Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon

Wave V Summary Findings

June 2019
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Executive Summary

With over 25,000 interviews conducted with ordinary Lebanese and Syrians to date, over the course of the Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon project, this fifth (i.e. Wave V) narrative report seeks to highlight, with respect to seven key indicators, significant changes over time, as well as important differences, or regional variation, over the four geographies of: the North and Akkar, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the South and Nabatieh, and the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel.

While even within these four regions, important variations exist — with different Lebanese and Syrian communities living in different circumstances, and with different factors contributing to the quality of relations between both communities — the regional focus in this narrative report is intended to provide the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), partner agencies, Government of Lebanon ministries (GoL), and other humanitarian, relief, or social stability programming actors with detailed data at the regional level to assist in current Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) efforts or future project and programme design.

Method

Survey data for this report was collected with a multi-stage stratified cluster design. Stratification was used to increase the representation in the sample of more-vulnerable localities, including localities with a higher concentration of Syrian refugees per capita. Sample sizes by wave and district may be found in the body of the report. Estimates have been weighted, given the survey design, to be representative of and generalisable to the total adult population of Lebanon, including both Lebanese and Syrian households. Total sample statistics within waves have a margin of error of approximately $\leq 3.0\%$.

Quality of Relations

In this analysis, the quality of relations has been assessed with a composite indicator, including the level of agreement with a number of statements like, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’, as well as a direct rating of current relations as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. A per cent of this scale maximum (%SM) has been used as in indicator in this report, and in previous reporting within this survey
project. In the body of this report, current Wave V estimates for a number of the component items are provided, disaggregated by region.

In early 2019, the fraction of the public evaluating relations as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ increased by fifteen percentage points. However, as a composite of multiple items, this indicator for the quality of relations has fluctuated over the course of this survey project — both nationally and regionally — only within a very narrow band of approximately ±5% SM. Given the protracted nature of the refugee crisis, now in its eighth year, many of the policies, circumstances, and other factors that might affect relations have remained relatively stable or constant, and the situation is not currently ‘evolving’ at the same rapid pace as at the outset of the refugee crisis.

**Peace and Tension Factors**

The public’s perception of peace and tension factors did not differ greatly by region, and wave-over-wave, changes in what factors the public — both Lebanese and Syrian — feel are most likely to contribute to greater or lesser tensions have been slow to change. By far the most-cited tension factor, nationally and within each region, has been the perception of ‘competition [between Lebanese and Syrians] over lower-skilled jobs’. And though this perception, like other peace and tension indicators, changed little over the period between the Wave IV and Wave V surveys, over the longer course of surveying, dating to Wave I in early 2017, the salience of this tension factor has, nevertheless, steadily declined, particularly in the North and Akkar, where the level of agreement with this possible driver of tensions has dropped over the long-term from 75.0% to 56.4%, and in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, where it has dropped from 72.4% to 48.5% over the same period.

With respect to peace factors, a large fraction of Lebanese in Wave V cited ‘the return of Syrian refugees’ as the most important factor. However, in the absence of any other data indicating the return of a significant number of refugees from Lebanon to Syria, it was unclear whether this Lebanese expression was (a) ‘aspirational’, in the sense that this was understood as something that *would* improve relations, (b) a result of mis-information regarding rates of actual return, or (c) a consequence of declining rates of social interaction or inter-communal contact between Lebanese and Syrians.
The prevalence of rates of agreement with other more substantive factors for peace did not differ greatly over regions, with ‘pre-existing relations’ and ‘social bonds’ considered amongst the most important.

**Assault and Other Victimisation**

The rate of exposure to armed violence — that is, the fraction of the public reporting personally witnessing ‘violence with a knife, gun or explosives’ increased somewhat over the period July 2018 - March 2019, the period between the Wave IV and Wave V surveys, from 7.8% to 13.2%. Of those who had witnessed armed violence, most were in the (more populous) regions of Beirut and Mount Lebanon (47.3%) and the South and Nabatieh (31.9%), with a relatively smaller percentage of the total in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel (11.5%) and the North and Akkar (9.2%).

Despite this modest increase in the rate of exposure to armed violence, over the same period, the majority of both Lebanese and Syrians stated that they felt ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, both ‘during the day’ (93.2%) and ‘during the night’ (84.8%). Most also felt that safety in their area over the previous three months had ‘stayed about the same’ (69.2%) or ‘improved a lot’ or ‘a little’ (23.4%).

A number of other forms of victimisation, including for example, assault and eviction, were also queried in the survey. Regional estimates for these experiences are provided in the body of this report; however, there were few notable changes in rates of exposure, or geographic exposure, to these other forms of victimisation observed in the Wave V survey. While incidents of, for example, the eviction of Syrian refugees from temporary settlements have occurred over the period covered by this survey, these incidents and other forms of victimisation specific to the refugee experience in Lebanon have tended to be highly localised, and thus difficult to discern at higher levels of aggregation, by district, governorate, or region.

**Pressure on Services**

Satisfaction with public services varied significantly by region, with for example, lesser satisfaction with all services in the North and Akkar and in the South and Nabatieh, relative to Beirut and Mount Lebanon. A majority of both Lebanese (93.1%) and Syrians (75.3%) agreed with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’. However, the relationship
between the concentration of refugees in an area and the public’s level of satisfaction with different public services is neither strong nor direct. That is, Lebanese satisfaction with the level and quality of public services, despite a consensus that there is a degree of refugee population pressure on services, is more likely to be determined by other factors, including historical factors, related to how different regions of Lebanon have been included or excluded in the provision of public goods like clean water, electricity, or education.

The two instances where there was significantly strong evidence of refugee population pressure on services concerned access to or the quality of education in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel and, in some areas, concerns about the quality or availability of health services. In the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, 31.3% rated the quality of education services as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, compared to 19.4% nationally. Nationally, 48.3% also rated the quality of health services as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, though pressure on health services, regionally and geographically, was more difficult to determine, with many persons utilising such services likely to seek care, especially hospital care, outside of the area where they resided.

**Social Media Usage**

Though not included in pervious iterations of this survey, in this fifth wave of the survey, respondents were asked about their recall of messages or content related to the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon on a number of social media platforms. A majority of Lebanese recalled such content, and by far, the most-cited platform was Facebook. A smaller fraction (19.1%) reported recall of such content on the WhatsApp messaging application, and recall on this platform was lower in more urban areas, especially the capital of Beirut, possibly indicating a greater reliance on this platform for news and information on developments related to the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in more rural areas. However, no data was collected on the sentiment in this content, and there were no discernible, direct linkages between the recall of such content and the other outcomes considered in this analysis.

**Trust in Institutions**

Though a number of district-level exceptions are documented and discussed in the body of this report, a persistent trend over the course of this survey project has been the documentation of greater confidence in the ability of local and
municipal authorities to respond to the challenges of managing Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugee relations, relative to national-level governance institutions, like the Cabinet or Parliament.

The formation of a new Lebanese government (i.e. the Cabinet, and parliamentary elections in 2018) took place shortly before the conduct of the Wave V survey in early 2019; however, there was little to suggest that these developments have had a significant effect on the public’s perception of the government’s level of capability in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Public confidence in Lebanese security services, particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remained high in this most recent survey, and where rates of support for the LAF had, previously, been significantly below the national average in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, the level of support for the LAF in this region has continued to improve, reaching a level of 74.6% agreeing that the LAF had ‘improved life a lot’ or ‘a little’ in recent months.

**Inter-Communal Contact**

Lebanese and Syrian respondents were both asked about the frequency with which they had contact with persons of the other nationality, for example, ‘at work’ or ‘in the street’. On average, over the eight sites of possible contact queried, and over the five waves of survey, the level of inter-communal contact has steadily declined, and this decline has been more pronounced in some regions than in others, for example, in Beirut, were the rate of regular contact ‘in the street’ has declined from 91.2% to 70.4% over the course of the study. The rate of decline in the level of inter-communal contact, on average, has also been more severe for more personal or substantive forms of contact, like ‘in social circles’, relative to more casual forms of contact, like ‘in the street’. However, this trend has not been observed in all areas. In the region of the North and Akkar, the fraction of the public reporting regular contact with persons of the other nationality ‘in social circles’ has instead risen from 41.4% to 52.2% over the course of the study, and this appears to be an important ‘protective factor’, with those in this region reporting more regular contact also more likely to evaluate relations as more positive and more likely to identify peace factors.
Introduction

As the Syrian crisis enters its eighth year, host community fatigue with the protracted presence of Syrian refugees remains prevalent. Only a minority (26.7%) of Lebanese would rank the current quality of relations between Lebanese and Syrians as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, and only a somewhat larger fraction Syrian refugees (42.1%) in the country would, likewise, rank current relations between both communities as positive.

The primary objectives of this report for Wave V of the Regular Perceptions Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon is to extend the analysis provided in previous narrative reports, by focusing specifically on regional and district-level variation in indicators for key social stability outcomes, as well as by identifying significant changes, within regions, over the course of this survey project, which began in early 2017 (see Figure 2, p. 4).

This analysis focuses on seven specific indicators or outcomes. The measurement and construction of indicators for each of the seven may be found in an appendix to this report:

1. Quality of Relations
2. Peace and Tension Factors
3. Assault and Other Victimisation
4. Pressure on Services
5. Social Media Usage
6. Trust in Institutions
7. Inter-Communal Contact

Six of these indicators have been featured heavily in previous reporting within this survey project. This fifth wave of the survey saw the addition of a number of additional question items specifically related to social media usage, as it related to how both Lebanese and Syrian refugees in Lebanon might access news and information related inter-communal relations or tensions.

Organisation of the Report

This narrative proceeds with a brief summary of sampling methods and the survey protocol. This is followed by a description of results, which has been organised within four regions: the governorates of the North and Akkar, the South and Nabatieh, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and the Bekaa and Baalbek-
Hermel. Each of the seven outcomes are discussed regionally, followed by a brief discussion of developments, nationally.

**Summary of Previous Reporting**

Data used in this report has been collected over five waves of surveying. While this report focuses on specific changes in attitudes, opinions, and relations over the approximately three months prior to the conduct of the fifth wave of the the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon*, previous narrative reports within this survey research project have addressed a number of different topics. Continuously updating the basis and format of reporting has been done in order to enhance the relevance and usefulness of the survey research for different readers and users of the data, including those with social-scientific questions related to relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees, as well as direct practitioners or service providers within the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP).

The first narrative report focused on the validation of indicators and assumptions in the Stabilisation Monitoring Framework (Figure 1, p. 3), establishing the importance of considering the multiple, interactive effects of different structural, evolving and proximate drivers of conflict, and discussing the implications of this for social stability programming.

With the increased sample size available in analysis after the second wave of surveying, the second narrative report within this survey project sought to better understand variations in attitudes and opinions across a number of different sub-populations, including different geographies.

The third and fourth narrative reports sought to examine more closely the *impact* of assistance on key indicators measured in this survey research, namely, the (1) the quality of relations, (2) perceived refugee population pressures on services, and (3) the propensity for violence or other negative forms of collective action. The third narrative report proposed a model for this impact evaluation, considering nine types of assistance spending, and the fourth narrative report extended this model and analysis to consider, in addition, direct cash assistance. The results detailed in both the third and fourth narrative reports provided evidence of the impact of assistance and highlighted social stability outcomes which might result from the interaction between dedicated social stability programming and other types of assistance in the most-vulnerable or most-affected Lebanese and Syrian communities in Lebanon.
**Figure 1:** Stabilisation and Monitoring Framework

Previous narrative reports are available on the UNHCR Operational Portal for Refugee Situations, and the Online UNDP-ARK Interactive Dashboard includes both links to previous reporting associated with this project and offers users the opportunity to interact or ‘explore’ the data collected to date, disaggregated by a number of key indicators and geographic and other socio-demographic categories.

**Data and Method**

Given the research objectives of the survey and with the sample size of 5,000 interviews per wave, there was adequate statistical power to assess meaningful differences in outcomes with precision at the district (*qada*) level, as well as differences across levels of vulnerability indicated in the ‘Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon’ map. A complex sample design was required to optimise the efficiency of the sample across the two dimensions of (a) district geographies and (b) vulnerability-level geographies, while at the same time (c) minimising the margin of error for total-sample statistics. The survey was implemented with a multistage stratified cluster design.

In the first stage of selection, the sample was stratified across districts, with a formula including a vulnerability weight. Approximately 40% of the sample
was allocated on the basis of the vulnerability weight, and the remaining 60% of the sample was allocated across districts proportional to population size. In other words, interviews were allocated on the basis of population size, but this allocation was then adjusted to oversample more vulnerable areas. Thus, all districts were included in the sample, but relatively fewer interviews were allocated to districts like Jbeil, Kesrouan, Bcharre and Batroun, which had fewer vulnerable Lebanese and fewer Syrian refugees per capita.

In the second stage of selection, cadasters within district strata were sampled probability proportionate to population size (PPS) with replacement. No additional steps were taken to oversample more vulnerable cadasters. A post-stratification weight for district size was required for the estimate of total-sample statistics and estimates across vulnerability-levels. Because the second stage sample was taken with PPS methods, no sampling weight was required for within-district estimates.

In the third stage of selection, for the allocation of clusters, a number of random GPS coordinates were generated equal to the number of clusters allocated to each cadaster, and this coordinate indicated the starting point for household selection. Enumerators began with the residential building closest to the random GPS coordinate and conducted an interview with a random adult in this building. Using a random number table, the enumerators then walked in a random direction, skipping a random number of homes, and then conducted the next interview in the next home. This proceeded until six interviews per cluster were completed. In the event of refusal, households were substituted within clusters, but individuals were not substituted within households.

Figure 2: Timeline of Interviews, by Wave
Regarding the selection of primary respondents, in the fourth stage of selection, the enumerators alternated between selecting the adult male and female householder who celebrated his or her birthday most recently. Up to three attempts were made to contact the selected respondent if the respondent was not at home at the time of the visit. If after three attempts the respondent could not be contacted, the household was substituted within the cluster.

**Table 1:** Total number of surveys conducted by wave and district.

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Additional information on the sampling design and survey methods, as well as additional information on the drafting and content of the survey questionnaire, may be found online in the Inception Report for the Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon survey project.

**Governorates of the North & Akkar**

**Key Findings**

- While ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’ remained one of the most-cited tension factors, the fraction of the public naming this as a primary factor has declined over the course of this study, from a high of 75.0% to 56.4% in early 2019.
- Compared to other regions, the North and Akkar has witnessed lower levels of decline in the level of inter-communal contact over the course of this study. That as much as 52.2% of the public in this region report contact ‘daily’ or ‘regularly’ with persons of the other nationality likely remains an important protective factor, with respect to the quality of relations between both communities.
- Levels of satisfaction with most public services remains low in the region, with particular concern regarding the quality and accessibility of health services. While most Lebanese do perceive a degree of ‘refugee population pressure on services’, disparities are not necessarily attributable to the refugee presence but rather to other governance factors.

**Quality of Relations**

Over the period between the Wave IV and Wave V surveys, average Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of the quality of relations between both communities in the North and Akkar did not change significantly. At 54.3% of the scale maximum on the indicator used to assess these perceptions of relations, the perceptions in this region did not differ greatly from elsewhere in the country. However, while the average perception of the quality of relations did not change significantly, it should be noted that this did set the region apart from other regions, somewhat, with the nationwide average of the perception of the quality of relations improving marginally over the same period.
In the region of North and Akkar, 38.6% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’. Likewise, 36.1% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’. And, 86.5% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’. Including both Lebanese and Syrians, proportional to their prevalence in the total population, in this region, only 24.1% rated the quality of relations as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, given the prompt, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?’

**Peace and Tension Factors**

The perceptions of peace and tension factors in the North and Akkar mirrored those elsewhere in the country. By far, the most-cited tension factor was ‘competition over lower-skilled job’, though the per cent (56.4%) naming this tension factor in Wave V, in this region, was greatly lower than the per cent (75.0%) observed at the outset of the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* project in May 2017. Of other tension factors assessed, the rate of agreement with most others remained relatively constant over Wave V. Consistent with observations in this region in Wave III and Wave IV, ‘marriages between Lebanese and Syrians’ was named as one possible driver of tensions by 28.3%, a figure far higher than observed in other regions.

In terms of peace factors, consistent with findings over the previous year, the indication or perception that some Syrians had left the area to return to Syria was cited my 51.5% of the public in this region. However, despite some limited press reporting on the subject, there has been no substantive indication of the return of a significant number of Syrian refugees over this period.

In the North and Akkar, the per cent citing other more substantive factors for peace continued to decline. For example, at the outset of this study, 27.1% cited ‘social bonds’ as a peace factor, whereas in Wave V, only 2.6% cited this factor in the region. The per cent citing ‘pre-existing relations’, referring more so to Lebanese relations with Syrians who had lived in the region prior to 2011, declined to 12.9% in Wave V, but was nevertheless the second most-cited factor for peace in the North and Akkar region (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Tension factors in the North and Akkar

Tension Factors, by Wave, in the North and Akkar

Wave I, May 2017
Wave II, Sep 2017
Wave III, Feb 2018
Wave IV, July 2018
Wave V, March 2019

- Child marriages or pregnancy
- Competition for higher-skilled jobs
- Competition for lower-skilled jobs
- Competition for services and utilities
- Competition for the establishment of businesses
- Differences in religion, nationality, place of origin
- Marriages between Syrians and Lebanese
- Cultural differences
- The media
- Unfair aid distribution
- The political situation regionally and nationally
Figure 4: Peace Factors in the North and Akkar

Peace Factors, by Wave, in the North and Akkar

Wave I, May 2017
Wave II, Sept 2017
Wave III, Feb 2018
Wave IV, July 2018
Wave V, March 2019

- Assistance and projects by municipality
- Better services by municipality
- Economic exchanges
- Pre-existing relationships
- Positive role of local authorities
- Restrictions on refugees
- Return of Syrian refugees
- Social bonds between communities
Assault and Other Victimisation

Of the fifteen items related to assault and other forms of victimisation, except for the fraction of the public in the North and Akkar reporting ‘verbal harassment’ (7.4%), rates of report were low. After ‘verbal harassment’ the two most reported incidents were ‘disputes between children’ (3.9%) and ‘theft or robbery’ (3.3%).

Within the region of the North and Akkar, there were more significant differences between districts in the region, than there were between districts in the other three regions discussed in this report, relating to assault and other victimisation, but also relating to other outcomes assessed in this study. For example, between Tripoli and Zgharta, the rate of exposure to armed violence in Tripoli (7.4%) was far higher than in adjacent Zgharta (1.2%) or Batroun, Bsharre and Koura (3.4%) (Figure 5). Perceptions of safety and security, by other metrics, were also lower in urban Tripoli than in other nearby areas, with for example, lower perceptions of safety both during the day and night.

Pressure on Services

In the region of North and Akkar, 92.8% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’.

Respondents were also asked about their satisfaction with a number of different public services. While there was a weak correlation between Lebanese satisfaction with all services and the perception of refugee population pressure, the level of satisfaction with all services was more likely to be determined by other factors, particularly geographic factors. As in nearly all other geographies, except for the district of Zahle, dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of electricity was a foremost concern in the region of the North, with a majority (57.9%) ranking the quality of this service as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, a level of dissatisfaction unchanged from previous waves of surveying.

A majority (51.6%) in the North and Akkar also ranked the quality of health services as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, and a significant fraction also ranked water (27.5%), sewage (22.8%), and waste removal (15.5%) as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’.
Figure 5: Exposure to Armed Violence, by Region

Exposure to armed violence by wave (inner circle) and distribution of exposure to armed violence by region (outer circle).

- Wave I, May 2017
- Wave II, Sep 2017
- Wave III, Feb 2018
- Wave IV, July 2018
- Wave V, March 2019

Legend:
- Beirut and Mt Lebanon
- Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel
- No
- North and Akkar
- South and Nabatieh
- Yes
Social Media Usage

In terms of where the public in the North and Akkar was most likely to have encountered conversations regarding the status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, most (66.2%) recalled at least one social media post, conversation or other online content related to the topic, with Facebook, by far, being the most-used forum (56.1% of the public or 84.7% of those recalling any conversation), followed by WhatsApp (22.1% of the public or 33.4% of those recalling any conversation). Other social media platforms queried were less likely to be cited by respondents in this region, including: Twitter (6.4%), SMS (0.5%), ‘comments on a webpage’ (11.8%), Viber (0.2%), Skype (0.5%), and LinkedIn (0.0%).

Trust in Institutions

On average, trust in security services remained high. And as observed in previous waves of surveying, trust in local authorities, for example, municipal authorities, was significantly greater than trust in national government authorities, like the Cabinet or Parliament. Neither national elections nor the recent government formation had a significant positive or negative effect on perceptions of these national governance actors in the North and Akkar.

While municipal authorities were favoured over national authorities by the public in nearly all districts in Lebanon, including in the North and Akkar, this discrepancy in the level of trust was especially large in the districts of Zgharta, Bsharre, Batroun and Koura, where for example, the fraction stating that the Cabinet had ‘helped improve life a lot’ or ‘a little’ was as low as 28.2% in Zgharta, compared to 51.7% in Tripoli.

Inter-Communal Contact

While the level of inter-communal contact, nationally, has slowly declined over the course of the five waves of this study, particularly more substantive forms of contact, for example, contact in ‘social circles’ rather than ‘at work’ or ‘in the street’, this trend has not been observed, to the same extent, in the North and Akkar. In fact, the fraction of the public reporting interaction with persons of the other nationally in social circles ‘regularly’ or ‘daily’ has risen from 41.4% at the outset of the study, to 48.7% in the previous wave (i.e. Wave IV), and 52.2% most recently (i.e. Wave V). More regular contact was positively correlated with other social stability outcomes, for example, for Lebanese, lower levels
of prejudice, and for both Lebanese and Syrians, more positive assessments of the quality of relations between both communities. Inter-communal contact, thus, remains an important protective factor in the North and Akkar, and likely in other regions, as well.

Governorates of Beirut & Mount Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Reports of both crime (8.7%) and ‘verbal harassment’ (8.2%) were somewhat higher in Beirut and Mount Lebanon than in other regions. While many Lebanese did agree that the Syrian presence ‘contributed to higher rates of crime and violence’, there was little evidence to substantiate this. Rates of crime do tend to be higher in urban centres like Beirut, and the data did not indicate that a Syrian refugee presence was a significant contributing factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• While recall in Beirut and Mount Lebanon of social media content related to the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was comparable to other regions, recall on specific platforms, including Twitter and WhatsApp, was below other regions and below national averages. Facebook was, by far, the platform where users in this region were most likely to encounter related content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• While in the capital city of Beirut, favourable ratings of the Cabinet and other national institutions were somewhat higher than elsewhere in the country, in the other districts of the Beirut and Mount Lebanon region, the gap in confidence between local and national institutions has continued to grow, with greater confidence in local or municipal institutions, relative to national authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality of Relations

In the region of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, 66.7% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’. Likewise, 49.1% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’. And, 84.4% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of a large
Figure 6: Quality of Relations, by Region

Quality of Relations, as Per Cent of Scale Maximum

Greater Quality of Relations


North and Akkar  Bekaa and Baalbek–Hermel  Beirut and Mt Lebanon  South and Nabatieh
number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’. Including both Lebanese and Syrians, proportional to the prevalence in the total population, in this region, only 21.7% rated the quality of relations as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, given the prompt, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?’

**Peace and Tension Factors**

The ranking of peace and tension factors in Beirut and Mount Lebanon was similar to elsewhere in the country, and there was minimal variation in the ranking of factors between districts in the region. An increasing fraction of the public (63.1%) ranked ‘competition for lower-skilled’ jobs as a primary tension factor, up from the 52.7% who ranked this as a primary tension factor at the outset of the study in 2017 (Figure 7). Syrian refugees, like their Lebanese counterparts, were also more likely to name this factor than any other factor. Following this, the most cited tension factors were ‘competition for services’ (37.2%), ‘the political situation’ (34.4%), and ‘the establishment of businesses’ (28.9%).

As observed elsewhere, despite a lack of data evidencing a significant number of returns to Syria, Lebanese residents of Beirut and Mount Lebanon were likely to cite this as a ‘peace factor’, with 41.0% saying that the return of Syrians had improved relations in recent months. More substantively, ‘pre-existing relations’ and ‘social bonds’ remained the two most-cited factors for peace. Despite a decline in the fraction reporting these as factors for peace in early 2018, over the last two waves of surveying, the fraction naming ‘pre-existing relations’ (26.7%) and ‘social bonds’ (20.7%) in Beirut and Mount Lebanon has either improved or remained constant (Figure 8). Amongst Lebanese who named either one or both of these factors, this was associated with a higher likelihood also of reporting greater levels of contact with Syrian refugees in different settings, and also with more positive assessments of the current quality of relations between both communities.

**Assault and Other Victimisation**

Reports of crime, specifically (but not other forms of victimisation queried), were somewhat higher in Beirut and Mount Lebanon than in other regions. In the region, 8.7% reported incidents of theft or vandalism. Reports of ‘verbal
Figure 7: Tension factors in Beirut and Mount Lebanon
**Figure 8: Peace Factors in Beirut and Mount Lebanon**

Peace Factors, by Wave, in Beirut and Mount Lebanon

- **Wave I, May 2017**
- **Wave II, Sep 2017**
- **Wave III, Feb 2018**
- **Wave IV, July 2018**
- **Wave V, March 2019**

Lines represent:
- Assistance and projects
- Economic exchanges
- Pre-existing relationships
- Return of Syrian refugees
- Better services by municipality
- Positive role of local authorities
- Restrictions on refugees
- Social bonds between communities
harassment’ (8.2%) were also higher than in other locations. While these rates have fluctuated over the course of the study, the rates for theft and harassment were comparable to those observed at the outset of the study, in May 2017, with rates for both at 7.7% and 8.1%, respectively.

While still relatively low, but nevertheless rising slightly over the course of the study, rates of report for ‘community violence or disputes’ (4.2%), ‘extortion or bribes’ (3.5%), and ‘disputes between children’ (3.4%) were higher in the Beirut and Mount Lebanon region, relative to national averages.

In the region, 84.4% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’. This did not differ greatly from the national average (81.1%) agreeing with this statement, though there was no data collected in this study to suggest that this relation was more than perceptual, as there was no correlation, after controlling for other factors, between the estimated size of the Syrian population and Lebanese reports of crime, assault, or any other form of victimisation.

**Pressure on Services**

In the region of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, 94.1% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’.

Despite this, Beirut and Mount Lebanon residents were generally more satisfied with the level and quality of each of the public services queried in this survey, both in the most recent wave of surveying, and over the course of the previous five waves of surveying. Though for example, a significant fraction (31.4%) evaluated the quality of electricity as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ in the region, this fraction was still well below the national average (43.5%).

While Beirut and Mount Lebanon residents were, on average, more satisfied with the level and quality of most services, the exception was in ‘health services’, where 42.3% rated these as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’. Despite a higher concentration of hospital and other health service providers in the capitol of Beirut, these were also more likely to be accessed by Lebanese and Syrians residing in other parts of the country, likely also contributing to greater crowding or pressure on some of these centralised health services.
Social Media Usage

As in other regions, most in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (62.9%) recalled at least one social media post, conversation or other online content related to the topic, with Facebook, by far, being the most-used forum (59.9% of the public or 95.2% of those recalling any conversation). In contrast, Beirut and Mount Lebanon was the region where the public was least likely recall such conversations on WhatsApp, with only 10.1% citing this forum, compared to 19.1% nationally.

Despite other findings which have found Twitter users in Lebanon to be more ‘cosmopolitan’ and more likely to reside in Beirut than elsewhere, the fraction reporting exposure to such conversations on Titter in the region (7.3%) was below the national average for this statistic (8.6%) and well below the rate for the South and Nabatieh (14.9%).

Trust in Institutions

Support for Lebanese security services, particularly the LAF, was high in all districts in the region. The perception that municipal authorities had ‘improved life a little’ or ‘a lot’ was also widespread, and the public generally expressed a greater level of satisfaction with these local authorities than with national authorities. For example, in Baabda, over the previous five waves of surveying, the gap between approval for municipal authorities (74.2%) and the Cabinet (24.5%) has remained quite large, and the same was observed in other districts in the Beirut and Mount Lebanon region — with the exception of the Beirut district, where 43.5% had a favourable rating of the Cabinet.

Inter-Communal Contact

The level of inter-communal contact or interaction in Beirut and Mount Lebanon has continued to decline over the course of this study, including for both more ‘casual’ forms of contact, for example, ‘in street’, and for plausibly more substantive forms of contact, for example, ‘in social circles’. The fraction of both Lebanese and Syrians reporting ‘daily’ or ‘regular’ contact ‘in the street’ has declined from 91.2% to 70.4% over the course of the study. Averaged over the eight locations or types of contact queried in the survey, comparable declines in the average level of interaction at each site were observed. This level of decline in social interaction was observed in all districts in the region, and to a greater degree, in the district of Beirut. Though a causal relationship between
Response to prompt: 'I’m going to read you a list of actors responding to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. Thinking about the last three months and the area where you live, will you please indicate whether their activities have changed life in your area for better or worse', mean on four-point scale from 0.0 – 4.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
<th>Zgharta</th>
<th>Hamra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal authorities</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Forces (ISF)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs or International agencies like the UN</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and charitable organisations</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government (Cabinet) of Lebanon</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the average response for each type of organization, with values ranging from 0.0 (worsened life a lot) to 4.0 (improved life a lot).
the different outcomes could not be established, there was a significant and strong correlation between the declining rates of interaction and (a) greater Lebanese prejudice (Figure 10), (b) more common Lebanese reports of ‘the return of Syrian refugees’ as a possible peace factor, and (c) more negative assessments of the quality of relations between both communities.

**Governorates of the South & Nabatieh**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• For many of the indicators examined in this study, there was a greater degree of variation between districts than in other regions, with for example, very different perceptions related to national institutions between Saida and Nabatieh. Some of these differences were most likely due to demographic, including confessional, differences between districts, with greater support for, e.g., the Cabinet in Saida.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Satisfaction with the level and quality of public services was below the national average in the region, and more so outside of Saida. In Nabatieh and surrounding areas, the public was also significantly more likely to regard both ‘competition for services’ and ‘unfair aid or assistance’ as important tension factors. However, lesser satisfaction with public services in this region also, historically, predates the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, and this higher level of dissatisfaction is also likely due to other historical and political factors, independent of any Syrian refugee presence in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Despite modest increases in some reports of crime and other forms of victimisation, general perceptions of safety and security had not worsened, and indeed, most felt that the security situation had ‘stayed about the same’ or improved to a degree in recent months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Quality of Relations**

In the region of the South and Nabatiyeh, 79.1% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’. Likewise, 60.6% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’. And, 62.9% said they ‘agreed’ or
Figure 10: Prejudice, by Region

Lebanese Prejudice, as Per Cent of Scale Maximum

Greater prejudice


North and Akkar  Bekaa and Baalbek–Hermel  Beirut and Mt Lebanon  South and Nabatieh

Greater prejudice

North and Akkar

Bekaa and Baalbek–Hermel

Beirut and Mt Lebanon

South and Nabatieh
‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’. However, including both Lebanese and Syrians, proportional to the prevalence in the total population, in this region, only 38.0% rated the quality of relations as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, given the prompt, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?’ (see Figure 6, p. 14).

**Peace and Tension Factors**

While ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’ was the most-cited tension factor in the South and Nabatieh, as it was in other areas of the country, the fraction of the public naming this as a factor has continued to decline, from 55.7% at the outset of the study, to 43.4% in the most-recent Wave V survey. Likewise, at the outset of this study, ‘the establishment of Syrian business’ was the second most-cited tension factor in the region, but after declining in early 2018, the fraction of the public naming this as a tension factor has remained low, with only 13.9% naming it as a primary tension factor in Wave V.

Nevertheless, while the public’s attribution of tensions to these factors has continued to decline, the fraction naming ‘child marriages’ (20.8%) and ‘unfair aid’ (19.3%) as possible tension factors in the region has risen over recent waves of surveying.

Consistent with findings from other regions, residents of the South and Nabatieh were more likely to attribute any improvement in relations to the return of some refugees to Syria. As a possible factor for peace, the per cent of the public naming ‘social bonds’ fell marginally to 22.4%, from an initial level of 29.7%, though this was offset, to some extent, by a comparable rise in the per cent naming ‘pre-existing relations’ (22.2%) and ‘economic exchanges’ (18.2%) as possible peace factors.

**Assault and Other Victimization**

The survey asked respondents about a number of different forms of exposure to crime, violence, or experience of other forms of victimisation. Many of these experiences would be expected to be rare events, and even with the large sample size available from a combined five waves of surveying, it can be difficult to discern the (statistical) significance of changes in the level of exposure for some of these rare events per-wave at the regional or district
**Figure 11:** Tension Factors in the South and Nabatieh

Tension Factors, by Wave, in the South and Nabatieh

- Child marriages or pregnancy
- Competition for lower-skilled jobs
- Competition for higher-skilled jobs
- Competition for services and utilities
- Competition for the establishment of businesses
- Cultural differences
- Differences in religion, nationality, place of origin
- Marriages between Syrians and Lebanese
- The media
- Unfair aid distribution
- The political situation regionally and nationally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Data Points</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave I, May 2017</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave II, Sep 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave III, Feb 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave IV, July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave V, March 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The graph shows the changes in tension factors over different waves from May 2017 to March 2019.
Figure 12: Peace Factors in the South and Nabatieh

Peace Factors, by Wave, in the South and Nabatieh

- Assistance and projects
- Economic exchanges
- Pre-existing relationships
- Return of Syrian refugees
- Better services by municipality
- Positive role of local authorities
- Restrictions on refugees
- Social bonds between communities
level. Nevertheless, for many of the forms of victimisation queried, rates of report increased in the South and Nabatieh, more so than in other regions. For example, 5.5% reported experiences of ‘extortion or bribes’ in Wave V, compared to 1.1% in Wave IV. Likewise, 11.2% reported incidents of ‘theft or robbery’, compared to 3.8% in Wave IV. And, 12.8% reported an ‘employed deducing salary’, compared to 2.1% in Wave IV.

Despite this, there were no strong indications that perceptions of safety and security had deteriorated, on average. Perceptions of security ‘during the day’ and ‘during the night’ remained high and comparable with levels previously observed. In fact, while a plurality of respondents (46.7%) stated that the security situation had ‘stayed about the same’, only 5.5% said that it has worsened at all, while 27.9% said it had ‘improved a little’ and 21.0% that it had ‘improved a lot’.

**Pressure on Services**

In the region of South and Nabatieh, 76.6% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’. While the level of agreement with this statement was lower than in other regions, the region of the South and Nabatieh was the only area where ‘competition for services’ was the second most-cited tension factor, with 26.1% citing this factor.

This was most likely due to overall lesser average satisfaction with the level and quality of services in the region, especially in the district of Nabatieh, which was not directly attributable to refugee population pressure, or to the fraction of Syrian refugees in the area utilising the public services queried in the survey.

**Social Media Usage**

To query social media usage, respondents were asked, ‘Thinking about where you might have heard about, read about or discussed refugee relations in Lebanon in the last three months, on what social media or messaging applications have you seen conversations like this?’. Facebook was the most-cited platform, with 48.1% reporting that they had seen such content, followed by WhatsApp, with 40.2% reporting the same. While still only a small fraction of social media users, of the four regions considered in this analysis, Twitter usage was most prevalent in the South and Nabatieh, with 14.9% reporting seeing
such content on this platform. As in other regions, recall of material related to refugee relations on other platforms or channels, including Viber, Skype, SMS, or webpage comment sections was minimal.

**Trust in Institutions**

By far, the most favourable ratings for the Cabinet observed in this study were in the Saida area, where the 77.3% agreeing that the Cabinet had helped ‘improved life a lot’ or ‘a little’ greatly exceeded the national average level of agreement of 28.5%. This was most likely due, partially, to the fact that Cabinet approval tended to be higher in more urban and more predominately Sunni areas, including Beirut and Tripoli, but also due to the prime minister’s personal affiliation with Saida. But even in Saida, where national government institutions were regarded more favourably than elsewhere in the country, a greater fraction of the public (84.1%), nevertheless, provided favourable ratings of municipal authorities.

Trust in specific institutions did vary significantly by district in the region. For example, while security agencies including the LAF and the ISF did, on average, enjoy higher levels of support than other institutions queried in the survey — as was the case in other regions — individuals in the districts of Nabatieh and Tyre were also far more likely to report that these security services ‘had no effect on the quality of life’ than anywhere else in the country. That is, while these services were not regarded negatively in these districts, only 50.6% in Tyre and 52.9% in Nabatieh said that they LAF had ‘helped improve life a lot’ or ‘a little’, compared to a national average of 86.6% for this figure. In the same region, 81.6% of Saida and Jezzine residents attributed quality of life improvement to the LAF. The perceived role of Hezbollah as a security provider in parts of the South and Nabatieh likely played a role in how the LAF and other security providers were regarded in some areas.

**Inter-Communal Contact**

In the region of the South and Nabatieh, the level of inter-communal contact over the various sites queried in the survey remained largely unchanged over recent waves of surveying. From the outset of the study, levels of contact in the region have been lower than in other regions; however, this was partially attributable to there being a somewhat lower concentration of Syrian refugees per capita in the area, relative to other regions. Nevertheless, the prevalence
of some forms of positive contact have increased, regionally, for example, with the fraction reporting ‘regular’ or ‘daily’ interaction in ‘social circles’ increasing from 41.4% at the outset of the study to 52.2% in Wave V.

**Governorates of the Bekaa & Baalbek-Hermel**

- Over the period of five waves of surveying, the fraction of the public evaluating relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ has risen, increasing from 29.4% to 42.8% in Baalbek-Hermel and from 18.8% to 52.6% in the Bekaa over the course of the study.
- While the *perception* of refugee population pressure on services has remained relatively high throughout Lebanon, there was somewhat greater evidence of the impact of refugee population pressure on some services in this region, relative to other areas of Lebanon. Dissatisfaction with the quality of educational services was significantly higher in this region than elsewhere.
- Support for the LAF and other security institutions has fluctuated more in Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel over the course of this study than in other regions, but over the previous year, these perceptions have steadily improved. For example, the 74.6% agreeing that the LAF had ‘improved life a little’ or ‘a lot’ in early 2019 represented a significant majority, but this rate was still below the national average (84.1%).

**Quality of Relations**

In the region of the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, 60.5% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’. Likewise, 47.9% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’. And, 79.4% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’.
Including both Lebanese and Syrians, proportional to the prevalence in the total population, in this region, only 24.1% rated the quality of relations as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, given the prompt, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?’ Over multiple waves of surveying, the fraction of the public rating relations as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ has risen, from 22.7% to 49.0%. However, the composite indicator used to assess the average quality of relations over time, including multiple question items, increased marginally from 50.2% of the scale maximum (% SM) in Wave IV to 54.3% SM in Wave V, a figure that has not fluctuated greatly over the course of the study, dating to early 2017.

**Peace and Tension Factors**

For the eleven tension factors queried in the survey, in the region of Baalbek-Hermel, over the nine-to-twelve months preceding the most-recent Wave V survey, most saw a steady decline. Some factors, like the perception of ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’ declined greatly over the full period of study study, from 72.4% naming this factor at the outset of the study, to 48.5% naming this factor in Wave V. While this factor remained the most cited factor in this region — as in all other regions — this degree of improvement for this specific factor and for other tension factors has not been observed in other areas over the same period. The resonance of a number of other tension factors cited in this area, including the ‘establishment of Syrian businesses’, ‘unfair aid distribution’, and the perception of ‘cultural differences’, peaked in early 2018 concurrent with confrontations between the LAF and extremist groups in the area, but have declined slightly in the intervening period.

Following ‘competition over lower-skilled jobs’, the most-cited tension factors in the region remained ‘the establishment of Syrian businesses’ (36.1%), ‘the political situation’ (32.6%), and ‘competition for services’ (28.3%).

Many in Baalbek-Hermel also cited the ‘return of refugees to Syria’ (50.9%) as a peace factor. Following this, ‘pre-existing relationships’ (20.2%), ‘social bonds’ (12.7%) and ‘economic exchanges’ (9.4%) have remained the most-cited factors for peace in the region. In late 2017, the most-cited factor for peace after ‘pre-existing relations’ had been ‘assistance’, but over the previous three waves of surveying, the prevalence of this sentiment has steadily declined, both in the level of agreement and in the ranking of factors, with only 5.8% citing this factor in the most-recent Wave V survey.
Figure 13: Tension factors in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel

Tension Factors, by Wave, in Bekaa and Baalbek–Hermel

- Child marriages or pregnancy
- Competition for higher-skilled jobs
- Competition for lower-skilled jobs
- Competition for services and utilities
- Competition for the establishment of businesses
- Differences in religion, nationality, place of origin
- Marriages between Syrians and Lebanese
- Cultural differences
- The media
- The political situation regionally and nationally
- Unfair aid distribution
Figure 14: Peace Factors in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel

![Graph showing Peace Factors, by Wave, in Bekaa and Baalbek–Hermel](image-url)

- Assistance and projects
- Economic exchanges
- Pre–existing relationships
- Return of Syrian refugees
- Better services by municipality
- Positive role of local authorities
- Restrictions on refugees
- Social bonds between communities
Assault and Other Victimisation

Of the four regions considered in this analysis, residents in Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, both of Lebanese and Syrian national origin, were amongst the most likely to have experienced ‘verbal harassment’, with 15.8% of households reporting this, compared to a national average of 9.5%. Comparable to the rate of report in the South and Nabatieh, and likewise above the national average, 5.2% reported incidents of ‘bribery or extortion’, and 11.8% reported incidents of ‘theft or robbery’.

While, amongst Syrians, there were greater reports of evictions, detentions, raids and shop closures in the region than in other regions, the size of the subsample of Syrian refugees in the area was not sufficiently large enough to provide an accurate estimate of the rate of exposure for each of these forms of victimisation.

Pressure on Services

In the region of Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, 93.3% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’. Compared to other regions, the correlations between agreement with this statement and (a) citing ‘competition over services’ as a specific tension factor and (b) dissatisfaction with the average quality of all services queried were stronger than in other areas. While a causal relationship between these items could not be established, this, nevertheless, likely indicated a degree of ‘real rather than perceived’ refugee population on services greater than in other areas of Lebanon.

While education was amongst the public services that both Lebanese and Syrians were most likely to be satisfied with, the fraction of those who said the quality of this service in the region was ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ (31.3%) was significantly higher in this region than elsewhere, and this level of dissatisfaction with the quality of educational services was also higher than than originally observed at the outset of this study, in May 2017 (25.8%).

With respect to other services queried in the survey, average regional satisfaction with the level and quality of services was comparable to other regions and the national average. However, this was partly attributable to above average satisfaction with some services, especially electricity, in Zahle.
Excluding Zahle from the calculation of average satisfaction in the larger region of the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, average satisfaction with the level and quality of other services, including water, sanitation, social services and health services was below the national average and, for most services, comparable to the average level of satisfaction observed in the region of the North and Akkar.

**Social Media Usage**

Asked about the use of various social and online media, and the recall of content or messages related to refugee relations in the country, Facebook was the most-cited platform in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, with 47.4% reporting that they had seen such content, followed by WhatsApp, with 25.8% reporting the same. As in other regions, recall of material related to refugee relations on other platforms or channels, including Viber, Skype, SMS, or webpage comment sections was minimal.

**Trust in Institutions**

On average, Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel residents had somewhat more positive perceptions of the performance of the Cabinet, with 48.1%, regionally, stating that this institution had ‘improved life a lot’ or ‘a little’. However, support for the Cabinet was notably lower in some districts than in others, for example, with only 17.2% of those in Rashaya and West Bekaa giving the same favourable response, averaged over the five waves.

In the Wave V survey, support for all security actors was strong, with 74.6% agreeing that the LAF had ‘improved life a lot’ or ‘a little’, and 66% saying the same of the ISF. Over the course of the survey project, support for the LAF and ISF and other security agencies has fluctuated more in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel than in other areas. This most likely was attributable to the confrontation between the LAF and extremist groups in the region in late 2017, where local reactions to these operations were ‘mixed’, in that, while the public did support the LAF’s objectives, many were also negatively affected by the conflict, and in some instances, even temporarily displaced. In the absence of any similar more-recent confrontations of the same scale including the LAF or other security agencies, public support for these institutions has returned to the ‘baseline’ levels initially observed at the outset of this study, and to levels comparable to the national average.
As in other regions, and despite strong support the security agencies (and in some districts, above average support for both the Cabinet and the Parliament), residents were still more likely to attribute positive outcomes to local or municipal authorities. Regionally, 65.6% agreed that municipal authorities had ‘improved life a lot’ or ‘a little’.

**Inter-Communal Contact**

The level of inter-communal contact in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel has remained relatively more stable over the five waves of surveying than it has in other areas of the country. Averaged over the different sites or types of contact queried in the survey, there was no significant change in the level of contact. Nevertheless, there was some evidence in this region, as in other regions, of diminishing levels of more substantive forms of contact. For example, the per cent reporting interaction with persons of the other nationality ‘daily’ or ‘regularly’ ‘in the street’ increased from 55.4% to 70.4%. However, the per cent who said they ‘never’ interacted with persons of the other nationality ‘in social circles’ also increased, from 13.3% in Wave IV to 21.8% in Wave V.

**Discussion**

Regional social forces, specific histories of cross-border contact and relations, and in some cases, specific histories or memories of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, as well as other social, political and economic factors play an important role in shaping the nature and quality of relations between Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugees in the country. Not all of these dynamics can be sufficiently explained with survey data.

Nevertheless, in this fifth narrative report for the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* survey project, we have sought to highlight some of the regionally specific circumstances and trends which might help explain variation in social stability outcomes, specifically, but also more generally, which might help explain variation in the quality of life for both Lebanese and Syrians in more-vulnerable localities.

Social change tends to occur only slowly, and after nearly eight years of a sizeable Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon, the state of affairs, and dynamics affecting Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugee relations have, in some sense, ‘normalised’, or a status quo has been established. That is, for example,
with respect to social stability outcomes, while there are both peace factors and tension factors, and while the plausible drivers of conflict represented in the Stabilisation and Monitoring Framework (SMF) do most likely remain valid assumptions, many of these dynamics have also remained relatively static. The same challenges to social stability persist, but more often that not, many of the same protective factors also endure.

Previous reporting in this survey project has emphasised the importance of understanding how many complex factors interact, and how no one single dynamic adequately explains variation, over time and over geographies, in the quality of relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees. The data and analysis from this fifth wave of surveying also support this conclusion.

Where significant changes in attitudes, opinions or other outcomes related to social stability and the situation and status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have been observed, these have, for the most part, been attributable to specific events (for example, conflict events), and the effects of the events have been both relatively limited, geographically and over time. For example, the threat posed by extremist groups and the LAF operations in response to this threat the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel in late 2017 had a significant ‘disruptive’ effect on multiple social stability indicators, including the quality of relations between Lebanese and Syrians. Yet, these effects were relatively short lived, and a year later, these events were not a primary driver of related sentiments in the areas.

Rather than seek to explain large (likely temporary) shifts at very local levels, the analysis and reporting in this narrative has instead sought to highlight key regional differences in seven key indicators understood to be relevant to explaining social stability outcomes. And this reporting has sought to highlight where slow, gradual change is most likely to have lasting effects on inter-communal relations and social stability outcomes.

This is in the three-way interaction between (a) inter-community contact, (b) the perception of the quality of relations, and (c) real or perceived refugee population pressure on services, including the Lebanese perception of the capability and fairness of international assistance provided with the intent to alleviate this pressure. The three factors are most likely causes and effects of one another. Both the level and quality of inter-communal contact has persistently declined in many areas of the country, and in many areas, this has been accompanied by worsening perceptions of the quality of relations
between communities, a sentiment shared by both Lebanese and Syrians. And finally, while the perceived neglect of vulnerable Lebanese in the provision of assistance remains a chief complaint for many Lebanese, perceptions of the capability and fairness of assistance have also steadily improved over the previous year, in many but not all communities, and this has also, most likely, helped mitigate worsening relations.

**Indicator Definitions**

**Quality of Relations**

A number of different question items were used to construct a scale for the assessment of the ‘quality of relations’. Respondents were asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements:

- ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’.
- ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’.
- ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’.
- ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’.

Additionally, respondents were asked to describe ‘current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area’ as positive or negative. With negative items reverse-coded, a per cent of the scale maximum was used as the indicator for quality of relations.

**Inter-Communal Contact**

To assess the level of inter-communal contact or interaction, both Lebanese and Syrian respondents were asked how often they encounter persons of the other nationality in a number of venues or scenarios, including:

- At work
- Social circles
- Paying rent
- In the street
- In the shop
- Religious events
• Activities organised by NGOs or local organisations.
• Municipality or neighbourhood organised events.

**Peace Factors**

The sum of items from a list identified as relevant ‘factors for peace’ by each respondent, including the following. Enumerators were instructed to code the options most closely related to the respondent’s answer:

• Pre-existing relationships between Lebanese and Syrians.
• Social bonds between communities (intermarriages, relatives, etc.).
• Positive role of local authorities (municipality/religious authorities).
• Better services by the municipality.
• Assistance and projects by NGOs/international organisations.
• Restrictions on refugees’ movements and access to jobs.
• Return of Syrian refugees to their home.
• Economic exchanges between Syrians and Lebanese.

In addition to ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refuse’, respondents were also given the option to state that, ‘Nothing helps improve relations’, which was not included in the sum of peace factors.

**Social Media Usage**

Respondents were asked about their exposure (i.e. ‘recall’) of conversations regarding Syrian refugees in Lebanon on various social media platforms, including:

• Facebook
• Twitter
• WhatsApp
• SMS
• Comments on webpage
• Viber
• Skype
• LinkedIn

**Tension Factors**

The sum of items from a list identified as relevant ‘tension factors’ by each respondent, including the following. Enumerators were instructed to code the options most closely related to the respondent’s answer:
• Competition for higher-skilled jobs (including office and desk-based jobs such as teachers bankers, lawyers, engineers)
• Competition for lower-skilled jobs (including manual labour such as a cleaner, casual labourers, electrician)
• Competition for the establishment of businesses
• Competition for services and utilities
• The media
• The political situation regionally and nationally
• Cultural differences (like how women behave)
• Differences in religion, nationality, place of origin
• Unfair aid distribution
• Marriages between Syrians and Lebanese
• Child Marriages/pregnancy

In addition to ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refuse’, respondents were also given the option to state that, ‘There are no tensions’, which was not included in the sum of tension factors.

**Assault and Other Victimisation**

The sum of a number of household reports of various experiences crime, assault or other victimisation, in response to the prompt, ‘I am going to read you a short list of experience either you or a member may have had. For each, will you tell me if you or a member of your family have experienced each of the following in the last three months?’, including:

• Verbal harassment
• Physical harassment
• Extortion/bribes
• Kidnapping
• Theft/robbery
• Community violence/disputes
• Displacements/evictions
• Employer deducting salary
• Sexual assault/harassment
• Disputes between children
• Raids, other than shop closure
• Raids, shop closure
• Detention
• Confiscated ID Paper
• Fines
Respondents were also given the options ‘Don’t know’, Refuse’, and ‘Other’, which were not included in the calculation of the sum.

**Pressure on Services**

Respondents were asked to rate the quality of a number of public services, including:
• Electricity
• Water
• Sewerage
• Waste removal
• Education
• Health services
• Social services
• Public and recreational space
• Environmental services
Additionally, respondents were asked a number of questions relating to the perception of refugee population pressure on services, including:
• ‘And of these services, would you say that competition over one or more leads to greater tensions in your area between Lebanese and Syrians?’
• ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’.

**Trust in Institutions**

Respondents were asked to assess the performance of a number of national and local institutions in their response to the refugee crisis in Lebanon. Institutions queried included:
• The Government (Cabinet) of Lebanon
• Local and charitable organisations
• NGOs or international agencies like the UN
• Lebanese Armed Forces
• Internal Security Forces
• Municipal authorities
• General Security