level, and municipal level, alongside internationally financed programming, is required in order to ensure that durable solutions are led and owned by national actors.

While there is consensus on the overarching goal, there is less clarity on the scale of the problem. Who should be targeted and included, and how? What practical programmatic approaches should be invested in? How can the sequencing of reform and investments be delivered in the enabling environment that is necessary to ensure the durability of programmatic outcomes? There are a number of key areas of conceptual ambiguity and critical gaps in evidence.
Incorporating durable solutions into the wider development agenda in Somalia requires a conceptual shift that sees durable solutions through the lens of poverty and inclusion, rather than through needs, status-based targeting, and project-based approaches. For example, although durable solutions are integrated in the NDP, the NDP 8 iteration (2017–2019) shows up the problem. Even with a resilience pillar and a clear statement of goals and proposed intervention strategies for durable solutions, NDP 8 was considered to be too broad and lacking a clear strategy, “driven by the fragmented and projectised input from stakeholders and partners”.

In contrast, NDP 9 (2020–2024) is built from an analysis of poverty and its causes. It is streamlined under four pillars that link to a government-owned framework. Rather than being prioritised according to status, IDPs are seen through a poverty lens that identifies them among a range of consistently vulnerable groups (including women, youth, rural poor, and persons with disabilities). In NDP 9, durable solutions are identified as a cross-cutting policy priority mainstreamed across all pillars and supported by a separate Durable Solutions Strategy that is intended to more clearly identify priority programming. It is not yet clear, however, whether existing poverty-based targeting is sufficiently nuanced to capture the specific vulnerabilities, marginalisations, and exclusions related to displacement. Currently, these are identified through humanitarian protection approaches.

Basic data and analysis on the scale and nature of internal displacement is lacking. At present, IDP numbers are thought to include people who have been displaced by conflict and disasters, along with other rural–urban migrants. The specific vulnerabilities in this very large category of people are not well understood. For example, many in this group have been displaced for years and have very different needs to recently displaced IDPs, who are likely to have immediate assistance and protection needs. In addition, programming practice in Somalia increasingly emphasises area-based approaches that include both IDP and host community members. Indeed, there is a strong argument for not targeting on the basis of displacement status, which can reinforce patterns of exclusion. In contrast, the broader category of displacement-affected communities adds a further dimension to the scope for inclusion in actions targeting durable solutions.

The conceptual scope of durable solutions is also subject to different interpretations. International actors, for example, emphasise assistance and solutions for displaced populations and affected host communities in their current areas of displacement. Because these are typically urban settings, international actors tend to focus on these areas. The primary emphasis on urban displacement-affected communities in durable solutions programming is, however, a point of some contention with government development priorities. In line with these priorities, for example, the first phase of the World Bank supported government-led Baxnaano social protection programme targets rural areas in an effort to balance out the concentration of international support in urban areas. It also tries to address the chronic vulnerability driving migration as part of a multi-sectoral developmental approach and aims to support the viability of rural pastoralism, which is a key pillar of the Somali economy.
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

Despite numerous interventions in support of durable solutions, there is nonetheless limited understanding of the factors driving migration — beyond general insights about the role of conflict, disasters, and rural—urban migration. There is also limited understanding of efforts to include investments that can address the root causes of displacement, including support for the resilience of rural communities and investing in flood prevention. Meanwhile, shocks and further displacements continue on a regular basis throughout Somalia. In some cases, deteriorating climatic conditions continue to add pressure on the viability of rural livelihoods.

The federal Durable Solutions Strategy is not yet supported by costed and prioritised plans. In turn, this creates challenges for resource mobilisation, prioritisation, and sequencing of investments. There is also no commonly agreed approach to measure integration at the collective level that would allow monitoring of progress and learning about what works, as well as including some degree of accountability for commitments and investments. To begin to remedy this, a monitoring framework is currently under development with support from international partners, including IGAD and the UN.

The durable solutions agenda in Somalia straddles the humanitarian—development nexus but this is not simply matter of working collaboratively according to comparative advantage. While humanitarian assistance is still required for the foreseeable future, and the engagement of development financing and programming have increased, a shift is now required towards longer-term national-level programming and financing approaches.

Within this shift, greater clarity on what and how to focus efforts and investments is needed to integrate durable solutions into the development agenda of Somalia. Without clarity around what actions and investments actually contribute to durable solutions, investments will be ad hoc with limited demonstrable impact and sustainability. There is also “a risk that the plethora of wider concepts floating around under which the IDP dossier is placed (durable solutions, resilience, social protection) contributes to a lack of focus; or the opposite, a multi-focus and partial approach to some of the big themes and priorities in Somalia”.

In the interim, there may be a compelling argument for support to transitional activities through flexible multi-year financing. This would provide practical programming support to displaced communities to begin to pursue inclusion and self-reliance, to strengthen local and federal-level government capacity to manage durable solutions for displacement, and to support specific enabling activities.
FINANCING LANDSCAPE

Somalia is heavily dependent on ODA and remittances, which together comprised more than 50% of GDP in 2017. Domestic revenues are extremely low — only USD 183 million in 2018 — and are focused on paying government wages, particularly for the security sector. In 2018, the federal government spent just 4.1% of its budget on social sectors. The FGS expects to continue to rely on ODA to finance its development priorities and for continued basic assistance, while focusing on increasing revenue generation and tax collection.

Remittances represent a major source of financing in Somalia: they were estimated at USD 1.4 billion in 2018. While remittances provide an important source of household income and buffer against shocks, they are primarily used for consumption (including education and health services), rather than for investment. Access to remittances is unequal across geographical areas, clans, and families throughout Somalia. They are also expected to decline in future as overseas migrant populations age and family ties with relatives in Somalia weaken. Efforts led by the international community to try to mobilise and target remittances have proven unsuccessful to date and there is thought to be limited scope for influencing private transactions between individuals. Although remittances are an important financing flow (particularly at household levels), as a private flow, they are largely outside the influence of policymakers. Their application to major development investment challenges is therefore limited.

Historically, ODA flows to Somalia have been dominated by humanitarian funding. The composition of ODA has shifted over time as development donors have re-engaged and scaled up support in parallel with the political transition in Somalia (see Figure 3). During this period of re-engagement of development financing actors, security and statebuilding have been priority investment areas.

FIGURE 3. MAJOR CATEGORIES OF ODA FLOWS TO SOMALIA (2010–2019)

Source: OECD International Statistics for Development. Note: development ODA is total ODA excluding debt relief, less humanitarian aid.
Development ambitions in Somalia require investment in infrastructure, capacity building, and policy reform, all of which require a transition from humanitarian to developmental investments and approaches to financing.\textsuperscript{46} These ambitions also require access to substantial additional ODA financing. Somalia is currently grappling with two inter-linked challenges in realising this transition: 1) resuming relationships with IFIs to increase access to development finance; and 2) reducing aid fragmentation\textsuperscript{49} and shifting towards use of country systems in the delivery of aid.

Normalising relationships with IFIs and obtaining forgiveness on outstanding historic debts to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank, through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief process, is currently a major priority for the FGS and development partners.\textsuperscript{50} As Somalia progresses through the HIPC process, substantial additional financing has already become available through the World Bank pre-arrears clearance grants of USD 250 million in 2018 and 2019, with an additional USD 902.5 million\textsuperscript{51} in International Development Association (IDA) grants in 2020, including financing for the locust and COVID-19 responses.\textsuperscript{52}

Strengthening FGS public financial management and oversight, as well as increasing the use of national budgetary systems, are important elements of the HIPC process and have already accelerated a range of reforms.\textsuperscript{53} Use of country systems also has the potential to deliver greater cost-efficiency in a context where operating costs are extremely high. For example, donors operating in Somalia estimate their non-programmatic costs – that is, the costs of monitoring, overheads, security, logistics, etc. other than the costs associated with paying those actually directly delivering the services – at between 30–60\% of project budgets.\textsuperscript{54}

Development partners, notably multilateral institutions, have made serious investments in public financial management and are demonstrating increasing levels of commitment to channel funds through the FGS treasury. The World Bank administered Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) has worked with the Somali government to strengthen and use national systems as a foundational investment in the journey to re-engage with the IFIs and channelled USD 157 million through the FGS treasury between 2015 and 2019.\textsuperscript{55} The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) agreed a State and Resilience Building Contract with the FGS, which provides EUR 107.4 million in grants between 2018 and 2021, with an expected EUR 99.4 million channelled through the treasury and EUR 8 million for institutional capacity strengthening and oversight.\textsuperscript{56} The new UN cooperation framework with the FGS also includes a commitment to begin channelling funds through national windows.\textsuperscript{57}

Efforts to improve the historically highly fragmented aid landscape in Somalia, and to consolidate and align investments with government-led priorities and systems, have had limited impact to date, however; there are limits to the feasibility of and appetite for donors to channel funds through the treasury, particularly among bilateral donors.\textsuperscript{58} While the proportion of development funding channelled through the treasury increased from 4\% in 2015 to nearly 15\% in 2017, by 2018 this had fallen to 10.5\%.\textsuperscript{59}
Concerns also remain with respect to government capacities to deliver programming with funds channelled through the treasury. This is clearly demonstrated in the development of a national social safety net, whereby the World Bank is providing financing but programme delivery is contracted to the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF, with the WFP responsible for delivery of cash transfers and UNICEF responsible for supporting government to build its own delivery and management systems.

FINANCING IN TRANSITION

Financing for durable solutions falls squarely within this incomplete transition from fragmented project-based aid towards programmatic and nationally aligned funding. A key defining feature of durable solutions funding and programming in Somalia is the dominance of the grant-funded multi-sectoral and multi-actor consortium model. This model provides a more streamlined and coordinated approach among consortia members but is nevertheless designed, funded, and managed largely outside government-led processes (see Figure 4). Durable solutions programmes have reportedly been developed with reference to and sign off from single ministries. The UN-led Saamaynta programme is a notable exception: it will be funded through the UN-administered Multi-Parter Trust Fund (MPTF) and therefore receive sign off from relevant ministries.

Financing for durable solutions remains largely rooted in a traditional grant funding model. The majority of funding is provided by a small sub-group of donors (the EUTF, UN Peacebuilding Fund, UK FCDO, and Danida). Funding for the first generation of durable solutions consortia came from the EUTF and the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The UN MIDNIMO programme is a case in point: it failed to attract funding from donors that are represented at country level, so instead sought funding from the global-level UN Peacebuilding Fund.

FIGURE 4. MAJOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS PROGRAMMES IN SOMALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Funding/Implementation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>MIDNIMO I (USD 4.5m; UNBF funded; joint IOM / UN-HABITAT implemented)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>MIDNIMO II (EUR 2.7m; UNPBF funded; UNDP-led consortium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>EU RE-INTEG (EUR 24.6m; EUTF funded; 4 NGO, 1 UN-led consortia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Danwadaag (GBP 20m; UK funded; IOM-led consortium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>DSP (DKK 100m; Danida funded; DRC-led consortium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Saameynta (SDC funded; Dutch government; UN-led consortium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One notable advance in funding for durable solutions is the introduction of a Durable Solutions Marker to the government Aid Flow Mapping tool, which both enables identification of investments contributing to durable solutions and links them to the strategic objectives of the NDP. Tracking of donor contributions indicates uneven funding levels over the last three years, with funding for migration, displacement, refugees, and durable solutions (under Pillar 8 of the NDP) recorded at USD 72 million in 2018 and USD 88 million in 2019 but falling to USD 33 million in 2020. Funding tagged against the Durable Solutions Marker indicates relatively large sums are being committed for projects and programmes that are reported as relevant to durable solutions, exceeding USD 700 million in 2019, for example. It is unclear, however, the extent to which these investments contribute to durable solutions or whether they are coherent. There is also a perception that there is little appetite from development donors to support durable solutions beyond consortia programmes and that development partner funding is likely already committed to ongoing programmes.

While it is now possible to identify financing contributions to durable solutions retrospectively against NDP pillars, there is not a prioritised and sequenced plan to guide investments in durable solutions. Despite the existence of a donor working group on durable solutions, funding decisions are reportedly determined on the basis of donor priorities. Overall, funding for durable solutions remains “fragmented and channelled through a multiplicity of contributions with a modality of investment that frequently engages one donor and one or a few implementing partners. These interventions are typically short term.”

Somalia has an established and well-functioning pooled funding architecture designed for the implementation of the NDP. Called the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), it includes an effective government and donor coordination platform. In principle, the SDRF could be called upon to target funding in support of durable solutions. In 2019, contributions to the SDRF grew to USD 225 million, reaching a record 32% of total development aid. Over time, however, contributions have become increasingly tightly earmarked, restricting the scope the funds have to strategically target funding against priorities. The MPF has funded very few durable solutions projects to date. A new fund for durable solutions has been mooted and is currently in discussion only. There may be scope, however, to use the existing funding architecture to target financing for agreed priorities that support durable solutions and to use the review and sign off process to ensure that durable solutions programmes align with the priorities established in the NDP.

The private sector is widely recognised as a key development actor in Somalia – creating employment, generating revenue, investing in infrastructure, and delivering key services, including health, education, water, and sanitation. The government has engaged in dialogues with private sector actors as part of its efforts to identify priority areas for reform to support economic growth. There are also efforts in resilience and development programmes to engage private sector actors. There is, however, no clear strategy to engage the private sector in the delivery of durable solutions, although it is widely acknowledged that private sector investment and services will be critical in scaling durable solutions. Despite this, efforts to engage with the private sector as a key partner in supporting the delivery of durable solutions have been limited overall. Moreover, in reality, markets are heavily deregulated and Somalia is a high-risk environment for investment. Therefore, efforts to use public sector funding and financing (including ODA grants, loans, and guarantees) to incentivise or reduce risks to private sector investment for durable solutions have received limited attention to date. They may also be premature without significant investment in the enabling environment.
DURABLE SOLUTIONS PROGRAMMING

Three programmatic areas support the achievement of durable solutions, through a range of approaches, models, and financing. These include: 1) area-based multi-sectoral programmes designed specifically to support the delivery of durable solutions; 2) efforts to build a national social safety net system; and 3) initiatives to provide housing solutions in urban settings.

AREA-BASED PROGRAMMING

Area-based programming approaches to durable solutions are perhaps the earliest concerted efforts to support durable solutions in Somalia. The first generation of these programmes was initiated in 2016, just as durable solutions were established at the national policy level as a key priority through the DSI. A small subset of donors – notably the EUTF, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the UK FCDO, and Danida – have been key to initiating and supporting the evolution of this “very new and innovative sector”.83

Building on experiences of earlier resilience-focused consortia, the durable solutions consortia in Somalia typically include multi-sectoral programming in defined geographical areas. They apply longer-term developmental approaches. They also intend to contribute to peacebuilding through activities building social cohesion between displaced and host communities. Given the frequency of shocks in Somalia, programmes often have responded to urgent new needs, including those of recently displaced people, alongside longer-term focused activities. In programmatic terms, durable solutions programmes simultaneously work across the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus.84

Each of the major durable solutions consortia and programmes have received multi-year funding. In some cases, this funding is flexible by design or in its management by donors. This allows adaptive management in response to new evidence and changing circumstances. Funding from some development donors (the EUTF and Danida) is reported to be less flexible than funding from others (the UK). The multi-year, outcome-focused approaches targeting wider displacement-affected communities represent a significant progression from short-term humanitarian projects providing relief assistance to IDPs and funding recipients consider this level of predictability and flexibility to be a substantial enabling factor for the delivery of responsive outcome-focused programming.85

Durable solutions programmes have made substantial investments in learning and lesson sharing.86 This has been facilitated by the relatively small group of donors and overlapping set of implementing organisations involved in delivery of the EU RE-INTEG, UK FCDO, and Danida-funded consortia, which has enabled an evolution in programming approaches. Experience and lessons from the EU RE-INTEG programme fed directly into the design of the UK-funded Danwadaag programme and the Danida-funded Durable Solutions Programme (DSP).87 MIDNIMO I (2017–2019) and II (2019–2021) also fed into the design of the Danwadaag and Saameynta programmes.
In addition to programmatic learning, a set of four key lessons pertinent to funding and particularly the scale up and effective targeting of investments in durable solutions has also emerged, as follows.

**Investing to deliver outcomes**

Durable solutions programmes have undergone a period of learning and improvement in their understanding of how to design, manage, and monitor the delivery of durable solutions. EU RE-INTEG programmes – Enhancing Integration of Displacement Affected Communities in Somalia (EIDACS), Jubaland Solutions Consortium (JSC), and Somaliland Durable Solutions Consortia (SDSC) demonstrated a clear aspiration to deliver durable solutions at outcome level in adopting the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) indicators from the ReDSS framework. These programmes did not, however, include theories of change, which limited ability to understand causal linkages between activities and longer-term outcomes. Reliance on community action plans for prioritisation of activities led to a broad scope of investments that may address community-level developmental concerns but may not have a clear contribution to durable solutions. Measuring progress against durable solutions indicators and objectives in a standardised way quickly emerged as a significant gap in these programmes, restricting insight and understanding about what works and what progress is being made. Ultimately, the final evaluations of these programmes struggled to demonstrate a clear causal linkage between the activities and progress in achieving durable solutions.

The Danwadaag and SDSC programmes have built on this experience. In particular, these programmes apply theories of change, with the Danwadaag programme also using a tool to measure key indicators of reintegration the Local (Re)Integration Assessment (LORA) index (see text box).

### The LORA index

The Local (Re)Integration Assessment (LORA) index was developed to support the Danwadaag programme with the stated purpose of providing contextualised analysis to focus programming and test innovative approaches to IDP integration.

The LORA index measures how IDPs and returnees perceive their local environment and prospects for building and maintaining safe and productive lives across 32 indicators designed to measure physical, material, and legal safety. The LORA also compares the situation of displaced people against that of the host population (rather than global standards) to help distinguish needs specifically related to displacement from the broader shared challenges of poverty, vulnerability, and insecurity. The LORA index also helps identify the specific challenges displaced people experience in relation to their integration.

In principle, this approach helps focus programming and investments on the specific factors that influence durable solutions. It also measures changes in perceptions of integration over time to enable continued learning, adaptation, and re-focusing programming.
Sustainability

Although multi-year funding is a significant advance on short-term humanitarian funding, evaluations of EU RE-INTEG funded durable solutions programmes raise serious questions about the sustainability of major areas of programming – notably health and education service provisions – in the absence of continued donor funding. In many areas, government institutions are seen as unable to take on responsibility for continuing services and facilities. While a new generation of durable solutions programmes have followed the EU RE-INTEG programmes, in most cases these were in different geographic areas and did not permit continuation of activities. Given the large-scale investment in some of these programmes (EUR 24.6 million under EU RE-INTEG), and serious questions about the sustainability of a range of programme investments, it is worth questioning whether the focus and duration of investments is appropriate, especially considering that achieving durable solutions is understood to require “the engagement of the international community, as well as the commitment of multiple national and local stakeholders – for decades”. Building on these lessons, the Danwadaag programme takes a more targeted approach to selecting activities that, based on their analysis, indicate they will make a direct contribution to integration rather than attempting to address broader poverty reduction challenges. Uniquely, SDC funding for the Saameynta programme has been agreed for a twelve-year period across three four-year cycles.

Area-based durable solutions programmes in Somalia have helped demonstrate proof of concept around how durable solutions could be achieved, and catalytic funding from a subset of donors has helped operationalise policy-level commitments to durable solutions.
Cost-efficiency

Consortium approaches are ultimately a relatively expensive model. While there are reportedly benefits from coordination and complementarity among actors within a consortium, this comes at a price. The evaluation of the EU RE-INTEG EIDACS programme, for example, raises questions as to whether the added costs of coordination are ultimately offset by the benefits of working in a consortium.

Prioritisation and sequencing of investments

Many important contributing factors to the achievement of durable solutions are outside the scope of influence, programming repertoire, experience, and lifespan of durable solutions programmes in Somalia. For example, a number of obstacles to achieving durable solutions are related to the persistent influence of clan-based power structures, which may pose major barriers for marginalised groups in achieving their basic needs and rights.

There are also a range of programming areas where improved programme design and links with government-led reforms, capacity strengthening, and development, and the private sector, are required to deliver durable solutions. Government ownership, capacity, and, in some cases, commitment are noted as key limiting factors, particularly in ensuring secure land tenure and implementing eviction guidelines. Durable solutions programmes have not adequately confronted and made provision for these challenges, however. Lessons documented from three EU RE-INTEG consortia note, for example: “Although the programmes engaged constructively with government stakeholders, there was no clearly articulated strategy around engagement and capacity development with different levels of government.” Consequently, the next generation of durable solutions programmes, notably the Danwadaag and Saameynta programmes, have included stronger emphasis on engagement and investments in capacity strengthening of government counterparts at FMS level.

Durable solutions programmes have faced additional difficulties in designing activities that can meaningfully contribute to improved employment and household incomes. For example, skills training and livelihoods activities have been designed and implemented with insufficient analysis of value chains above the level of local markets. These activities also lack analysis of the political economy of access to employment and the ability to operate businesses. This challenge is not restricted to the first generation of durable solutions programmes but is also noted as one that continues to impact the Danwadaag programme.

Area-based durable solutions programmes in Somalia have helped demonstrate proof of concept around how durable solutions could be achieved, and catalytic funding from a subset of donors has helped operationalise policy-level commitments to durable solutions. A commitment to learning and an organic flow of information about programming in a small overlapping set of donors and implementing organisations has enabled durable solutions programming to progress through multiple iterations, adaptations, and innovations. Sustained financial support across multi-programme cycles and commitments to invest in evidence have played an important role in enabling the relatively rapid evolution of durable solutions programmes in Somalia. Without greater coherence with national-level development priorities, policies, development programmes, and timeframes, however, the impact of durable solutions programmes and the return on investments will be limited.
SOCIAL PROTECTION

In contrast to area-based durable solutions programmes, the social protection agenda in Somalia aspires to deliver a unified national-level system. This approach is a priority with a broad base of support across government and the international donor community. It is also a condition for achieving HIPC debt relief. A national social protection system that provides predictable transfers to vulnerable households and is able to scale up to respond to shocks is a more equitable, cost-efficient, and sustainable model that would help gradually eliminate some of the unintended consequences of humanitarian cash programming; notably, opportunities for rent-seeking and incentives to migrate towards and remain in urban areas. A national social protection system could also help bolster state legitimacy and strengthen the social contract.

With technical support from international partners, the FGS published a national social protection policy in March 2019. The policy outlines a vision and ten-year plan to achieve a universal social protection system designed to “address predictable needs throughout the life cycle in order to protect all groups, and particularly the poor and vulnerable, against shocks, help them to manage risks, and provide them with opportunities to overcome poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion”. The government acknowledges this will require “long-term funding, objectives, time horizons, and programming”.

There are currently two major donor funded social protection programmes under development: the World Bank Baxnaano programme; and an EU-funded programme, which is part of the wider EU Inclusive Local and Economic Development (ILED) programme that is funded through the EUTF. Although these programmes were developed with reference to the national social protection policy, and synergies reportedly are discussed through donor and operational coordination forums, in practice, both programmes have been developed separately and differ in a number of respects, as follows.

- **Implementation model.** Government capacity to deliver social transfers is currently limited and therefore both programmes rely on international partners for implementation and capacity strengthening. The Baxnaano programme has contracted the WFP to deliver cash transfers and UNICEF to support the establishment of delivery systems, including a registry. The WFP sub-contracts to NGO implementing partners for delivery of cash transfers. The EU-funded programme is contracted to the NGO-led Somalia Cash Consortium, which then sub-contracts to four NGO consortium members for programme delivery. Both programmes include major components of system strengthening work with the FGS, with the EU programme extending this to FMSs.

- **Funding approach and duration.** The World Bank contracted funds are not channelled through the federal treasury; however, the treasury is responsible for oversight and authorisation of contracting and transfers between the World Bank and WFP and UNICEF. The Baxnaano programme is therefore aligned with government systems. In contrast, the EU-funded programme is not aligned with government financial systems. The Baxnaano programme is contracted to provide USD 60 million in cash transfers for an initial 12 months, although extension and further funding from the World Bank is anticipated (but not yet formally secured at this stage). The EU-funded programme runs...
for three years, with a total programme value of USD 32 million, after which the future outlook for funding is unclear.

- Targeting: The Baxnaano programme targets 200,000 poor rural households with children under five years old, who are at risk of entering IPC phase 4 (humanitarian emergency). It operates across 21 districts for one year. While the targeting rationale has a strong emphasis on poverty reduction, by focusing on rural areas, the Baxnaano programme is expected to have limited inclusion of IDPs. The EU approach to targeting differs from the World Bank income and vulnerability-based approach. The EU programme takes a more universal approach; for example, one pilot project targets all households with children under two years old. The EU targeting rationale is more consistent with a rights-based approach to social protection as a universal entitlement. The EU programme targets four geographic corridors, which include urban centres. IDPs are expected to be included in these locations.

The inclusion of IDPs is not, however, a priority in either the World Bank or EU programme. IDPs are reportedly a low priority issue in coordination discussions. The extent to which these social protection programmes are a viable durable solution for IDPs in the foreseeable future is also unclear at present. Moreover, it is likely that the next phase of expansion into urban areas will focus on targeting youth through cash-for-work. Nonetheless, future harmonisation and scale-up of these programmes provide critical opportunities to ensure that targeting is calibrated to capture the specific vulnerabilities of displaced people, and to negotiate a sustainable financing package.

The two large-scale World Bank and EU programmes currently proceed according to their own timelines and objectives, and are expected to generate evidence to inform future iterations and scale up of the nationally led system. There are also a range of smaller-scale experiments in predictable transfers underway. These include a WFP-led programme supporting the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) to register 1,000 households under the WFP Scope system and provide cash transfers through the BRA, and a two-year social transfers pilot through the UK FCDO funded BRCiS consortium, as well as an array of short-term cash transfer programmes, all of which operate according to their own targeting criteria, transfer amounts, and duration. All these programmes need to be reconciled and harmonised into a single national system. The creation of a national social registry is expected to play a key role in this harmonisation process.

Donors are currently constrained in their ability to provide long-term funding commitments to the national social protection system. The World Bank has funded the Baxnaano programme through its HIPC pre-arrears clearance fund but in order to scale up in 2020 to respond to the locust crises, the bank had to draw funds from another regional crisis window, which required development of a new programme and agreement. EU funds are drawn from the EUTF, which will end in 2021. Scale-up will rely on donor contributions. Completion of the HIPC process and access to IDA lending may provide access to significant additional funding and the federal government is expected to begin to make small budget allocations in support of the social protection system in the near future. At present, however, there is not yet a model or vehicle for channelling international funds in a harmonised manner, apart from making bilateral contributions to the World Bank Baxnaano programme.
The government has proposed a pooled fund to receive all financial contributions to support the national social protection system in future, which may be implemented by a variety of international partners. The design of a fund could provide an opportunity to address a range of harmonisation and accountability issues, including an approach to financing that aligns with national budgetary and treasury systems. Such a fund could also be based on an agreed approach to targeting that ensures the inclusion of marginalised groups such as IDPs and returnees.

**SUSTAINABLE HOUSING SOLUTIONS**

Securing access and rights to housing for IDPs is one of the most challenging aspects of advancing durable solutions in Somalia. In the absence of government regulation and enforcement capabilities, access to land and security of tenure are negotiated through informal networks. IDPs often lack social and political capital, formal documentation, and the financial means to navigate these informal, often clan-based systems. They are frequently settled on the basis of precarious agreements, often on private land, where IDPs pay some form of rent and are at high risk of forced eviction. The threat of forced eviction deters IDPs and aid organisations from investing. Cycles of forced evictions also tend to drive IDPs to increasingly segregated and marginal areas of cities, where access to services and livelihood opportunities are limited.

Durable solutions programmes have experimented with a wide range of models to support the shelter needs of IDPs, including provision of rental subsidies, temporary shelter kits, and numerous construction models, with some of these constructions co-financed by IDPs through access to credit from community savings and loans associations. Humanitarian and durable solutions actors have also advocated effectively with government authorities to establish guidelines for lawful evictions and provided practical support to IDPs participating in lawful eviction processes.

Addressing the housing needs of IDPs rests primarily on the ability to secure property rights, and not on the physical provision of shelter. Indeed, the ability to negotiate access to land with secure tenure has proved to be a major limiting factor for durable solutions consortia programmes and the need to include advocacy for land and tenure security from the earliest design stages of programmes has been an important lesson.

Moreover, even with advocacy and technical assistance, most land tenure problems in Somalia cannot be resolved at the level of a durable solutions programme. There are fundamental challenges around urban planning and development, the legal basis and enforcement of property rights, regulation of the private sector, and deeply rooted social, political, and economic patterns of exclusion. For example, land is highly lucrative and one of the safest investments in Somalia. Land and housing prices are consequently subject to rapid inflation and are out of reach for the urban poor. There are compelling reasons for influential actors to keep IDPs housed and classified separately. There are political disincentives to recognising IDPs as formal residents of cities as their presence alters clan and power balances. There are also financial incentives to attract and maintain external assistance to IDPs – for landowners whose property may become more valuable as infrastructure and services develop alongside IDPs, for gatekeepers who extract rent from IDPs, for host communities that benefit from improved services, and for aid agencies themselves.
Government authorities have limited influence and capacity, having only relatively recently come into existence alongside established informal systems and networks of governance that in reality are often responsible for dispute resolution, recognition of property titles and sales, and service provision. Most de facto authority continues to lie in the hands of non-state actors, including traditional clan elders, business leaders, militia leaders, civic groups, and religious authorities.

There is an emerging consensus that housing for IDPs should be considered within the framework of a more comprehensive spatial development strategy that does not target populations on the basis of displacement status. Such solutions are likely to be highly context specific and to advance at different speeds depending on local opportunities and enabling conditions. There may be pockets of opportunity, for example, at municipal levels, where key power holders are supportive of durable solutions approaches, as in the case of Baidoa (see text box).

**Housing solutions for IDPs in Baidoa**

In early 2018 in the wake of a series of mass forced evictions in Mogadishu, under the leadership of the mayor and with support from a range of international partners, Baidoa embarked on a process to find a more sustainable housing solution for IDPs in the city.

In April 2018, a joint assessment with the municipal authorities and international partners was conducted to identify a suitable area of land, which would be allocated by the government to help ensure that IDPs would not be subject to the threat of eviction from private landlords.

IOM and UN-HABITAT supported the process of demarcating and clearing the land, and setting up services, including solar panels, schools, police posts, and health facilities. In June 2019, 1,000 households were relocated to the new site, each of which received a 10m x 10m plot. NGOs provided IDPs with a variety of shelter solutions, including cash grants to construct their own shelters.

This initiative was made possible by leadership from local government and has been followed closely by other municipalities. Some challenges remain, however. The municipality is now seeking funding to relocate another 1,009 households to a new site, which has been cleared and demarcated. Funding from international donors has not been forthcoming to date. Tenure for relocated IDPs also remains unclear and title deeds have not been issued due to concerns about the risk of IDPs selling the land.

The logical sequencing and appropriate level of investment in resolving the housing needs of IDPs is the subject of active debate. This debate spans many foundational development issues in Somalia. It also involves political settlements between Somalis that include resolving historic claims to property and reaching agreements about the rights of people to access and reside in cities. There is currently no clear strategy to address these issues.

The recent World Bank urbanisation review assesses Somalia as “not yet at a point where conventional urban development policies and programs can be effective”.
because it “lacks the effective, empowered, and financed local institutions to provide the requisite governance framework and directly provide services”. The World Bank recommends a transitional strategy that involves working with hybrid governance systems and private service providers based on collectively agreed rules, norms, and accountability mechanisms.

Urban development in Somalia illustrates the depth and scope of the developmental challenges the country faces. The acute need for sensitivity to the political economy of urban environments, the varied capabilities and hybrid nature of institutions and political actors, the need for carefully sequenced attention to political, policy, capacity, and infrastructural investments, and the constant threat of shocks and displacement all point towards the necessity of a carefully coordinated approach that spans the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus.

A coalition of actors committed to understanding and addressing the organisational challenges in Somalia is emerging, bringing together the World Bank, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs. In October 2020, this group of actors convened and issued a “Collective roadmap towards a common agenda on urbanization, land and displacement in Somalia”. The roadmap identifies a sequenced set of short, medium, and long-term actions that are required to: advance legal and regulatory frameworks on land issues; support local and national institutions to deliver settlement plans, urban master plans, and service delivery responsibilities; and initiate a national reconciliation process addressing land conflict and citizenship rights. Durable solutions are an established priority theme in these discussions.

This type of convening does not fall within regular development or humanitarian coordination structures. Rather, it provides an indication of an alternative, more organic nexus approach that is based on a coalition of interested actors sharing common cause for finding solutions to a set of specific problems. While analytical work and reaching consensus on priority issues continues to advance, discussions about sustainable financing for both longer-term urban development ambitions and transitional housing solutions for displaced people are in relatively early stages. Nonetheless, there are committed investments for urban development. Notably, the Second Urban Resilience Project of the World Bank, worth USD 112 million, works directly with municipal and regional governments to strengthen public service delivery capacity and increase access to urban infrastructure and services.

Sustainable financing options, however, rely heavily on government (including federal government, member states, and municipalities) and private sector leadership and investment; notably, construction and service provision are already undertaken by the private sector. In the absence of an agreed strategy and leadership from government, discussions on financing are considered somewhat premature. Broad discussions about private sector engagement are also in very early stages.

At the same time, there are opportunities for government to use regulation and tax incentives to improve quality and accessibility of services to the poorest and most vulnerable. There are also opportunities to incentivise private sector investment with financing instruments, including access to finance and risk guarantees, and to leverage financing from future increases in land value generated by infrastructure investment.
In late 2019, for example, the Norwegian government agreed a USD 3.2 million programme with UN-HABITAT to establish a two-year programme in Somalia and Afghanistan to mobilise revenues from land and property taxation to generate funds for service provision and reconstruction. Due to start in 2021, the Saameynta programme also has a range of innovative activities to address the challenges of sustainable finance for durable solutions activities. Saameynta intends to attract private sector actors and investors to develop public works and social infrastructure identified in government-led durable solutions roadmaps. Saameynta also plans to establish community-level funds to support activities prioritised by displacement-affected communities and will endeavour to mobilise funding contributions to these community-level funds.

These innovative programmes illustrate the potential for using ODA-funded programming to mobilise alternative sources of financing. They also have the potential to provide sustainable financing for government-led durable solutions in urban settings in Somalia. They are currently in early stages of implementation, with key activities under Saameynta delayed as a result of COVID-19 movement restrictions.

Meanwhile, ad hoc experimentation and piecemeal investments in the provision of shelter for IDPs continue across an array of UN and NGO programmes. This risks further fuelling the status-based separation of IDPs, particularly where projects relocate IDPs to new and often peri-urban locations. It also risks continued rent-seeking, land speculation, and cycles of eviction. There are avid debates about the merits and relative costs of different shelter options and the implications of costs for the feasibility of scale-up, with different housing models that range from a few hundred dollars to USD 5,000 per household.

Given the very large numbers of IDPs in Somalia, however, these models are simply too expensive and reliant on international donor funding to provide housing solutions at scale. An interim or transitional strategy to target investments in more sustainable housing solutions for IDPs would help reduce the risks of costly short-term shelter investments, and enable investments to be prioritised and sequenced within a broader framework of ongoing work on secure tenure, infrastructure development, sustainable financing, and institutional capacity strengthening.
CONCLUSION

Somalia has made substantial progress in establishing the enabling conditions for pursuing durable solutions. Relatively modest but well targeted investments and technical support at the policy and coordination levels have delivered high returns, helping create an enabling policy environment and rapidly building awareness and support for the integration of durable solutions into the development agenda in Somalia.

Donors and international partners have also pushed forward durable solutions programming across several generations of area-based durable solutions programmes. These have included a commitment to evidence-based programming and learning that has demonstrably contributed to successive programme design and implementation improvements and refinements, as well as the creation of new tools and new levels of understanding around practical challenges.

The durable solutions agenda in Somalia is now at a crossroads. Having laid these critical foundations, the questions of scale-up and how to integrate durable solutions effectively into the wider development agenda in Somalia without losing focus on the specific vulnerabilities and needs of IDP populations now looms. Analysis and consensus around the structural barriers to durable solutions in context with broader development and political challenges in Somalia will be fundamental to this process. Linked to this, agreement on prioritisation and sequencing of necessary reforms, capacity strengthening, and investments will be key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources. Only when these foundations are in place can discussions shift to designing financing packages and instruments to support them.

LESSONS & AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION

- Strong and committed leadership on durable solutions from the UN, backed up with targeted financial and technical support from key donors, has delivered a high return on investment.
- Durable solutions should be considered a long-term undertaking that progresses at different rates within enabling pockets of demand and capacity at municipal, FMS, and federal levels. The durable solutions agenda therefore requires sustained political engagement, advocacy, investments in enabling conditions, programming, and financing at multiple levels. On the side of international actors, the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office has played an important convening role and has helped establish key tools, including the Durable Solutions Marker and monitoring framework. In future, this continuity of leadership and tools could play a key role in keeping the durable solutions agenda prioritised and on track.
## Coherent approaches
- The existing pooled funding architecture provides an opportunity to target funding for and in support of government-led durable solutions.
- The Durable Solutions Marker in the Aid Information Management System is a useful tool for promoting awareness and dialogue around durable solutions, and for tracking contributions against national development plans.
- The urbanisation agenda in Somalia is a good example of actors organically convening across the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus around a shared set of concerns and priorities, in which durable solutions are a prominent priority.

## Multi-level progress
- Catalytic funding to support both policy and programmatic work – through area-based programming – has been critical for creating an enabling policy environment and demonstrating proof of concept and programmatic learning in durable solutions programming.
- There are opportunities in the scale-up of the national social protection system to ensure that targeting is calibrated to include IDPs and to negotiate sustainable financing packages with donors. Inclusion of IDPs could be considered as a key condition of a long-term funding package, which could include the creation of a dedicated financing mechanism for donors to channel contributions in alignment with government systems.
- A transitional or interim strategy is required to focus and direct programming and financing for housing and shelter for IDPs to ensure programming is connected with a broader framework of ongoing work on secure tenure, infrastructure development, sustainable financing, and institutional capacity strengthening.

## Sequencing investments
- In the National Durable Solutions Strategy, there may be a case for clearly identifying specific activities that support further progress in durable solutions, but are unlikely to be addressed in the near term by development programming, and advocating for transitional funding to support these.
- These transitional activities might include: establishing baseline evidence on the numbers of IDPs and their specific needs and vulnerabilities; targeted evidence and analysis to inform programme design and targeting; additional costs associated with ensuring IDPs can access services and rights; support for the continued development of policy and legislation; and support for capacity strengthening of government actors, particularly at FMS and municipal levels, to lead and deliver durable solutions.

## Tactical investments in efficiency, learning, and accountability
- There is a fundamental gap in the evidence base necessary to define the parameters of durable solutions in Somalia. Without clarity around the numbers, locations, and profiles of IDPs, it is impossible to assess the overall scope and scale of the problem. It is equally difficult to prioritise and target resources effectively into programming. Without a baseline and monitoring of changes against this, it will also be impossible to measure progress in achieving durable solutions. A country-wide assessment and profiling of internal displacement would help inform more efficient targeting and sequencing of investments and provide greater clarity as to where the specific needs of IDPs fall across the remits and competencies of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors.
ENDNOTES

1 Interview transcripts have been rendered anonymous and are only referred to by randomly assigned interview numbers. This is done to guarantee the privacy, safety, and security of the interviewees.

2 UN Somalia (2019). Somalia – Displaced populations and urban poor no longer left behind. An options paper by the Special Advisor on Internal Displacement, Prof. Walter Kälín, with the support of the Durable Solutions Unit in the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC; see https://uncommissions.org/sites/default/files/un_somalia_dis_d_sop.pdf


7 World Bank (2020).

8 UN Somalia (2019).

9 UN Somalia (2019).

10 The SDC has supported the Durable Solutions Initiative since 2016 with key contributions, including support for five missions of the Special Advisor on IDPs to the DSRSG/RC/HC for Somalia, Walter Kälín, which led to the definition of 1) characteristics of durable solutions in the Somali context, 2) displacement, scope, and objectives of the DSI, and 3) key recommendations to the FGS and the international community (on normative, institutional, and programmatic levels). The SDC also supported the secondment of three staff to the Resident Coordinator’s Office and UN-HABITAT Somalia, a key contribution to coordination on durable solutions and the set up the framework for the DSI; see: https://www.edg.admin.ch/countries/somalia/de/home/internationale-zusammenarbeit/projekte.html/content/dezoprojects/3DC/en/2018/7F10155/phase1%20PagePath%20content/countries/somalia/de/home/internationale-zusammenarbeit/projekte.html

11 Interviews 3 and 7.

12 Interviews 4 and 15.

13 FGS (2019a). Terms of Reference (ToR) Durable Solutions Secretariat.

14 FGS (2019a).

15 Yernell (2019).


17 Interview 25.

18 Interview 25.

19 Humanitarian aid and cash assistance in particular is noted as problematic. Based on consultations for the NDP 9, the FGS notes, for example: “Evidence from consultations suggests that, once moved to IDP camps, a displaced household is likely to be trapped in perpetuity poverty – the humanitarian support received often in the form of protracted cash transfers and food assistance, crowds out any incentive for a household to return to their original livelihood even if the conditions that caused the displacement no longer exist.” FGS (2019b).

20 UN Somalia (2019).

21 The FGS (2019b) explicitly acknowledges that, “Somalia’s institutional environment remains at an early stage of development and currently lacks the capacities needed to carry forward an ambitious and wide-ranging development agenda.”

22 World Bank (2020).

23 Interview 25.

24 Interviews 4, 10, 23, and 24.


26 FGS (2019b).

27 FGS (2019b).

28 Interview 23. Also see: FGS (2019b).

29 Interviews 10 and 23. The REF also notes “The international community advocates for a dual approach that incorporates both local integration and return depending on the preferences of IDPs. In contrast, district administrations interviewed by this research revealed a strong preference for IDPs to return rather than locally integrate in cities.” REF (2018). Return and (Re)Integration after Displacement. Belonging, Labelling and Livelihoods in Three Somali Cities; see: https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file131104.pdf

30 The Banaano programme also forms part of an integrated rural development approach, which will extend health and education services to rural areas (Interview 26).

31 Interview 26.

32 Interview 15.

33 ReDSS collection of lessons learned from EU RE-INTEG programmes notes, for example: “Several respondents highlighted that the focus of their programmes was primarily upon the local integration of IDPs into urban areas. In doing so, they highlighted the need for durable solutions programming to consider rural–urban linkages and complementarity with resilience programming implemented in rural areas. An important caveat to this is the security situation: several respondents highlighted that their ability to work in some rural areas was inhibited by insecurity.” ReDSS (2019). Lessons Learned from the EU RE-INTEG durable solutions consortiums [2017–2020]; see: https://regionaldss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ReDSS_Re_integ_LL_EFA-002.pdf

34 Interviews 13, 15, 16, and 23 corroborate this.

35 Interview 3.

36 de Clercq and Valbuena (2020).

37 Interview 3.

38 de Clercq and Valbuena (2020).

39 FGS (2019b).

40 FGS (2019b).


42 FGS (2019b).

43 FGS (2019b).

44 FGS (2019b).

45 Development Initiatives (2020).

46 Interviews 5 and 6.

47 Development Initiatives (2020).

48 FGS (2019b).

49 Aid fragmentation is widely noted as problematic in Somalia; e.g. FGS (2019b); de Pulford et al. (2019). Multi Partner Fund for Somalia Mid Term Review. Final Report; see: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/638261691387785804/SMG-MFF-Mid-Term-Review-September-2019.pdf

50 Somalia faces constraints in their access to development finance as a legacy of defaults on historic debts to multilateral development banks, which has rendered them ineligible for concessional lending through the IFIs.


52 Development Initiatives (2020).

53 In order to reach the HIPC decision point, which was reached in March 2020, “Somalia has (i) adopted its Ninth National Development Plan 2020–2024 (in September 2019), as its Poverty Reduction Strategy; (ii) established a satisfactory track record under IMF and IDA supported programmes; (iii) cleared its arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB), and agreed an approach to clear its arrears with the IMF; and (iv) agreed a set of appropriate Completion Point triggers with IDA and IMF staffs that promote stronger public financial management, improved governance, enhanced delivery of social programs, private sector-led growth and resilience.” IMF (2020). Somalia. Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative-Decision Point Document. Country Report No. 20/86; see: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/03/26/Somalia-Enhanced-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-HIPC-Decision-Point.pdf
86  Interviews 2, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 21.
87  The three EU RE-INTEG programmes (EIDACS, JSC and SDSS), for example, made a strong commitment to learning in their design process by including ReDSS as a learning partner and adopting a common learning outcome. See: JSC (2020a). Durable Solutions and Reintegration Support to Displacement Affected Communities in Jubaland State of Somalia — End Line Survey Report.
88  JSC (2020a); ReDSS (2019). Interviews 7, 20, and 21 corroborate this.
89  See: ReDSS (2019) and Consilient / Concern Worldwide (2020). The JSC (2020a) evaluation also notes, for example, “Based on the lessons learnt from the programme, future EU durable solutions programmes should ensure they develop a clear theory of change, which outlines a causal pathway for advancing (re)integration and addresses vulnerability across the targeted displacement-affected communities, from the inception and design phase of the programme.”
90  Interviews 20 and 21.
91  Interview 14.
92  The endline evaluation of the EU RE-INTEG JSC indicates, for example, that: “During programme implementation, it was noted that some key governments institutions did not have capacity to support programmes in order to improve quality and ensure that objectives of the programme are met. Of particular concern was the government capacity to supervise both new and existing schools as well as the capacity to supervise vocational training to ensure that the standards are of acceptable levels.” JSC (2020a).
93  There is reportedly some continuity across the EIDACS and Danwadaag programmes in specific geographical areas, which means that partners funded under EIDACS and Danwadaag may have scope to continue activities. See: Consilient / Concern Worldwide (2020). Interview 11 corroborates this.
94  Interviews 14, 20, and 21.
95  UN Somalia (2019). Interviews 5, 13, and 14 corroborate this.
96  Interview 20.
97  Interview 15.
98  ReDSS notes, for example: “Adequate investment is required in consortium management structures to ensure harmonization of approaches across agencies, maximization of synergies and impacts across sectors, cross learning, and robust monitoring and evaluation of programmes.” ReDSS (2019).
99  “...intra-consortium coordination may have not been conducted most efficiently, suggesting that the consortium may have incurred organizational, coordination, and other costs that were not fully offset by the primary benefits – comparative advantage within different sectoral areas – commonly touted in favour of consortia.” Consilient / Concern Worldwide (2020).
100  The JSC (2020a) evaluation notes: “Under-achievement in some of the outcome indicator targets may point to a more complex situation that requires a holistic, long term approach and combination of strategies from multiple actors than a medium-term project can possibly achieve.”
101  The evaluation of the EIDACS consortium notes, for example: “The existing customary justice structures and the local power dynamics, based on clan systems, are likely to continue to deny specific groups of population certain rights. These power structures affect displaced people’s ability to realize their most basic human needs – such shelter, as displaced populations often belong to a marginalized clan or community groups because of their displacement status.” Consilient / Concern (2020).
102  The EIDACS consortium observes, for example: “The sustainability evaluation report considers the sustainability of HLP progress – including eviction monitoring and prevention, land tenure security, and community structure empowerment – as extremely tenuous.” According to the report, local and regional governments “have not institutionalized eviction prevention in their strategic plans, and this is undermining efforts to protect displaced communities from eviction.” Consilient / Concern Worldwide (2020).
103  The evaluation of the JSC notes, “During programme implementation, it was noted that some key government institutions did not have capacity to support programmes in order to improve quality and ensure that objectives of the programme are met.” JSC (2020a).
104  ReDSS (2019).
The evaluation of the EIDACS programme notes: “Upskilling beneficiaries for employment presupposes the existence of a functioning private sector in want of skilled youth—which is not necessarily the case. And, even in Somalia’s most vibrant economic hubs, using skills training to secure gainful employment is extremely rare and bound up in clan and family loyalties—a highly relevant consideration for a population of economically marginalized groups. Given this reality, while the objective in question remains relevant and valid, the activities are unlikely to be consistent with the intended impact. In fact, quantitative data analysis did not reveal a statistically significant and meaningful change in the employment of household members and the results remain inconclusive.” Consistent / Concern Worldwide (2020).

The evaluation of the JSC (2020a) notes, “While some labour market assessments have traditionally been done before implementing skills training, there is a need to further understand market systems before scaling up such interventions. A more detailed market assessment will be required to ensure that TVET [technical and vocational education and training] is linked to the wider markets and value chains rather than just the ability of the market to absorb graduates after the training.”

Interview 20. The UK FCDO also notes: “While both BRCiS and Danwadaag have made progress implementing a range of household and community-level livelihood activities, both consortia have struggled to articulate more comprehensive strategies for livelihood development and self-reliance at an area/regional level. The same can be said of market systems and value chain activities for both BRCiS and Danwadaag, where the current combination of partners may not be appropriate for delivering this, given the mandate and strengths of these agencies being primarily humanitarian focused.” UK FCDO (2020).

SHARP Annual Review 2020, see: https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-256128/documents

Interviews 4, 8, 14, and 19.

Interview 7, 19, and 24.

FGS (2019c).

Interviews 9, 10, and 22.

Interviews 2, 9, 19, and 22.

Interviews 7, 9, and 22.

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).

Aubrey and Bryld (2019). The challenge of finding money to build shelter in Mogadishu’s informal settlements; see: https://www.iec.org/challenge-finding-money-build-shelter-mogadishu-informal-settlements

Bonnet et al. (2020).

Aubrey and Cardoso note, for example: “The dense occupation and thus urbanization of land, compounded by foreign aid (including from diaspora and international organizations) and private sector investment in basic infrastructure for IDPs, has the effect of increasing land value, often several times over its value, prior to being occupied. In some instances, as land value has increased, informal landowners have sold the land and evicted populations living there.” Aubrey and Cardoso (2019). Towards Sustainable Urban Development in Somalia and IDP Durable Solutions at Scale: https://somalia.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/Geology%20of%20somaliland%20%20Towards%20Sustainable%20Urban%20Development%20in%20Somalia%20and%20IDP%20Durable%20Solutions%20at%20Scale.pdf

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).

UN Somalia (2019). Interview 22 corroborates this.

Interviews 7, 9, and 22.

UN Somalia (2019). Interview 22 corroborates this.

UN Somalia (2019). Interview 22 corroborates this.

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).

World Bank (2020).


Interviews 1 and 22.

Interview 22.

Interviews 2, 9, 19, and 22.

Aubrey and Cardoso (2019). Interview 4 corroborates this.


FGS / UN Somalia (2020).

Interviews 9, 10, and 22.

Interview 22.

Interviews 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 22.

Interview 5.

Interviews 5 and 9.
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The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) is a coordination and information hub that acts to catalyse forward thinking and policy development on durable solutions for displacement. ReDSS seeks to improve joint learning and programming, inform policy processes, enhance capacity development, and facilitate coordination in the collective search for durable solutions. It is comprised of 14 organisations working together to maintain focused momentum and stakeholder engagement towards durable solutions for displacement-affected communities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.