Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon*

Wave VI

ARK Group DMCC
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Executive Summary

Research in the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* project is intended to provide a detailed understanding of changes in social stability outcomes, and where possible, to attribute these changes to evolving or proximate conflict causes. This document provides a summary from the sixth wave of surveying in this project.

This analysis focuses on seven key themes: (1) the level of satisfaction with public services, with a emphasis on environmental services; (2) the role of media in politics; (3) expectations of refugee return to Syria; (4) trust in institutions and authorities; (5) the quality of inter-Lebanese relations, including tension factors; (6) the quality of Lebanese-Syrian relations, including tension factors; and (7) attitudes on the acceptable use of violence.

The survey was conducted with a multi-stage stratified cluster design, and surveying for Wave VI took place over the period 17 June – 13 July 2019. The survey included 4,950 completed surveys, of which 540 (10.9%) were conducted with primary respondents in Syrian-headed households. Over the course of the survey project, a total of 29,715 interviews have been conducted since May 2017.

Results

The public expressed significant concerns regarding the level and quality of public services, and in particular, the services regarded as most in need of improvement included medical care, electricity and access to jobs. This ranking of priorities was consistent with previous waves of the survey. While some level of ‘refugee population pressure’ on services was observed, the Lebanese level of satisfaction with all public services was not necessarily strongly determined by perceptions of host-community and refugee competition, relating also to other factors, like historically differing levels of service provision by the government over different geographies. Of the services that were the most likely to be associated with perceptions of competition, access to jobs, education, and medical care were amongst the most-cited, though stronger perceptions of competition were regionally-concentrated in some areas, for example, in Baalbek-Hermel (education) and in more-urban centres (medical care).

The level of satisfaction with environmental services, specifically, has steadily declined over previous waves of surveying, with only 18.6% of the public rating the quality of such services as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in the most recent survey.
Decreased spending in the domain of environmental services—tied to recent governmental budget cuts—has the potential to impact the quality of these services in the future.

Asked about media concerning Syrian refugees in Lebanon, approximately two-thirds of Lebanese were able to recall at least one piece of social media content related to refugee relations. This was most likely to have been on Facebook. The recall of social media content was related to the self-report of interest in politics, with those saying they were more interested in politics (most especially, men) also more likely to recall such social media content.

Related to the third theme of ‘expectations of return’, respondents were asked both about how long they expected refugees to remain in Lebanon, and more generally regarding the future, they were asked, ‘Do you think that five years from now, Lebanon will be a better or worse place to live?’ On average, across the country, the Lebanese outlook on the future has gradually worsened. An increasing fraction of both Lebanese and Syrians do see the potential for a durable solution to the refugee crisis, through the return of refugees to Syria, in the foreseeable future; however, there has been no indication any significant rate of return to date. Amongst Lebanese, those who did not anticipate a further stay of ‘five years or more’ were also more likely to profess optimism about Lebanon’s future, indicating that they thought Lebanon would be a ‘better’ or ‘much better’ place to live in five year’s time. That is, for many, the expectation of return and their outlook on the future were interlinked, most likely, as it was seen that the return of refugees might alleviate significant stress on Lebanon, thereby improving future prospects.

Trust in all institutions queried in this survey project have not fluctuated greatly over time; however, average levels of trust across institutions, and especially national-level governance institutions like the Cabinet, have steadily declined over recent waves of surveying, after peaking concurrent with parliamentary elections held in 2018. With respect to perceptions of the institutional response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanese perceptions of the capability and fairness of assistance has remained one of the strongest predictors of the public’s evaluation of many national institutions. For example, Lebanese who more strongly agreed that Lebanese had ‘been neglected’ in the provision of assistance were approximately two-to-four times more likely to provide negative assessments of the capability of the Cabinet, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and United Nations (UN) agencies.
Asked about intra-Lebanese relations, a plurality of Lebanese (42.1%) described these relations only as ‘neutral’, which indicated a minor deterioration in the public’s perception of these relations; whereas in previous in waves, Lebanese had been more likely to describe these relations as ‘positive’. This minor deterioration in the quality of Lebanese relations was somewhat more pronounced in the areas of Baalbek-Hermel, the South, and Mount Lebanon. Where the perceptions of intra-Lebanese relations were worse, Lebanese were most likely to attribute this to ‘political and sectarian conflict’, though after controlling for other factors, no one confessional group was greatly more or less likely to rank the quality of intra-Lebanese relations as ‘negative’. Following ‘political and sectarian conflict’, the most-cited tension factors in intra-Lebanese relations, as of the Wave VI survey, included class and economic concerns.

Regarding the quality of relations and most-cited tension factors in Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugee relations, ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’ remained the most-cited tension factor in the Wave VI survey. However, over the last three waves of surveying, the resonance of this tension factor, amongst both Lebanese and Syrians, has declined somewhat. Possibly contributing to this moderating trend—over time, sector employment between Lebanese and Syrians has become increasingly differentiated, with Syrian employment most heavily concentrated in the sectors of construction, agriculture, and manufacturing; these were sectors where Lebanese were less likely to be employed or seek employment.

The last of the seven themes explored in this analysis related to attitudes on the acceptable use of violence. The rate of exposure of armed violence remained unchanged, nationally, from levels observed in the Wave V survey (Figure 10). In the Wave VI survey, 13.4% ‘personally witnessed armed violence, for example, with a knife, gun or explosives’, compared to 13.1% in the Wave V survey.

The fraction agreeing with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’ declined from rates observed previously, a majority of Lebanese (56.2%) still agreed with this statement, highlighting how violence might be regarded as acceptable in some situations and contexts. Over the course of the six waves, the level of agreement with this statement rose steadily, to peak in late-2018 in Waves III and IV, before returning to approximately baseline levels over the two most-recent waves of surveying in 2019. Of those more likely to concede that violence might sometimes be appropriate, inter-personal violence was more likely to be viewed as sometimes acceptable as a means of last resort in the enforcement of some social norms.
Implications

The Lebanese Parliament passed a new state budget on 19 July 2019, which included public spending cuts and tax raises. Most Lebanese feel uncertain about the future and lack confidence in the government’s ability to effectively respond to challenges like the refugee crisis. Given the lack of confidence in many national-level governance institutions, and rising concerns about the state of the economy, many may also lack confidence in the government’s capability to implement the new budget without severe and potentially hard-hitting cutbacks in public service provision. Lebanese are, already, dissatisfied with the level, quality, and availability of most public services, and any further deterioration in these has the potential to exacerbate pre-existing tensions, both in intra-Lebanese and in Lebanese-Syrian relations.

Nevertheless, most changes in the tension and resilience landscape in Lebanon, as documented in this analysis, have been both modest in scope and consistent with trends identified previously in the survey project. Both intra-Lebanese relations and relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees remain fragile, and economic concern’s remain amongst the most-pervasive tension factors in inter-group relations. A key component of the ‘resiliency landscape’ will relate to the ways in which communities respond to (potential) new economic stressors, when or if new budget cuts come into effect.

The majority of Lebanese do see potentially destabilising effects in the refugee presence. Most, for example, agree that refugee population pressure on public services fosters competition, and even though there is very little evidence to support this contention empirically, most Lebanese, nevertheless, also believe that the refugee presence contributes to higher rates of crime and violence. Coupled with concerns about the state of the economy and the direction Lebanon is headed, the prevailing public opinion holds that vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in development and assistance programming. If economic anxiety continues to mount, or if there is further deterioration in public services, then there exists a very real risk that discrimination or other negative forms of collective action, like the imposition of harsher curfews or restrictions on the refugees’ freedom of movement, may increase.
Introduction

This narrative provides a summary of findings from the sixth wave (Wave VI) of the Regular Perceptions Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon survey project. Surveying for this wave took place over the period 17 June – 13 July 2019, approximately four months following the conduct of the previous Wave V survey. The distribution of the sample is provided in an appendix (Table 1).

The primary objective of the survey project is to obtain a better understanding of the tension and resilience in landscape in Lebanon, considering both relations between different Lebanese groups and relations between Lebanese host communities and the more than approximately 1.2 million Syrian refugees in the country. Regular surveying is intended to provide a detailed understanding of changes in social stability outcomes, and where possible, to attribute these changes to evolving or proximate conflict causes.

This research is situated within the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), and in the Social Stability Sector for the response, specifically. However, results are intended to provide a range of readers with relevant data to inform policy, project and programme design, and to assist in ongoing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) efforts across sectors. Intended users of this research thus include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Lebanon, Lebanese ministries including the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), and partners in the response, both nationally and regionally.

This summary of Wave VI findings focuses on seven key themes: (1) the level of satisfaction with public services, with a emphasis on environmental services, (2) the role of media in politics, (3) expectations of refugee return to Syria, (4) trust in institutions and authorities, (5) the quality of inter-Lebanese relations, including tension factors, (6) the quality of Lebanese-Syrian relations, including tension factors, and (7) attitudes on the acceptable use of violence. Figure 1 seek to situate these seven themes within the Stabilisation and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (SMF). The seven themes cover a range of conflict causes, classified as structural, evolving or proximate causes of conflict, though of course, each outcome might also be considered over multiple levels. The remainder of the report has been organised to reflect the hierarchy depicted in Figure 1, where the seven themes are discussed ‘bottom-to-top’, beginning with a discussion of the level of satisfaction with public services.

In addition to the results and discussion provided in this narrative report, data from this wave of surveying, along with data from previous waves, may
be accessed through the ARK-UNDP web portal associated with the project. A number of annexed ‘fact sheets’ also accompany this narrative, which provided a summary of key indicators at the district \((qada)\) level.\(^1\) These fact sheets are available on the operational portal for the Social Stability Working Group.

**Figure 1: Themes in reporting, with linkages to the SMF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy of Causes of Conflict in SMF</th>
<th>Themes and Indicators in Wave VI Reporting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Tension and resilience landscape</td>
<td>• Attitudes on acceptable use of violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Trust in institutions and local community</td>
<td>• Quality of Lebanese-Syrian relations, tension factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee population pressure</td>
<td>• Quality of intra-Lebanese relations, tension factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Basic needs and livelihoods</td>
<td>• Trust in institutions and authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capability and fairness in assistance</td>
<td>• Expectations of return</td>
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**Survey Method**

**Description of the Sample**

- The Wave VI survey included 4,950 completed surveys, of which 540 (10.9\%) were conducted with primary respondents in Syrian-headed households. Over the course of the survey project, a total of 29,715 interviews have been conducted to date.
- The survey was conducted with a multistage stratified cluster design, and weighted estimates were representative of the total adult population resident in Lebanon, including both Lebanese and Syrians.

A brief summary of the sampling protocol is provided here, and more information on the survey design may be found in the Inception Report for the survey project.\(^2\) A timeline of interviews conducted by wave is provided in Figure 2.\(^3\) Broadly, given the timeline of surveying to date, the analysis in this report considers trends over the period May 2017 – July 2019, where each individual wave captures a ‘snapshot’ of public opinion at the time at which the survey was conducted. While outcomes have not been measured continuously, the relatively short period between each wave allows for a clear picture of the rate and nature of change in key outcomes over this period spanning more than two years.


\(^3\)The first four waves of the survey were conducted at approximately 3-4 month intervals. Waves V-X have been scheduled to take place at approximately 4 month intervals, from 2019-2020. Throughout this report, surveys have been referred to by their wave number. Periodically, references to the month or month/year of the survey are also provided, where this may help illustrate the rate of change in an outcome over time.
Survey Protocol

A complex sample design was required to optimise the efficiency of the sample across the two dimensions of (a) district geographies and (b) vulnerability-level geographies, while at the same time (c) minimising the margin of error for total-sample statistics. The survey was implemented with a multistage stratified cluster design. In the first stage of selection, the sample was stratified across districts, with a formula including a vulnerability weight. Approximately 40% of the sample was allocated on the basis of this vulnerability weight, and the remaining 60% of the sample was allocated across districts proportional to population size. In other words, interviews were allocated on the basis of population size, but this allocation was then adjusted to over-sample more vulnerable areas. Thus, all districts were included in the sample, but relatively fewer interviews were allocated to districts like Jbeil, Kesrouan, Bcharre and Batroun, which had fewer vulnerable Lebanese and fewer Syrian refugees per capita.

In the second stage of selection, cadasters within district strata were sampled probability proportionate to population size (PPS) with replacement, and no additional steps were taken to oversample more vulnerable cadasters. A post-stratification weight for district size was required for the estimate of total-sample statistics and estimates across vulnerability-levels. As the second stage sample was taken with PPS methods, no sampling weight was required for within-district estimates.

In the third stage of selection, for the allocation of clusters, a number of random GPS coordinates were generated equal to the number of clusters allocated to each cadaster, and this coordinate indicated the starting point for household selection. Enumerators began with the residential building closest to the random Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinate and conducted an interview with a random adult in this building. Using a random number table, the enumerators then walked in a random direction, skipping a random number of homes, and then conducted the next interview in the next home. This proceeded until six interviews per cluster were completed. In the event of refusal, households were substituted within clusters, but individuals were not substituted within households.

Regarding the selection of primary respondents, in the fourth and final stage of selection, enumerators alternated between selecting the adult male and female

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householder who had celebrated his or her birthday most recently. Up to three attempts were made to contact the selected respondent if the respondent was not at home at the time of the visit. If after three attempts the respondent could not be contacted, the household was substituted within the cluster.

Level of Satisfaction with Public Services

<table>
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<th>Key Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The public services regarded as most in need of improvement were medical care, electricity and access to job (in order of importance).</td>
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<td>• After ‘access to job’, the two services most likely to be associated with perceptions of competition were education and medical care, though these perceptions of competition were regionally-concentrated in Baalbek-Hermel (education) and in more-urban centres (medical care).</td>
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<td>• Relative to their Lebanese counterparts, Syrian refugees were far more likely to regard ‘shelter and housing’ services as amongst the most important.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Average public satisfaction with the quality of environmental services has declined, nationally, over the previous eighteen months, with the lowest levels of satisfaction observed in the governorates of the Beqaa and Mount Lebanon.</td>
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Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of the public services: electricity, water, sewage, waste removal, education, health services, social services, public and recreational space, and environmental services. Respondents were then asked to list the three services most in need of improvement. In Wave V and Wave VI, respondents were also asked, ‘And of these services, would you say that competition over one or more leads to greater tensions in your area between Lebanese and Syrians?’, and then, ‘Competition over which one would you say is most likely to causes tensions?’

The level of satisfaction with each queried services, by wave, is given in Figure 3. More so than other outcomes assessed in this survey, the average level of satisfaction with all services has been less prone to variation over time, with only incremental change observed in average levels of satisfaction with some services.

By far, educational services have been the services with which the public has been most satisfied, with most rating the quality of these services as fair or better.
Figure 3: Satisfaction with public services

Response to prompt, ‘How would you rate the quality of the following services in the area where you live?’, nationally, Waves II-VI.*

*Not all public services queried in Wave I.

The one notable exception has been in the governorate of Baalbek-Hermel, where in the Wave VI survey, 47.3% rated the quality of educational services as ‘poor’ or worse. While this represented an improvement over the 58.8% who said the same in the previous Wave V survey, this rate of dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of education services remained well above the national average of 19.0% rating this service as ‘poor’ or worse. While not all Lebanese complaints
with the quality or availability of public services can or should be attributed to refugee population pressure, the practice of split days in school, with separate sessions for Lebanese and Syrian children (where this practice is more common in areas with a higher concentration of refugees) likely contributed to the more negative perceptions of the quality of public education in this region.\(^5\) Providing further evidence of this association, when asked if competition over one or more of the services queried (including education) led to greater tensions in the area, 66.3% of Baalbek-Hermel residents agreed that they did, compared to 46.8% nationally.

How the public ranks the prioritisation of different public services also provides some indication of what shortcomings in service provision (or related policy) are most likely to contribute to popular grievances in this domain. Respondents were asked to list the three services ‘most in need of improvement’. To analyse this data, weighted counts for each named priority were used. The first priority received a weight of 0.5, the second a weight of 0.3, and the third a weight of 0.2. Weighted counts were used to retain preference rankings in the results; however, in practice, the specific weights applied to each level did little to affect the ranking of items. With any reasonable combination of weights, the same three items emerged as being regarded as most in need of improvement: medical care, electricity, and access to jobs (in order of importance).

With respect to competition over which services were regarded as most likely to contribute to tensions, the most-cited option, by far, was ‘competition over jobs’. While job creation is not conventionally considered a public service or public good, Lebanese and Syrians alike saw the responsibility for job creation as sitting with the government, and to a lesser extent, with other actors involved in the response. And indeed, job creation has figured prominently in the programmatic response to the Syrian refugee crisis and may reasonably be considered to sit within the configuration of service provision.

Including both Lebanese and Syrians, 54.3% named ‘access to jobs’ as the ‘service’ most likely to cause tensions. Between the two nationalities, Lebanese were approximately 4.5 percentage points more likely to name this factor. Relative to their Lebanese counterparts, Syrians were instead more likely to name competition in ‘shelter and housing’ as the service most likely to contribute to tensions, with 27.0% of Syrians naming this factor, compared to 10.5% of Lebanese. After ‘access to job’, the next most-cited factor amongst Lebanese was competition in access to

‘medical care’, with 12.4% of Lebanese naming this factor, compared to only 2.5% of Syrians naming this factor.

**Environmental Services**

In a recent interview with *Al Monitor*, UN resident coordinator Philippe Lazzarini highlighted the potential linkages between the government’s recently approved budget and the threat to environmental services, remarking on the suspension of a Ministry of Environment air pollution monitoring system:

> ... it is a result of the ministry’s inability to renew the maintenance and operation contract to upkeep these stations due to austerity and financial challenges. Securing the needed financing for the maintenance and operation of these stations is essential for the continuation of data production and monitoring to address air pollution. … Discussions in setting the annual budget to reduce the fiscal deficit should take into account the impact of the work of the government on people’s well-being.\(^6\)

Decreased spending in the domain of environmental services has the potential to impact the quality of these services in the future. This analysis sought to determine to what extent the public had seen, if at all, any degradation in the quality of environmental services, as a result of this governmental decision on spending, or as a result of other factors.

After rising somewhat over Waves III and IV, average public satisfaction with the quality of environmental services has declined, nationally over the previous eighteen months, beginning with only 26.7% stating that the quality of these services was ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in Wave IV, declining to 20.1% in Wave V, and then to 18.6% in Wave VI. A plurality of respondents over all governorates, over all waves, have consistently rated the quality of environmental services only as ‘fair’. The lowest levels of satisfaction with the quality of environmental services have been in the governorates of the Beqaa and Mount Lebanon, where 37.7% and 38.2% of the public, respectively, rated the quality of these services as ‘poor’, ‘very poor’, or reported that they had ‘no access’ to such services in the Wave VI survey.

In addition to there likely being objective differences in the quality of environmental services in different areas of the country, individual ratings of the quality

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of such services also likely reflected the extent to which persons prioritised the importance of such services. While all persons benefit from a cleaner environment, not all persons may see the improvement of environmental services as amongst the most urgent priorities in service provision. This may be especially true in areas of the country and within specific subpopulations where the demand for more basic essential goods and services, like food, water, shelter and electricity, may prevail. In line with this, the average rating of environmental services tended to be more negative in less vulnerable population. Lebanese evinced lesser satisfaction with these services than did their Syrian counterparts. Satisfaction was significantly lesser in ‘non-vulnerable’ cadastres relative to the 251 cadastres designated as amongst the ‘most vulnerable localities’. All else being equal, younger persons in the age ranges 18-24 and 25-34 were also less satisfied with the quality of environmental services, as were those with higher levels of education.

Role of Media in Politics

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<th>Key Findings</th>
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<td>• Approximately two-thirds of Lebanese were able to recall at least one piece of social media content related to refugee relations. This was most likely to have been on Facebook.</td>
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<td>• Those with a greater interest in politics, particularly men, were more likely to recall media related to refugee relations.</td>
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Reach and Recall of Social Media Content

Respondents were asked, ‘Thinking about where you might have heard about, read about or discussed refugee relations in Lebanon in the last three months, on what social media or messaging applications have you seen conversations like this?’ Media and messaging applications queried included Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, SMS, comments on a webpage, Viber, Skype, and LinkedIn.

Of all sources of media queried in Wave VI, only 32.9% said they did not recall any content related to Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Of the remaining approximately two-thirds who recalled related content, 42.2% named one source, 18.7% named two sources, and 6.2% named three or four sources. This represented approximately a six percentage point increase over rates of reach and recall
observed in the Wave V survey. The greatest increase in these rates was in the governorates of Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel. The increase in reach and recall was also somewhat greater in the youngest age category of 18-24 years of age. While recall of social media content, on average, declined with age, this did not drop off ‘sharply’ before the threshold of about 65 years of age. Amongst the oldest category of Lebanese, only 23.2% recalled any social media content related to refugees; however, up until the age of about 50, a majority of Lebanese below this age threshold were likely to state that they had seen or read about at least one piece of content related to Syrian refugees in Lebanon. These trends in the recall of content related to Syrian refugees, specifically, were consistent with age and other demographic trends in social media usage in Lebanon, more generally.

Regarding specific platforms, Facebook was by far the platform where Lebanese were most likely to have encountered content related to refugee relations in Lebanon, with 59.1% citing this platform in Wave VI, followed by WhatsApp, with 24.6% citing this platform. Usage of specific platforms did not vary greatly by geography, with the exception of markedly lower rates of Facebook usage in Baalbek-Hermel; and while Twitter usage was low nationally, it was somewhat greater in Beirut and in the governorates of the South and Nabatiye. 7

Interest in Politics

While all persons are affected by politics, not all persons may be equally ‘interested’ in politics. To the extent to which the government and other partners’ response to the refugee crisis might be considered political, those with a greater interest in politics might be more likely to consider news and political information related to the refugee crisis in Lebanon as ‘more important’ in the formation of attitudes and opinion related to the quality of relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees. When asked about their interest in politics, responses were mixed. Relatively few stated that they were ‘very interested’ in politics in Wave VI (5.5%). While the modal response was ‘interested’ (38.3%), many more stated that they were either only ‘a little interested’ or ‘not interested at all’, indicating a fair degree of apathy. Interest in politics peaked in the Wave IV survey, roughly concurrent with Lebanese parliamentary elections, then declining.

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7 The Wave V narrative report in this survey project remarked on the lower than expected usage of Twitter in the more cosmopolitan centre of Beirut. Results from the Wave VI survey suggested that this may have been due to some degree of random sampling error. The estimate of recall of content related to refugee relations on Twitter in Beirut in the Wave VI survey was 26.5%, relative to a national average of 10.2%, which was more consistent with expectations regarding this platform.
somewhat over subsequent waves, to the rates given above from the most recent Wave VI survey.

Men were significantly more likely to profess and interest in politics, but not to an extreme degree. Over the multiple waves of surveying, on average, 45.2% of men indicated that they were ‘interested’ in politics, compared to 36.5% of women, and 8.6% of men stated that they were ‘very interested’, compared to only 5.4% of women. Over governorates, the governorate of the Akkar was, by far, been the geographical area were interested in politics was lowest, with 51.4% in Wave VI stating that they were ‘not at all interested’, compared to 27.7% indicating the same, nationally. Interest in politics did not vary greatly between the ‘most vulnerable localities’ and all other cadastres in Lebanon. By age, those in category 18-24 (many of whom would have been too young to vote in the 2018 elections) were the most likely to state that they were ‘not at all interested’ (38.4%), followed by those in the age category of 25-34 (many of whom would have been eligible first time voters in the previous elections) (29.1%).

Those who said they were ‘interested’ in politics were significantly more likely to recall social media or news content related to Syrian refugees. Of those who recalled at least one source, 44.0% indicated that they were ‘interested’, relative to only 36.9% of those who could not recall such media saying the same. One might reasonably infer that this exposure to—or recall of—relevant news and political information may have been more likely to influence their attitudes and opinions related to the refugee response.

### Expectations of Return

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<th>Key Findings</th>
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<td>• An increasing fraction of both Lebanese and Syrians do see the potential for a durable solution to the refugee crisis, through the return of refugees to Syria, in the foreseeable future. That is, over time, fewer have estimated that it might take ‘five years or more’ for refugees to return.</td>
</tr>
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| • Lebanese who did not anticipate an even-lengthier stay of ‘five years or more’ for Syrian refugees were also more optimistic regarding the future, indicating that they thought Lebanon would be a ‘better’ or ‘much better’ place to live ‘five years from now’.

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Respondents were asked, ‘In your opinion, how long do you think it will take for Syrian refugees to return to Syria?’ Over the first four waves of the survey, for both Lebanese and Syrians, public expectations fluctuated considerably; however, the fraction of the population offering the most extreme estimate of ‘five years or more’ declined consistently. For Lebanese, 63.5% gave this long-term estimate in Wave I of the survey, with this declining to 32.3% in Wave II 25.1% in Wave III, and to 18.3% in Wave IV. Over approximately the last one year, between the Wave IV and Wave VI surveys, this estimate has remained constant, with 18.2% of Lebanese indicating that they thought it would take ‘five years or more’ for refugees to return. Amongst Syrians, this rate also declined from a high in Wave I of 51.6%, to just 8.0% in the most recent Wave VI survey.

Many Syrians and their families have been displaced to Lebanon for as long as eight years, at this point. Despite this protracted period of refugeehood for so many, most Lebanese and Syrians do see the potential for a durable solution through the return of refugees to their home country in the foreseeable future. While the public, including ordinary Lebanese and Syrians, is in no privileged position to accurately anticipate the trajectory of the conflict in Syria, these results nevertheless suggested that there was some degree of consensus that conditions, at least in some parts of Syria, may have improved enough to receive returnees. Very few anticipated the return of refugees ‘in less than one year’ (8.3% of Lebanese and 6.8% of Syrians). However, as of the Wave VI survey, 29.0% of Lebanese and 42.3% of Syrians indicated that this might be possible ‘within one to two years’, and 32.1% of Lebanese and 33.4% of Syrians indicated that this might be possible ‘within two to three years’.

While the general trend of the course of the survey project has been a decline in the fraction of both Lebanese and Syrians anticipating an even-lengthier stay for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, there were some exceptions. In areas with a larger fraction of Syrian refugees per capita, this trend was less pronounced. While over time, fewer did indicate that situation might last at least another five years, thus fitting the national trend, Lebanese in these areas, nevertheless, were still less likely to see an ‘imminent’ return—either in less than a year or in less than three years—as plausible, relative to their Lebanese counterparts in areas of the country with a lesser concentration of Syrian refugees. Also, in the governorates of Akkar and Beirut, the fraction of the public indicating that it may take ‘five years or more’ has remained well above the national average. In Akkar, 33.0% gave this response, i.e. ‘five years or more’, and in Beirut, 56.1% said the same. In Beirut, this represented an increase, rather than the steady decrease observed elsewhere, in expectations of
a protracted stay, up from the 42.7% in Beirut in Wave I predicting a protracted stay of ‘five years or more’. The explanations for these specific geographic differences were not immediately clear.

**Outlook on the Future**

Lebanese perceptions of sources of tensions, either between Lebanese groups or in Lebanese-Syrian relations, might also be represented in individual outlooks on the future. To the extent that Lebanese saw a potential for a durable solution to the Syrian refugee crisis, through the voluntary return of refugees to their home country, and to the extent that ordinary citizens saw credible signals of reform in government, for example, in the approval of a national budget, Lebanese may have been more or less optimistic about the future. To assess this, respondents were asked, ‘Do you think that 5 years from now, Lebanon will be a better or worse place to live?’ Results from the combined six waves are given in Figure 4. There was a significant degree of variation in attitudes by geography, with for example, Lebanese in the governorates of the North and Baalbek-Hermel greatly more optimistic, on average, compared to Lebanese in the governorates of the South and Nabatiyeh.

**Figure 4: Outlook on the Future**

Response to prompt, ‘Do you think that 5 years from now, Lebanon will be a better or worse place to live?’, by governorate, combined waves.
However, on average across the country over the previous year, the Lebanese outlook on the future has gradually worsened. In the run-up to parliamentary elections in early-2018, the Lebanese outlook improved, reaching a high of 46.6% and in Wave III and 46.2% in Wave VI anticipating a ‘better’ or ‘much better’ future, but with this percentage dropping thereafter—to only 37.4% in Wave V and 35.8% in Wave VI providing the same positive outlook.

Amongst Lebanese, a person’s outlook on the future was strongly correlated with expectations of the return of refugees to Syria. For example, of those who indicated they thought Lebanon would be a ‘much worse place to live’, 48.3% also anticipated a protracted stay of ‘five years or more’ for refugees. In contrast, of those who indicated that Lebanon would be a ‘much better place to live’, only 27.3% anticipated a lengthy delay in Syrian return. This correlation was most likely due to a combination of two factors. More ‘pessimistic’ individuals may have been more likely to respond in the negative, regarding both Lebanon’s future and the prospects of refugee return. However, many may also have seen the two as interlinked, that is, that the return of refugees would alleviate a significant stress on Lebanon, thereby improving future prospects.

Trust in Institutions and Authorities

### Key Findings

- After peaking concurrent with parliamentary elections in 2018, confidence in most national-level governance institutions like the Cabinet has continued to decline.
- Those with more negative perceptions of the capability and fairness of assistance were more critical of institutions regarded as responsible for setting policy in the refugee response, including both the Cabinet and ‘international agencies like the UN’.
- After first declining in early 2018, perceptions of security agencies in areas of the country affected by military operations along the border have continued to improve over the pervious eighteen months, though public confidence in these actors has not yet returned to baseline levels.

To query trust in institutions, or perceptions of capability in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, respondents were asked about their perceptions of nine different institutions. For each, respondents were asked to what extent
the institution had ‘improved’ or ‘worsened’ life in their area. The institutions queried included: the Government (Cabinet) of Lebanon; local and charitable organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or international agencies like the UN; the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Internal Security Forces (ISF), municipal authorities, and the Directorate of General Security (DGS). In Wave V and Wave VI, respondents were also asked about their perceptions of the Central Bank’s role. Responses for three of these institutions—the Government (Cabinet), LAF, and municipal authorities—are given in Figure 5.

While some specific institutions obtained a greater or lesser degree of public approval, all nine institutions fell into one of two discrete categories. The first category might broadly be understood as institutions regarded as responsible for setting policy related to the response, and this included the Government (Cabinet) of Lebanon; the Central Bank; local and charitable organisations, NGOs; and international agencies like the UN. The second category might be broadly understood as institutions responsible for policing or for maintaining order, and this category included municipal authorities as well as all three of the security agencies queried. Within each category or domain, the average perceptions of each actor were strongly correlated with one another. For example, while the LAF were the most likely to have been regarded as having played a role in ‘improving
life’, greater confidence in the LAF was also strongly correlated with greater confidence in the ISF and DGS. It was likely that most respondents employed similar heuristics in evaluating each of the nine institutions queried, related both to each institution’s perceived role in the response (e.g. policy vs policing) and/or level of influence (e.g. local vs national).

Given the degree to which perceptions of each institution queried were correlated with one another, the three institutions shown in Figure 5 provide a clear picture of the way in which perceptions have changed over time. For the six institutions not shown, confidence in these institutions has trended in highly similar ways. For example, perceptions of the LAF and ISF have tended to fluctuate jointly over time, over the six waves of surveying.

For national-level governance institutions like the Cabinet, public confidence increased greatly in the run-up to parliamentary elections in 2018. However, given the lengthy delay in government formation, the lack of an agreed budget, and that lack of other credible signals of reform, over the course of the next year, including the Wave V and Wave VI surveys, the level of confidence in the Cabinet returned to baseline levels, where the average citizen was most likely to say that the Cabinet had ‘no effect’, and where (excluding this neutral category), the average citizen was more likely to say that the Cabinet had worsened life to a degree than improved it.

The LAF has long been regarded as one of Lebanon’s strongest national institutions. Pre-dating the Syrian refugee crisis and into 2019, the LAF still enjoys greater public confidence than does any other formal government institution. More recently, perceptions of other security agencies, including the ISF and DGS, have also improved. In the Wave VI survey, 87.2% of Lebanese said that the LAF had improved life to a degree, and 78.8% and 75.1% said the same of the ISF and DGS, respectively. The one recent exception to widespread support for Lebanon’s security agencies has been in some border areas. In parts of Baalbek, Hermel, West Beqaa and Rachaya, support for the LAF and other security agencies declined sharply in Wave III and Wave IV. While perceptions of these actors have steadily improved in the approximately eighteen month since, though public confidence has not quite returned to the baseline levels observed in 2017 in these locations. The LAF’s more recent operations in these areas have related to drug interdiction, and these efforts appear to have been regarded favourably by residents in these areas, given the increasing levels of support for security agencies observed in the vicinity of these operations.
While Lebanese confidence in different institutions may be predicted by numerous factors, including factors not directly related to the refugee crisis in Lebanon, each of the institutions in this first category were clearly regarded as responsible for policies related to the response, and those who more critical of these policies were also more critical of these institutions. For example, of those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programmes’, these Lebanese were also more likely to indicate that the Government (Cabinet) had ‘worsened life somewhat’ (19.7%) or ‘worsened life a lot’ (38.6%). Lebanese with more negative perceptions of the capability and fairness of assistance—specifically the notion that Lebanese had been neglected in assistance—were approximately two-to-four times more likely to provide negative assessments of the capability of the Cabinet, NGOs, INGOs, and UN agencies, relative to Lebanese who did not see vulnerable Lebanese as having been neglected in assistance.

Quality of Intra-Lebanese Relations

Key Findings

- Lebanese were increasingly more likely to describe intra-Lebanese relations as ‘neutral’ rather than ‘positive’. While this did not indicate a severe strain in relations, it did indicate a moderate deterioration in average Lebanese perceptions of the quality of relations ‘between different Lebanese groups’.
- Intra-Lebanese tensions were somewhat more likely to be concentrated in more confessionally heterogeneous areas, most notably, in the governorates of Baalbek-Hermel, the South and Mount Lebanon.
- In intra-Lebanese relations, the most-cited tension factors related to ‘political and sectarian conflict’, followed by class and economic concerns.

Asked, ‘How would you describe current relations between different Lebanese groups who live in the area’, only 2.1% of Lebanese rated the quality of these relations as ‘very negative’ in the Wave VI survey, while a further 14.9% rated these relations as ‘negative’. A plurality of 42.1% described relations as ‘neutral’, with 39.4% rating them as ‘positive’, and only 1.4% rating them as ‘very positive’. While these estimates did not necessarily indicate a severe strain on the quality of intra-Lebanese relations, they nevertheless indicated a moderate deterioration in the
public’s perception of the quality of these relations. In 2019, over the course of the Wave V and Wave VI surveys, an increasing percentage of the public has moved to describe relations as merely ‘neutral’ rather than as ‘positive’, and increasing percentage of the population has likewise moved to describe relations as ‘negative’ rather than ‘neutral’. For example, the fraction rating the quality of relations as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ increased from 7.4% in Wave I (2017) to 16.9% in Wave VI (2019).

Students in Baalbek-Hermel were amongst the most likely to rate the quality of intra-Lebanese relations as more negative, followed to a lesser degree, by persons in the South and Mount Lebanon. Of Lebanon’s eight governorates, these three—where perceptions of the quality of relations were somewhat worse—were also amongst the most confessionally heterogenous. However, within regions, no one confessional group was greatly more likely to assess the quality of relations as more negative. For example, where the quality of relations were considered more negative in Baalbek-Hermel, Sunnis, Shia, and Christians alike rated the quality of relations in this governorate as more negative, relative to their co-religionists in other areas. Thus, where the quality of intra-Lebanese relations was regarded
as more negative, this could not directly be attributed to one or more specific confessional dynamics or grievances.

Respondents were also asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘In this area, Lebanese from different confessions live peacefully among each other’. To this, 78.2% of Lebanese said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement in Wave VI, compared to 82.7% saying the same in the Wave V survey. As with the previous assessment of the quality of relations, persons in Baalbek-Hermel were the most likely to provide a negative report, with 38.0% stating that they ‘disagreed’ with this statement and 3.2% stating that they ‘strongly disagreed’ with this statement.

Respondents in Beirut were also significantly more likely to provide a ‘neutral’ response of ‘neither agree nor disagree’, given this statement. While a majority were still more likely to view intra-Lebanese relations as positive rather than negative, by this measure, 41.5% nevertheless provided a neutral evaluation, compared to only 14.9% nationally.

**Tension Factors in intra-Lebanese relations**

Lebanese respondents were asked about what factors they though were most likely to contribute to tensions between different Lebanese groups. Rather than select
options from a list, enumerators accepted a verbal response from the respondents and coded up to three factors into one of a number of predetermined categories. The most-cited factors, as well as the percentage citing each factor are given in Figure 8, disaggregated by wave.

Over the course of the survey project, the percentage of Lebanese citing ‘political and sectarian conflict’ as a primary tension factor in intra-Lebanese relations has steadily declined, to the point where only 38.1% cited this as a primary tension factor in the Wave VI survey, down from the 59.7% who said the same at the outset of the study in 2017.

After ‘political and sectarian conflict’, the most cited tension factors, in order of prevalence, were economic competition, differences in socio-economic (SES) status, cultural and religious differences, and lastly, the unfair distribution of resources. The percentage citing all five of the queried tensions factors, nationally, declined marginally over the previous four months, between the Wave V and Wave VI surveys. This decline in the resonance of all tension factors was, admittedly, inconsistent with the observation that, over the same period, Lebanese of all backgrounds became somewhat less likely to categorise ‘relations between different Lebanese groups’ as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’. It may be the case that the tendency toward more neutral—but not necessarily negative—perceptions of the quality of intra-Lebanese relations can be attributed to the lack of any notable
political conflict, e.g. between Lebanese political parties, over this period of approximately four months.

**Quality of Lebanese-Syrian Relations**

**Key Findings**

- The most-cited tension factor in Lebanese-Syrian relations remained ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’, though the salience of this tension factor has also continued to decline wave-over-wave, most notably in the governorate of Nabatiye.
- Plausibly related to the decline in perceptions of competition over jobs, sector employment between Lebanese and Syrians has become increasingly differentiated over time, with Syrian employment heavily concentrated in the sectors of construction, agriculture, and manufacturing.
- Relative to Lebanese households, Syrian households were more than four times more likely to report that one or more children were employed.

**Tension Factors in Lebanese-Syrian relations**

Tension factors in Lebanese-Syrian relations were queried with the same approach as intra-Lebanese tensions. That is, both Lebanese and Syrians provided a verbal response, and the enumerator coded up to three factors, using a predetermined list. The most-cited factors, as well as the percentage citing each factor are given in Figure 8, disaggregated by wave.

The most-cited tension factor remained ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’, with 58.4% of Lebanese and 41.8% of Syrians citing this factor. For neither Lebanese nor Syrians did this rate differ significantly from the rate observed four months prior in the Wave V survey. It, nevertheless, represented a reduction in the resonance of this tension factor over rates observed in previous waves, where agreement with this factor was highest at the time of the Wave II survey, when 65.4% of Lebanese and 56.6% of Syrians cited this factor.

While the level of agreement regarding threat of ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’ remained constant over most of Lebanon, the fraction of the public citing this item in the governorate of Nabatiye declined to just 26.5% in the Wave VI survey, in a continuation of a trend observed in the Wave V survey, where from
Wave IV to Wave V, the resonance of this factor also declined sharply, from 68.4% to 46.6% citing this factor.

**Jobs and Sector Employment**

The typical surveyed household consisted of three adults and 1.3 minors, though Syrian households tended to be slightly larger than Lebanese households. Of those employed, Lebanese were more likely to be employed on a full-time basis, whereas Syrians were more likely to be employed in daily labour or to work on a part-time basis. Child labour rates were also found to be more severe amongst Syrian households, with 23.9% of Syrian households reporting at least one child worked, compared to only 5.4% of Lebanese reporting the same.

Slightly less than three-quarters (69.4%) of those employed were salaried or wage earning employees, including 83% of Syrians and 67.2% of Lebanese. The discrepancy between nationalities in their employee status was due to the fact that Lebanese were more likely to be employers in small business (17.6%) or own account workers (15.2%), compared to Syrians, of whom 6.7% and 10.3% reported that they were employers or own account workers, respectively. Concerning domains or sectors of work, Lebanese households were almost twice as likely, compared to their Syrian counterparts, to have at least one member employed in the professional services, wholesale and retail trade, and public services industries.
In contrast, Syrian households were more likely to have at least one member working in the sectors of construction, agriculture, or manufacturing. The survey queried each working householder’s area of work. While Syrians have consistently been more likely than Lebanese to work in specific sectors, like agriculture, over the course of the six waves of surveying, sector employment has become increasingly differentiated by nationality.

**Attitudes on the Acceptable Use of Violence**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Key Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The fraction agreeing with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’ has declined from previous highs, yet a majority of Lebanese still agree to a degree with this sentiment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Nationally, exposure to armed violence remained comparable to previous waves; however, more recent exposure was regionally concentrated in the governorates of Nabatiye, Baalbek-Hermel and the South.</td>
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</table>

Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’. On average, on this four-point measure, over the six waves of surveying, a plurality or majority have consistently indicated that they ‘agreed’ with this statement. In the Wave VI survey, 56.2% indicated that they ‘agreed’, while only 3.0% indicated that they ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement. Over the course of the six waves, the level of agreement with this statement rose steadily, to peak in late-2018 in Waves III and IV, before returning to approximately baseline levels over the two most-recent waves of surveying in 2019.

However, attitudes regarding the acceptable use of violence can vary greatly, by situation and context, and acceptance of a world view in which violence is deemed as sometimes acceptable does not necessarily indicate a greater individual or collective propensity for violence. Cross-culturally, the public’s potential to justify forms of inter-personal violence, as opposed to state-sanctioned violence, for example, in more coercive forms of policing or inter or intra-state armed conflict, can vary greatly, and different factors may be associated with greater or lesser acceptance of different varieties of violence.

More recent waves of the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* also included a battery of questions related to the situational acceptance...
of a number of forms of inter-personal violence. For each of a number vignettes, such as a description of ‘[a person who] believes it is acceptable to hit someone who hits [him or her] first’, the respondent was asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed that ‘this person resembled’ him or her. These items were adopted from the The Human Values Scale (HVS) of the European Social Survey (ESS). Bivariate correlations for these items, along with a factor analysis solution, are given in Table 2.

For example, given the vignette, ‘He or she would physically attack someone who verbally insulted him or her’, 26.6% indicated that they were ‘like’ this person. And related to the enforcement of social norms, given the vignette, ‘If he or she saw someone getting harassed on the street, he or she would get involved’, 42.9% said they were ‘like’ this person.

One prevailing explanation for variation in individual and communal support for different varieties of violence relates to different means of socialisation around culture, identity, and interests, within which there may also be variation in the extent to which individuals and the public approve of different means of policing, including the threat of violence, around specific sets of social norms. The factor analysis in Table 2 indicates the presence of at least two discrete dimensions in this scale: one related to the enforcement of social norms, or what some have called, ‘the authoritarian personality’ and another related to the situational use of violence. And yet, while these two dimensions are separate from another, statistically and conceptually, they are nevertheless also strongly correlated with one another. In other words, within the context within which these attitudes on the acceptable use of violence were queried, those who more strongly valued adherence to specific social norms around authority were also more likely to accept that some forms of inter-personal violence were sometimes acceptable, in the enforcement of these norms.

The rate of exposure of armed violence remained unchanged, nationally, from levels observed in the Wave V survey (Figure 10). In the Wave VI survey, 13.4% ‘personally witnessed armed violence, for example, with a knife, gun or explosives’, compared to 13.1% in the Wave V survey. Rates of exposure to armed violence were significantly higher in the governorates of Nabatiye, Baalbek-Hermel, and the South. Syrians were somewhat more likely to have reported exposure to armed violence than Lebanese, with rates of 16.4% and 12.9%.

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respectively. Syrians were also significantly more likely to have witnessed ‘verbal confrontations’ over the same time period, with rates of exposure at 34.4% and 24.1% for Syrians and Lebanese, respectively.

**Figure 10: Exposure to armed violence**

Response to prompt, ‘In the last three months, have you personally witnessed armed violence, for example, with a knife, gun or explosives in your area?’, by governorate and wave.*

*Wave I = inner circle; Wave VI = outer circle.

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**Discussion and Conclusion**

For outcomes related to the seven specific themes considered in this analysis, where change was observed in attitudes or in rates of the incidence of events, or where change was observed in the strength of specific relationships, these changes were—on average—incremental. In the absence of any major political developments in the previous four months specifically related to the refugee presence in Lebanon, or which might plausibly affect intra-Lebanese relations, for better or worse, most changes in the tension and resilience landscape in Lebanon have been both modest in scope and consistent with trends identified previously in the survey project.
The Lebanese Parliament passed a new state budget on 19 July 2019, just three days after data collection for the Wave VI had been completed. However, the budget had been approved two months prior by the Cabinet, and its content was the subject of significant debate over the period in which data collection for this wave of the survey took place. In short, the ‘austerity’ budget, which was intended to appease donors and international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerned with Lebanon’s mounting national debt, included public spending cuts and tax raises. While the effects of any new government spending policies are not likely to have been represented in the survey data collected to date, the proposed budget—along with a measure of popular protest—has nevertheless contributed to some level of mounting economic anxiety.

While passing the state budget entailed meaningful collaboration and compromise between usually-competing Lebanese political parties, this unusual demonstration of cooperation amongst lawmakers, nevertheless, did little to alleviate slowly mounting intra-Lebanese tensions. On average, most Lebanese feel uncertain about the future and lack confidence in the government’s ability to implement the new budget without severe and potentially hard-hitting cutbacks in public service provision. Lebanese are, already, dissatisfied with the level, quality, and availability of most public services, and any further deterioration in these has the potential to exacerbate pre-existing tensions, both in intra-Lebanese and in Lebanese-Syrian relations.

By no means do all Lebanese complaints relate specifically to the presence of the Syrian refugee population. Yet, the majority of Lebanese do see potentially destabilising effects in the refugee presence. Most, for example, agree that refugee population pressure on public services fosters competition, most especially in education in some parts of the country, and in healthcare, especially in urban areas like Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli with a higher concentration of the nation’s hospitals. Even though there is very little evidence to support this contention empirically, most Lebanese, nevertheless, also believe that the refugee presence contributes to higher rates of crime and violence.

As the prevailing Lebanese opinion remains that vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected—if economic anxiety continues to mount, or if there is further deterioration in public services, then there exists a very real risk that discrimination or other negative forms of collective action, like the imposition of harsher curfews or restrictions on the refugees’ freedom of movement, may increase.

Though both Lebanese and Syrians are increasingly optimistic about a durable solution to the refugee crisis, that is, through the return of refugees to relatively
more safe or stable parts of Syria, most also do not expect to see a significant return imminently, within the coming year. Thus, economic and related social developments in the situation of Lebanese are likely also to impact relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees. A key component of the ‘resiliency landscape’ will relate to the ways in which communities respond to (potential) new economic stressors, when or if new budget cuts come into effect.
### Distribution of the Sample

Total sample size (N), by district combinations and wave.

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Value Orientations and Violence Scale

Bivariate correlation in ‘value orientations’ in items related to inter-personal violence

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<td>Q1. He or she believes that people should do what they’re told. He or she thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.</td>
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<td>Q2. It is important to him or her to listen to people who are different from him or her. Even when he or she disagrees with them, he or she still wants to understand them.</td>
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<td>23951</td>
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<td>Q4. He or she would physically attack someone who verbally insulted him or her.</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.145**</td>
<td>-.088**</td>
<td>.386**</td>
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<td>.410**</td>
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<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q5. If he or she saw someone getting harassed on the street, he or she would get involved.</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.017**</td>
<td>.090**</td>
<td>.340**</td>
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<td>22896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q6. If he or she got in an argument, he or she would be able to call on his or her friends to intervene.</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.022**</td>
<td>.060**</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.326**</td>
<td>.533**</td>
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Factor Analysis

Rotated Component Matrix

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<tr>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.837</td>
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<td><strong>0.672</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.08</strong></td>
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<td><strong>0.705</strong></td>
<td>-0.239</td>
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<td><strong>0.796</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.062</strong></td>
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<td><strong>0.766</strong></td>
<td>0.057</td>
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References


