Refugee Economies in Uganda:
What Difference Does the Self-Reliance Model Make?
Host community house in Nakivale
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Executive Summary

• Uganda’s refugee policies have been widely recognised as among the most progressive in the world. Through its self-reliance model, it allows refugees the right to work and freedom of movement. It has sustained this approach virtually since independence despite currently hosting more refugees than any other African country.

• Uganda’s model has three core elements that distinguish it from most other refugee-hosting countries. First, its regulatory framework: it lets refugees work and choose their place of residence. Second, its assistance model: it allocates plots of land for refugees to cultivate within its rural settlements. Third, its model of refugee-host interaction: it encourages integrated social service provision and market access.

• This report explores the question: what difference does Uganda’s self-reliance model make? How do its different elements influence welfare outcomes for refugees and for host communities? These questions matter both for Uganda and for refugees around the world. Given that Uganda’s model has become an exemplar for development-based approaches to refugees, an evidence-based understanding of the conditions under which self-reliance policies lead to enhanced welfare outcomes matters for policy, programming, and advocacy.

• Assessing the impact of the self-reliance model is methodologically challenging. It relies upon being able to compare outcomes for refugees and hosts outside the model with refugees and hosts within the model. In order to do that, we compare welfare outcomes for refugees and host communities in Uganda with those in neighbouring Kenya. We choose this comparison because the countries have contrasting legal and policy frameworks relating to refugees, and yet both are in the same region and host refugee populations from the same countries. The comparison can also help answer questions of broader interest like ‘what difference does the right to work actually make?’

• Drawing upon quantitative and qualitative research, including a survey of over 8,000 refugees and host community members in urban (Kampala and Nairobi) and camp (Kakuma and Nakivale) contexts, we provide a nuanced account of the impact that different aspects of the Ugandan model have on particular groups in relation to particular welfare outcomes. We focus on outcomes for Congolese and Somali refugees. The data in the report is representative of our focus populations and selected sites but not for all refugees or host communities in Uganda and Kenya.

• We argue that there is a need to go beyond a romanticised view of the Ugandan model, and identify the conditions under which particular self-reliance policies actually lead to improved welfare outcomes. The picture that emerges is mixed. It shows that aspects of the Ugandan model are highly effective for some populations, but that other aspects may be less effective than is commonly assumed.

• On the positive side, refugees in Uganda enjoy greater mobility, higher incomes, lower transaction costs for economic activity, and possibly more sustainable sources of employment than those in Kenya. However, refugee employment levels in Uganda are surprisingly lower compared with either refugees in Kenya or Ugandan nationals, educational access is more limited, and our data raises questions about the viability of current land allocation practices as the basis for self-reliance.
• One of the biggest advantages of the Ugandan model comes from the country’s regulation. Freedom of movement appears to result in higher levels of mobility. This enables refugees to adopt economic strategies that might not otherwise be possible, including split-family strategies. Mobility is particularly important for Somalis whose commercial activities are often connected to national and transnational supply chains. In Kenya, refugees are working and moving outside the camps. However, they incur far higher transaction costs as a result of doing so.

• In terms of employment, overall levels are surprisingly higher among refugees in Kenya than Uganda. However, in Kakuma, this is largely due to the availability of international organisation and NGO-supported ‘incentive work’, whereas refugee employment in Nakivale comes from self-employment in agriculture and market-based sources, and hence may represent more sustainable sources of employment. In Nairobi, the difference may reflect that the city offers a larger labour market.

• Refugees in Uganda generally have higher incomes than those in Kenya, even though there is not a significant difference between the surrounding host communities. However, there is one notable exception: Congolese refugees in Nakivale are worse off than Congolese in Kakuma. This pattern reflects that Congolese in Nakivale are mainly engaged in subsistence agriculture, while Congolese in Kakuma are mainly employed as incentive workers by NGOs. Somalis generally engage in commercial activities, and are able to earn higher incomes across our research sites in Uganda than those in Kenya.

• The allocation of plots of land for cultivation is a defining feature of the Ugandan model. However, our data calls into question the sustainability of the current approach. First, the approach does not benefit all communities: although many Congolese households take up the opportunity to cultivate land, Somalis refrain from agricultural activity. Second, there is insufficient land for newly arrived refugees: the overwhelming majority of land is cultivated by families who arrived before 2012. Third, although Congolese refugees who have access to land do better than those who do not, and more land is associated with better food security outcomes, subsistence agriculture is inherently limited as a pathway to high income levels.

• Aside from land allocation, levels of assistance in Uganda and Kenya are broadly comparable. This suggests that the most important explanation for refugees in Uganda’s generally better welfare outcomes is the different regulatory environment rather than the assistance model. Indeed, in some areas, notably education, there is evidence that public service provision may actually be weaker in Uganda than in Kenya. For example, in regression analysis and controlling for other variables, being in Nakivale is associated with three years less education than being in Kakuma for refugees who arrived before the age of sixteen. This may be partly due to the greater involvement of the international community in parallel service provision in Kenya compared with direct national government provision in Uganda.

• In terms of refugee–host interaction, host communities in Kenya are slightly more likely to have positive perceptions of refugees than in Uganda. This is especially the case for the Turkana around Kakuma and ethnic Somali Kenyans in Eastleigh. In both cases, the difference seems to be based on a perception that their presence brings a positive economic contribution, notably through employment. In the camp context, this difference may be because whereas the economic activities of refugees and hosts are complementary in Kakuma, refugees and hosts undertake similar economic activities in Nakivale, making competition more likely.

• Overall, the report provides strong support for the value of ensuring that refugees have access to the right to work and freedom of movement. However, it offers a nuanced account of the aspects of the Ugandan model that lead to improved welfare outcomes and those that do not. Based on these insights, we outline a series of recommendations for refugee policy in Uganda and globally.
1. Introduction

Uganda is widely regarded as having one of the most progressive refugee policies in the world. Despite currently hosting more refugees than any country in Africa, it allows refugees the right to work and significant freedom of movement. This self-reliance model contrasts with many other refugee-hosting countries in the region, which often require refugees to live in camps, and deny them access to labour markets.

Ever since the Nakivale settlement, Africa’s oldest refugee camp, opened in 1958, Uganda has provided refugees with plots of land in rural settlements, allowing them to engage in subsistence farming. Vibrant and entrepreneurial markets have emerged in many of its main refugee settlements in the south-west of the country, notably in the Nakivale, Kyangwali, and Kyaka II settlements. Refugees who wish to live in cities like Kampala are able to do so, provided that they give up access to nearly all assistance. Although there has always been variation in the implementation of the approach, notably in the more arid Nile Valley region, the BBC described Uganda as ‘one of the best places to be a refugee’.1

Uganda’s approach was formalised in policy through the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS), established with donor support in 1999. The right to work and to choose a place of residence were incorporated into law in the 2006 Refugee Act. Most recently, the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategic framework updated the SRS model in 2016, outlining a model to support resilience and self-reliance for both refugees and the host community.2 In the context of UNHCR’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, ReHoPE’s aim is to integrate refugees in national development plans through a series of commitments by the government of Uganda, the United Nations, the World Bank, and other partners.

Although policy labels have changed over time, we use the term ‘Self-Reliance Strategy’ as an umbrella term to describe Uganda’s overall model, encompassing three main elements. First, its regulatory framework, which allows refugees to work and freedom of residence. Second, its assistance model, which has traditionally been based on allocating plots of land in rural settlements. Third, its integrated service delivery, in which refugees have access to the same schools and hospitals as nationals.

Recently, Uganda faced the challenge of a dramatic increase in its refugee numbers. Crisis and conflict in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) led refugee numbers in Uganda to increase from 450,000 in early 2015 to around 1.4 million by late 2017. In June 2017, the United Nations supported a Uganda Solidarity Summit in Kampala, with the aim of raising $2 billion; however, commitments fell significantly short of this figure, and in 2018, amid allegations of corruption and the inflation of refugee numbers, a number of government staff were removed from key posts.

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Regardless of these events, Uganda’s policy stance on refugees remains exceptional, and it has been a viewed as a source of inspiration by governments, international organisations, and NGOs around the world. Despite an increase in research interest in Uganda’s model, there has hitherto been relatively limited evidence on what difference Uganda’s self-reliance model actually makes to refugees and the host community. Does it improve welfare outcomes for refugees and the host community? Does it improve refugee–host community relations? This report aims to explore these questions.

Of course, providing rigorous quantitative evidence on the impact of Uganda’s Self-Reliance Strategy is methodologically challenging. It relies upon some kind of counterfactual; we need to be able to compare outcomes for refugees and hosts within the model with refugees and hosts outside the model. As a starting point for this, we compare outcomes for refugees and hosts in Uganda and neighbouring Kenya. The comparison is valuable because, although the countries are in the same region and receive some of the same refugee populations, they have contrasting regulatory and policy frameworks relating to refugees. While Uganda allows the right to work and freedom of movement, Kenya imposes significant restrictions on both of these rights. Kenya’s legislation formally requires refugees to reside in designated camps in which work permits are not available to refugees.

Using comparable survey methods, we draw upon data collected in 2017 and 2018 in urban and camps contexts in Uganda (Kampala and Nakivale) and Kenya (Nairobi and Kakuma). Comparing these countries has limitations: other factors beyond law and policy are likely to explain variation in outcomes for refugees and host communities across the two countries. And although our data is representative of refugees and hosts within these contexts, these sites are not representative of all refugees in the two countries. Nevertheless, we attempt to account for at least some of these other sources of variation, sufficiently to be able to identify the difference it makes to refugees being in Uganda compared with being in Kenya.

In this report, we therefore examine three Uganda-specific questions, which we bring to life through comparison with Kenya. Each question focuses on different aspects of what is ostensibly unique about the Ugandan model. First, on the regulatory framework: what difference do the right to work and the right of movement make? Second, on the assistance model: do self-reliance policies lead to self-reliance outcomes? Third, on refugee–host interactions: does Uganda’s integrated service approach lead to improved community relations?

Within each section, we outline what is distinctive about the Ugandan model and explore its relationship to a range of welfare outcomes.

Overall, our research challenges the idea of a stark dichotomy between a progressive Ugandan model and a restrictive Kenyan model. In some areas, Uganda’s Self-Reliance Strategy appears to lead to notably better welfare outcomes for refugees and hosts than Kenya’s encampment policy. For example, it may lead to greater mobility, higher incomes, lower transaction costs, more sustainable job creation, and a greater perception of freedom. However, it also appears to have weaknesses in areas that have often been praised, notably in terms of the sustainability of its land allocation model and in the quality of service provision. The overall picture is a complex one, which reveals areas in which the Kenyan and Ugandan models both have relative strengths and weaknesses, with nuanced consequences for different populations.

“While Uganda allows the right to work and freedom of movement, Kenya imposes significant restrictions on both of these rights”
2. Methodology

Our aim is to comparatively explore what difference Uganda’s progressive refugee policies make to refugees and host communities, when compared with Kenya’s apparently contrasting regulatory environment.

The research is based on a mixed-methods, participatory approach. We sequence qualitative research and quantitative data collection. Across all of our research sites, we begin our research by drawing upon methods such as focus groups, semi-structured interviews, transect walks, and non-participant observation. This enables us to acquire an understanding of context, build relationships within the community, and adapt our survey questionnaire based on our observations. We then progress to the implementation of the survey on both refugee and host communities. In order to allow comparison, our survey design is broadly similar across all research contexts; however, it includes some adaptation to context based on the insights of our qualitative research. All of our surveys are implemented by enumerators from the host and refugee communities, whom we train in basic research methods and data collection skills.

The quantitative data presented in this report is derived from the first waves of a panel data collection exercise being undertaken in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia between 2017 and 2020. The purpose of this report is to provide some of that data within an analytically interesting and policy relevant structure. Although this report is based on preliminary analysis, it has a number of methodologically distinguishing features. In particular, it represents one of the first quantitative studies on the economic lives of refugees to engage in comparative cross-country analysis. Furthermore, it includes both urban–camp and refugee–host community comparisons.

Our case selection for this report is based on Uganda and Kenya’s contrasting regulatory frameworks and assistance models. Uganda’s Self-Reliance Strategy and Kenya’s encampment policy have commonly been identified as occupying contrasting ends of the refugee policy spectrum. And yet, as neighbouring countries, both hosts to Congolese, Somali, and South Sudanese refugees, they have enough in common to make comparison meaningful. Within each country, we select an urban and rural comparator. We compare Nairobi and Kampala, as refugee-hosting capital cities. We compare the Kakuma camp in Kenya with the Nakivale settlement in Uganda. While Kakuma is one of two sets of camps in Kenya, Nakivale is one of 13 designated settlements in Uganda. We selected them partly because they have a number of things in common: they are both widely regarded as the most progressive and economically dynamic camps or settlements in their respective country, they both have a long history (Kakuma was created in 1992 and Nakivale in 1958), and they both host Congolese and Somali refugees in sufficient numbers to enable meaningful comparison.
Refugee Economies in Uganda

Research team visits an Ethiopian refugee in Nakivale

Research assistant Louise Guo and refugee enumerators sampling in Kampala

Research assistant Jordan Barnard and refugee enumerator sampling in Kampala

Louise Guo, Hope Zainab, and Naohiko Omata

Training in Nakivale

Training in Kampala

Research team in Nakivale
Our data is not representative of Uganda or Kenya. Both countries have a diverse range of refugee-hosting contexts, entailing different geographies, local political contexts, and populations. However, the data is representative of the respective contexts in which we work.

By way of background, Kampala hosts nearly 100,000 refugees. Most Somalis live in the geographically contiguous Kisenyi area which is well organised, visibly entrepreneurial, and informally governed through the Somali Community Association. Meanwhile, most Congolese refugees co-reside with Ugandans in the Nsambya and Katwe areas, and are often associated with specific economic activities such as textiles and jewellery making. There are similarities with Nairobi, which may also have around 100,000 refugees, and where Somalis general live in the Eastleigh area, and Congolese are more dispersed across areas such as Kasarani and Githurai.

In Uganda, the vast majority of refugees live in one of the country’s designated settlements, which are jointly managed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and UNHCR. The Nakivale settlement is home to approximately 105,000 refugees. Until recently, it was Uganda’s largest settlement. Its largest populations are Congolese, Somali, and Burundian. An hour’s drive from the district capital of Mbarara, the settlement area is divided geographically into three administrative zones: Base Camp, Juru, and Rubondo. Meanwhile, Kakuma is slightly larger with 180,000 refugees of mainly Congolese, Somali, and South Sudanese origin, and divides into four main camps, Kakuma 1 to 4, and a new settlement called Kalobeyei. Although close to Kakuma Town and Lodwar, it is more remote from large-scale market activity than Nakivale.

Despite similarities, the legal and policy contexts contrast in ways that are salient to our analysis. First, the regulatory frameworks are different: Uganda provides the formal right to work and freedom of movement; Kenya does not. Second, the assistance models are different: Uganda provides plots of land in its settlements as the basis of self-reliance and allows urban refugees to work and register businesses; Kenya does not. Third, the dominant approach to refugee–host interaction is different. In Uganda, refugees are integrated into national service provision; in Kenya, refugees receive parallel services provided by the international community. We were interested in exploring what difference these three contrasting features make.

We carried out large-scale surveys in Uganda and Kenya to collect representative data and enable statistical analysis (n=8159). In Uganda, we worked with the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, which kindly provided access to data from the 2014 Census. We used two-stage cluster sampling to select the sample of refugee and host community households. In the first stage, we randomly selected enumeration areas in the Kampala district and Nakivale sub-county proportionally to the size of the populations of interest. We then used satellite images and community mobilisers to map the selected areas and identify all households. A fixed number of households was then randomly selected in each enumeration area. In Kenya, we used a similar sampling strategy, building on census data from the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics. The only exception is for the Congolese refugees living in Nairobi, which were selected using simple random sampling from lists prepared by Banyamulenge and Banyamasisi leaders. The final sample is detailed in Table 1.

In terms of survey implementation, the questionnaires for both refugee and host populations include modules on a range of themes such as demographics, economic activities, income, assets, networks, mobility, health, and well-being. Questionnaires were refined through multiple rounds of testing with respective refugee communities before implementation. Questionnaires were translated into the most prevalent languages of respondents: Somali, Kiswahili, and two Ugandan languages, Luganda and Runyankole.

We recognise that the Ugandan and Kenyan contexts vary in a range of ways beyond the legal and policy variables we are interested in, and that a range of confounding variables are likely to contribute to our observed outcomes. We therefore use our qualitative research not only as a means to inform our survey design but also as a means to triangulate our quantitative observations, and to elaborate on the causal mechanisms that may underpin quantitative patterns and correlations.

“**All of our surveys are implemented by enumerators from the host and refugee communities, whom we train in basic research methods and data collection skills**”
On the surface, Uganda and Kenya’s refugee policies could not be more different. They occupy opposite ends of the regulatory spectrum when it comes to refugees’ socio-economic rights. Uganda allows refugees to work and select their place of residence. Kenya requires refugees to live in designated camps where they are unable to apply for work permits.

Uganda’s Refugee Act of 2006 represents its main source of legislation relating to refugees. Described as ‘a model for Africa’ by UNHCR, it provides refugees with the right to work, move around the country, and live in the community. Section 29(e) explains that refugees shall enjoy ‘the same treatment accorded to aliens generally in similar situations’, including the right to (iv) ‘establish commercial and industrial companies in accordance with applicable laws’ and (vi) ‘the right to have access to employment opportunities and engage in gainful employment’.

Meanwhile, Section 30 provides that ‘a recognised refugee is entitled to free movement in Uganda’, albeit subject to national security and public order provisions.

The Act came into force in 2009 at a time when Uganda hosted just 140,000 refugees. It replaced the Control of Aliens Refugee Act (1960), known as CARA. Although CARA required refugees to reside in settlements and marginalised important elements of international refugee law, it also included the right to work. Section 15 stated: ‘Arrangements shall be made for offering employment to refugees who shall be paid at the appropriate rate of wages prevailing in Uganda for the performance of similar work’.

While advocacy organisations such as the Refugee Law Project (RLP) described the 2006 Act as having ‘some deficiencies, loopholes, inadequacies, room for excesses, and glaring omissions’, notably in areas like the prohibition of refugees’ political activities and its ambiguous definition of protection, the Act has more widely been viewed as highly progressive in terms of creating legislation that recognises refugees’ socio-economic rights.

In contrast, Kenya’s refugee legislation is often viewed as highly restrictive. Canadian academic James Milner has described Kenyan policy as being characterised by ‘encampment and abdication’ since the early 1990s. Although Kenya tolerated the self-settlement of refugees until the late 1980s, the large-scale influx of Somali refugees led to a policy change towards requiring refugees to reside in the Dadaab or Kakuma camps from 1992 onwards. This de facto policy framework was enshrined in legislation through the Kenyan Refugee Act of 2006, which restricts refugees’ freedom of movement, and indirectly limits their right to work.
Section 16(2) of the Refugee Act explains that ‘the Minister may, by notice of the Gazette, in consultation with the host community, designate places and areas in Kenya to live – a) ... transit centres; b) camps.’ Section 16(4) appears to offer refugees the right to work: ‘every refugee and member of his family in Kenya shall, in respect of wage-earning employment, be subject to the same restrictions as are imposed on persons who are not citizens of Kenya.’ Indeed, Section 40 of the 2011 Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act creates a category of work permits for refugees known as Class M Permits. However, in practice, these permits, issued by the Director of Immigration Services, are only available in Nairobi. While legislation was brought to Parliament in 2017 that proposes giving refugees in Kenya the right to work and access to land, similar to Ugandan legislation, the proposed Bill was rejected by the President on the grounds that it was not based on adequate consultation in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution.

The contrasting state of refugee legislation between the two countries has been widely recognised. The real question, though, is: what does the contrasting regulatory framework mean in practice? To what extent do differences in law and policy relating to work and mobility rights actually translate into different outcomes in terms of employment and mobility? While intuitively we might predict that the Ugandan model would inevitably lead to more progressive outcomes, the reality is more nuanced.

**Mobility**

Refugees in Uganda are not greatly more mobile than refugees in Kenya. 22% of Congolese and 29% of Somalis in Nakivale report leaving the settlement in the last year, compared with 13% of Congolese and 17% of Somalis in Kakuma (Fig. 1). Although there is a gap (of around 70%), this is also true for the host community: 70% of Ugandans around Nakivale and 40% of Turkana around Kakuma have travelled in the last year, probably reflecting the fact that Nakivale is closer to the capital city and Mbarara offers greater economic opportunities than Kakuma Town or Lodwar, for example. Refugees in Kenya are travelling less, and paying more in terms of bribes and fees to do so.¹

Nevertheless, some refugees appear to deliberately select Uganda’s regulatory environment over Kenya’s. Over 80% of Somali refugees in Uganda have engaged in secondary movement from Kenya to Uganda. Of those who moved, around 30% cited the absence of freedom to work and move as the primary reason for onward movement (security was a concern for others).²

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¹ See, for example, Betts, A et al (2018), Refugee Economies in Kenya (RSC: Oxford).
² DRC = Congolese refugee; SOM = Somali refugee; TUR = Turkana; KEN in DRC = Kenyan in Congolese area; KEN in SOM = Kenyan in Somali area; UGA = Ugandan; UGA in DRC = Ugandan in Congolese area; UGA in SOM = Ugandan in Somali area.
ranked similarly highly). Some stayed there for some time, especially in Nairobi, but eventually moved to Uganda in search of less stringent regulations. One Somali refugee explained:

Kenya is tough. The police harass refugees. We cannot move freely. We have to carry our ID all the time in Kenya. Nairobi is also dangerous and has so much crime...Uganda is safer and more peaceful. When we are walking, no one harasses us. It is much easier to live here.

Greater mobility rights are valued because they enable refugees to adopt economic strategies than might otherwise be unavailable or expensive. For example, many Somali refugee families adopt a split-family strategy in which some family members (usually women and younger children) remain in Nakivale in order to access aid and free accommodation while others live in Kampala, returning briefly when verification or food distribution take place. The prevalence of this strategy among Somalis is borne out by the data: 40% of Somali refugees in Kampala reported to live in the place where they are registered compared with 86% of Congolese refugees. To take an example, Osman⁵ is the household head of a Somali refugee family, which is split between Kampala and Nakivale. For business purposes, he lives alone in Kisenyi, where he runs a brokerage business and a small food stand, while his wife and six children remain in Nakivale. Osman sends them money regularly.

By dividing household members, families can take advantage of the aid provided in Nakivale while benefiting from business opportunities in Kampala. While this split-family strategy is not uncommon amongst refugees in other countries, Somali refugees in Uganda seem to employ it extensively and do not worry about trying to conceal it.

Interestingly, such strategies also extend transnationally, with some Somali households with split-family members living in both Kampala and Nairobi. For example, Mariana is a Somali refugee in Kampala; she has been in Kampala since 2014, but her husband has lived in Eastleigh in Nairobi since 2016:

My husband is registered in Kenya as a refugee. First, we met in Kampala and got married in 2016.... He is working as a shopkeeper of a grocery shop in Eastleigh. He also has a cousin who lives in Nairobi. Every month he sends me USD 150...Nairobi is a better economic place and has more business opportunities. Kampala is an easy place to live with better security and less harassment.

The viability of split-family strategies illustrates one of the relative advantages of Uganda’s regulatory environment.

⁵ To protect the anonymity of participants, we use pseudonyms throughout the report.
Employment

One of the biggest surprises of our data is that refugees in Kenya have higher rates of employment (defined broadly as a form of remunerated economic activity) than those in Uganda. In Kakuma, 66% of Congolese and 34% of Somalis have some form of employment, compared with 46% of Congolese and 23% of Somalis in Nakivale (Fig. 2).6 This observation, however, requires some nuance. In Kakuma, unlike Nakivale, refugees have access to high levels of ‘incentive work,’ low-paid roles working for international organisations and NGOs in a variety of positions from cleaners to electricians, while Nakivale refugees rely more on agriculture and on market-based sources of employment. In Kakuma, over 80% of employed Congolese and 40% of employed Somalis are incentive workers. This compares with less than 5% of employed Congolese and less than 5% of employed Somalis in Nakivale. Most jobs in Nakivale come from businesses run by refugees or Ugandans. It might therefore be argued that while there are more jobs for refugees in Kakuma, there are more sustainable jobs in Nakivale.

In the urban context, refugee employment levels are comparable but, if anything, slightly higher in Nairobi than Kampala. A total of 55% of Congolese and 44% of Somalis have a job in Nairobi compared with 52% of Congolese and 23% of Somalis in Kampala. Indeed, this may be partly due to Nairobi having a larger market. One Somali refugee who had moved from Nairobi to Kampala commented:

Nairobi has more economic opportunities for us [compared with Kampala]. Nairobi also has a much larger Somali community. A lot of Somali investment goes to Nairobi. There are many active businesses owned by Somali people… Also life is cheaper in Nairobi than Kampala... [because] almost all items in Kampala such as milk, rice, and clothing are imported through Kenya.

However, some of the difference between Nairobi and Kampala may also be explained by a selection effect. Because staying in Nairobi as a (Somali) refugee is more expensive and difficult, those with good economic prospects are more likely to remain in Nairobi. This effect is reflected in the fact that, according to official data, 55% of Somalis in Uganda live in the capital, while only 9% of Somalis in Kenya live in the capital.

Fig. 3 underscores the striking difference in the main sources of refugee employment between Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda, a relatively much greater proportion of refugee employment is created by other refugees of the same nationality. In Kampala, nearly 100% of Somali refugee employment and 33% of Congolese refugee employment is by co-nationals, compared with just 2% for Somalis and 4% for Congolese in Nairobi. The pattern replicates in the camps: in Nakivale 88% of Somali employment and 51% of Congolese employment is by co-nationals compared with 57% for Somalis and 10% for Congolese in Kakuma. In Kenya, a far larger proportion of employment comes instead from either international organisations and NGOs or Kenyan nationals. This pattern holds for both Somalis and Congolese refugees and across the urban and camp contexts, although in both countries, Somalis are more likely to be employed by other refugees and Congolese are more likely to be employed by NGOs or host nationals. This observation reinforces the idea that the Ugandan regulatory framework may lead to more sustainable sources of employment because it enables refugees to employ other refugees.

In Uganda, a relatively much greater proportion of refugee employment is created by other refugees of the same nationality

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6 It should be noted that these data relate to the individual level. In our earlier work we highlighted the high levels of economic activity at the household level, for which our earlier surveys revealed that nearly all refugee households in Nakivale and Kampala had some form of independent income-generating activity.
Indeed, Somali refugees in Kampala invariably source their income from economic activities tied to existing Somali communities. Here the Somali Ugandan hosts sometimes play an important role, as many refugees (and non-refugees of Somali origin) end up working in salons, shops, and restaurants owned by them. For instance, Somali private companies such as City Oil tend to hire considerable number of Somali refugees. One Somali refugee who works at City Oil explained:

There are many Somali refugees working for City Oil. We have a language in common. We have cultural and religious bonds. So it is easy to work together.

Congolese refugees in Kampala are also more likely to be employed by Ugandan nationals. For instance, a Ugandan who employs refugees at his business in Mengo, where many Congolese refugees live, said:

I own a trading company dealing with agricultural processed products such as spices, medicines, herbs, fish…At my shop, I employ some Congolese refugees as porters and staff who help pack these items into bags. For more than 10 years, I have been working with these Congolese residents.

While this business owner expressed a preference for hiring Congolese refugees, this preference was closely related to lower wage levels:

I hire them because they are cheaper than Ugandan labour. This is a seasonal recruitment so no contract. Whenever I need people, I call these Congolese refugees [who live in my neighbourhood].

For Congolese refugees, these reduced wage rates paid by nationals are a common source of frustration. One Congolese refugee employed in a clothing shop by another Ugandan owner works from Monday to Saturday, from 8am to 6pm, for a monthly salary of around UGX 250,000. He expressed his dissatisfaction with his salary:

This is not enough. I cannot cover all necessary costs [with this salary]. At the end of the month, nothing remains in my pocket. So no saving, no investment. Especially when I get ill, it is hard to cover medical bills.

In terms of self-employment, there is a mixed picture. In Nakivale, of those with a job, 33% of Congolese and 37% of Somalis run their own business compared with 28% of Congolese and 41% of Somalis in Kakuma. Meanwhile, of those with a job, 62% of Congolese and 52% of Somalis in Kampala are self-employed compared with 38% of Congolese and 54% of Somalis in Nairobi (Fig. 4). Congolese therefore appear to have greater opportunities for self-employment in Uganda, while Somalis appear to have slightly greater opportunities for self-employment in Kenya. This is likely to be due to the fact that, for the most part, they are engaged in different activities. Nakivale offers greater opportunities for agricultural self-employment than Kakuma. Its relatively more fertile land and the availability of plots for refugees creates opportunities for self-employment. This is also

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7 UGX 100,000 is equivalent to around USD 27.
Refugee Economies in Uganda

reflected in the 66% of employed Ugandans around Nakivale – nearly all of whom are farmers – being self-employed.

Meanwhile, because Somalis are not engaging in agricultural activities, they benefit far less from the Ugandan Self-Reliance Strategy’s provision of land. The area in which larger, particularly wholesale, businesses report entrepreneurial benefits from being in Nakivale is in terms of being able to participate freely in national and transnational supply chain networks. For example, Fatuma is a Somali trader who deals with food, spices, shoes, cosmetics, and perfume in zone 3 of Nakivale, where the majority of Somali refugees reside. She came to Nakivale in 2011 after spending several months in Nairobi, and she chose Uganda for safety and more freedom of movement:

*I go to Kampala every two months to purchase my stuff. I usually buy in Owino and Chikubu markets in Kampala... When I go there, I stay at my friend’s place in Kisenyi... I initially started this business with my Somali refugee friend who moved from Nakivale to Kampala. She started sending items to me to sell in the camp and we were sharing profits... Later she got resettled in Sweden. But I continued this business.*

**Transaction Costs**

Despite the regulatory framework, refugees in Kenya are working and are mobile. One key difference, though, is that they may incur significantly higher transaction costs for doing so. Somalis in Nairobi face far higher rates of arrest than Somalis in Kampala, or any of the refugee populations in camps or settlements. They are also forced to pay police bribes at an average rate that is at least four times greater than any other group. It is notable that the difference does not affect the Congolese, who are less visible and also poorer, so less likely to be subjected to police harassment (Figs. 5 and 6).

**Fig. 5:** Proportion of the population that experienced police arrest at least once over the last three months

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Refugee-owned shop in Nakivale

Somali-owned refugee shop in Nakivale

Refugee-owned electronics shop in Nakivale

Refugee-owned barber in Nakivale

Refugee-owned cycle repair shop in Nakivale
Unlike Kenya, only a few informants in Uganda mentioned experiencing harassment from police or other national authorities. One of our Congolese research assistants in Nakivale, William, noted:

\[
\text{I have been living in Nakivale since 2008. I have never experienced any police harassment. I don’t think this is an issue for other refugees in Nakivale. In the first place, there is very little presence of police inside the settlement.}
\]

Abdinasir, a Somali refugee who has been selling construction materials like cement, iron sheets, nails, and wood stock in Nakivale since 2014, relies on this mobility to conduct his business. He goes to Mbarara every 2–3 months to buy construction materials. When we asked him whether he had ever had any problem when he travelled to Mbarara, he replied: ‘Never. Nobody has ever stopped me’.

Similarly, in Kampala, Shukri, a 28-year-old Somali female refugee who came to Uganda in 2012 via Kenya, commented:

\[
\text{Of course, I know I am a refugee here but I don’t necessarily feel any discrimination or handicap here. I don’t have any major problems living in Kampala.}
\]

The limited number of such restrictions helps to facilitate refugees’ economic activities, such as hawking in market areas, which is one of the most popular livelihood activities in Kampala. Similar to findings from our previous research, selling bitenge and jewellery, which is viewed as a ‘Congolese specialty’ in Kampala, is still widespread amongst Congolese refugees in Kampala. Many Congolese sellers take advantage of the relative freedom of movement in Uganda to venture to markets outside Kampala like Mbarara or Hoima. Rodgers, a 45-year-old Congolese refugee hawker, explained that Congolese vendors have been actively exploring new market areas outside Kampala:

\[
\text{Many [Congolese refugee] hawkers now travel and explore other markets of bitenge. They are reaching distant areas from Kampala like Hoima, Paidha, and Mbarara. Some even go beyond the border and reach Tanzania and Kenya.}
\]

One observable difference between urban Somali refugees in Kampala and Nairobi is that there are fewer jointly owned businesses with Somali ethnic nationals in Kampala. In Kenya, joint-business ventures with Somali Kenyans are a common strategy to overcome the more restrictive regulations and higher levels of police harassment in Nairobi. In the Kenyan context, such business partnerships could provide refugees with a ‘cover’. In Kampala, in contrast, there were far fewer joint-business models, probably due to the absence of restrictions on refugees in urban areas and reduced systematic police harassment.
4. Assistance Model

There are similarities between the assistance models for refugees in Uganda and Kenya. However, a distinguishing feature of the Ugandan model is the longstanding allocation of plots of land for cultivation to refugees living in the settlements. In theory, this enables them to grow crops for subsistence and for sale, supplementing food rations and any other sources of income.

The basis of Uganda’s settlement model has been present since the late 1950s. As refugees fled colonial liberation wars, Cold War proxy conflicts, and ethnic conflict across the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, Uganda encouraged spontaneous self-settlement in its underpopulated areas. With low numbers, there was sufficient arable land across south-western Uganda to create sustainable opportunities. With an increase in refugee numbers during the 1990s, notably (South) Sudanese refugees arriving in the West Nile region in northern Uganda, the country received increasing international attention and humanitarian assistance.

Reflecting an increased international interest in Ugandan refugee policy, and the government’s desire to attract more resources and recognition, Uganda and UNHCR jointly launched the Self-Reliance Strategy in 1999, formalising its longstanding rural self-settlement policy. The SRS focused on extending self-reliance’s application to the more arid West Nile region. Its aim was ‘to improve the standard of living of the people of refugee hosting districts, including the refugees’, by empowering refugees to help themselves, and by creating a model of integrated service provision for refugees and host communities. The SRS attracted additional donor assistance, although it received some early criticism for being linked to cuts in food assistance. Within the 2016 ReHoPE strategy, the centrality of the settlements model was recognised, and supported through additional World Bank loans under International Development Association (IDA) funding.

Within Nakivale and the other south-western settlements, refugees are offered plots of land for both shelter and cultivation. In Nakivale today, shelter plots are generally 15m x 20m, and cultivation plots are supposed to be 50m x 50m but sometimes end up being as low as 20m x 50m. Refugees receive usufruct rights but do not receive the freehold to the land. One of the challenges is that, over time, the size of the plots has been reduced due to declining availability of the land. Meanwhile, the quality, fertility, and proximity to market of available land has generally worsened with increasing refugee numbers. Nevertheless, the option to receive and cultivate land on this scale represents a unique feature of refugee assistance in Uganda. The new Kalobeyei settlement near Kakuma is experimenting with the distribution of plots of land but on a much smaller scale.

Beyond that, assistance models for refugees in Kenya and Uganda have striking similarities. In both Kakuma and Nakivale, refugees receive in-kind food assistance (30% is provided in a cash equivalent in Kakuma) from the World Food Programme (WFP) and access to a core set of ‘non-food items’, including firewood. Despite the Self-Reliance Strategy, food assistance is constant in Nakivale and there is no graduation model. There are a range of services available through NGO implementing partners support, limited vocational training, sports and community participation, and access to technology, for example.

Meanwhile, assistance in Nairobi and Kampala is similarly limited. In Uganda, by moving to the city, refugees make the decision that they are able to be self-sufficient and are willing to forego the food and material assistance available within the settlements. UNHCR’s only implementing partner in Kampala, Interaid, provides some limited support, through livelihoods training and psychosocial support to a small proportion of the most vulnerable refugees. In Kenya, refugees similarly give up any formal support for shelter or material needs, and only some limited support is available through NGO implementing partners and community-based organisations.

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8 The standard amount of land allocated per household for production in Nakivale is 50 x 50 square metres according to UNHCR, although we encountered variation in practice. For standard plot sizes in Ugandan settlements, see UNHCR (2017), Field Survey in Uganda, December 2016–January 2017 (UNHCR: Kampala).

Some differences exist in the delivery of public services across the two countries. Uganda has an integrated service provision model for refugees and host community members. Refugees and hosts access the same health and education facilities, provided by the government of Uganda. Even when international donor assistance contributes to the creation of a school or hospital in the settlements, it is a government school or hospital. For example, the Nakivale Secondary School, opened in 2010, has 1,100 refugee students and 400 Uganda students. In Kenya, by contrast, the refugee camps have some parallel services, provided by the international community mainly for refugees, even though, in practice, these are frequently also open to the host community. For example, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) runs the main hospital in Kakuma. To oversimplify, Uganda’s model integrates refugees into national provision; Kenya’s model integrates nationals into refugee provision.

In addition to differences in regulation, Uganda’s approach therefore implies some differences in its assistance model, notably the allocation of plots of land in settlements and the fully integrated provision of public services. But to what extent are the different approaches associated with different outcomes? Here we comparatively examine outcomes relating to a series of welfare indicators.

**Income**

One of the key indicators of welfare for refugees and hosts is income. Fig. 7 shows the median income of those individuals engaged in some form of economic activity (excluding remittances). It shows that refugees in Uganda generally have higher incomes at purchasing power parity than those in Kenya. Indeed, our regression analysis suggests that, controlling for other variables, being a refugee with a job in Uganda is associated with a 16% higher income than being a refugee with a job in Kenya (Appendix Table A.1). However, there is one notable exception: Congolese refugees in Nakivale (USD 58/month) are worse off than Congolese in Kakuma (USD 96/month). This contrasts, for example, with Somalis, who earn on average USD 193/month in Nakivale compared with USD 117/month in Kakuma.

**Fig. 7:** Median monthly income (USD, PPP) from an economic activity
This contrasting pattern reflects that Congolese and Somalis are doing fundamentally different things in Nakivale. The Congolese, like the neighbouring Ugandan hosts, are primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture, growing maize, beans, sorghum, and vegetables for their own consumption and commercial sales. Of course, not all Congolese refugees in Nakivale are farmers. There are markets and business centres, including in Isangano and New Congo (New Hope), where grocers, butchers, barbers, shops, stalls, and beauty salons operate, but agriculture is the dominant source of income. Unsurprisingly, the Congolese and local Ugandans, who have a similar economic profile, have exactly the same median income (USD 58/month). Meanwhile, Somalis are engaged in commerce, and choose not to do agricultural work.

Put simply, the Congolese are engaged in labour-intensive work; Somalis are engaged in capital-intensive work. Even though fewer Somalis are employed, those that earn money are doing better and they have higher levels of self-employment. In Kakuma, by contrast, the Congolese are able to earn more because they are mainly engaged in incentive work for NGOs. Meanwhile, Somalis earn less than in Nakivale because they face greater limitations in terms of regulation and market access.

These observations lead to questions about the sustainability of the land-based aspect of Uganda’s assistance. On the one hand, there is an argument that Congolese agricultural work in Nakivale is more sustainable than NGO employment in Kakuma. On the other hand, engagement in agricultural activity is associated with lower income levels, and successful Somalis thrive precisely because they opt out of the subsistence agriculture model.

According to a Livelihoods Officer of Nsamzi, which is a UNHCR partner in Nakivale, refugee farmers are experiencing increased challenges. In addition to the decreased amount of land available, he highlighted that the issue of land fertility, partly related to overuse, is a growing constraint:

> For the last several years, the quality and fertility of land has been declining. From four years ago, 10 bags of maize (100–120 kg) from the same land is now reduced to a yield of 6–8 bags of maize. Each year, we are losing about 10 kg of production (one bag). This is totally understandable; some refugees have been using the same plot for over 10 years.

In Kampala, refugees earn more than in Nairobi, despite the general assumption that Nairobi offers a bigger market. Working Somalis in Kampala have a median income of USD 463/month and Congolese USD 193/month, compared with USD 319/month and USD 138/month respectively in Nairobi (Fig. 7). These differences are unlikely to be due to the assistance models, which are comparably limited, but may well be attributable to the different regulatory environments. The clandestinity of refugees in Nairobi is likely to negatively impact their bargaining power on the job market.

In both Kakuma and Nakivale, the host communities are poor. In Kenya, refugees are significantly better off than the local Turkana, earning three to four times more. Nevertheless, despite being among the poorest groups, host communities around both Kakuma and Nakivale believe that they are economically better off than they otherwise would be because of the presence of refugees.
Food Security

Our findings relating to food security pose a further challenge to the value of Uganda’s land-based self-reliance approach. We might expect refugees allocated plots of land in Uganda to perform better on food security metrics than refugees not allocated land. But this is not necessarily the case.

Around 40% of Congolese refugee households in Nakivale take up the opportunity to use plots of land for cultivation, while Somalis almost universally decline to do so (we found a 0% participation rate among Somalis [Fig. 12, p.23]). Meanwhile, in Kakuma – with the exception of the Kalobeyei settlement, which is not part of this survey – refugees are not allocated plots of land.

However, we find that in Nakivale, Somali refugees have a higher food variety score, eat more meals per day, and are more likely to have eaten meat (partly for cultural reasons) over the previous week than Congolese refugees (Figs. 8–10). Outcomes for the Congolese in Nakivale are similar to the surrounding host community, which also engages in subsistence agriculture. Meanwhile, food security outcomes are also stronger in Kakuma, even for Congolese refugees, than they are for Congolese refugees in Nakivale (Fig. 11). Furthermore, the Congolese in Nakivale, the main ‘beneficiaries’ of land distribution, are among the economically worst performing refugee groups in the study across a range of other indicators.

Fig. 8: Dietary variety (higher score means greater variety)
Fig. 9: Number of meals per day
Fig. 10: Number of days they had meat over the last week
Fig. 11: HFIAP indicator of food insecurity (4 categories)
One way of interpreting this is that agriculture is not a good route to improved welfare. However, we know from our regression analysis that, controlling for a range of other variables, the more land Congolese refugees have access to, the better their outcomes in terms of dietary diversity, food security, and calorie intake (Appendix Table A.4). We also know that newly arrived South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei (with allocated plots of land) have better food security outcomes compared with newly arrived South Sudanese in Kakuma (with no allocated land), and that these differences can be positively attributed to the allocation of ‘kitchen garden’ plots. This suggests that the issue with Uganda’s land allocation model is more related to context and implementation. Our qualitative research substantiates this.

Many refugees have experienced reductions in the size of the plots provided by OPM due to Nakivale’s growing population. A Congolese refugee who has lived in the Rubondo zone of Nakivale since late 2006, explained:

> Initially I got a plot of 50m x 100m = 5,000 m². I started farming using the plot. But later my land was reduced due to influxes of new refugees. I experienced this twice. In 2013, first reduction due to Congolese refugee influxes: in 2013, I had to give up 20m x 60m = 1200 m². In 2015, second reduction due to Burundian refugee influxes: in 2015, I gave up 20m x 60m = 1200 m²…. Of course, my crop production was significantly reduced. I did not have enough land for the same production…. OPM said ‘you have to help each other. You are given a large amount of land so please share with your fellow refugees.’ So I accepted it.

Because the refugee assistance model in Nakivale is heavily based on agriculture, the limited allocation of land for new arrivals poses daunting challenges for newcomers. Our regression analysis highlights that plots of land are now much less readily available to new arrivals. One more year spent in the camp increases the likelihood of having access to land by 7 percentage points. As a matter of fact, 80% of the Congolese households that arrived before 2012 have access to land compared with just 17% of those that arrived after 2012. One more year spent in the camp is associated with an 18% increase in land size (Appendix Table A.3)

> 80% of the Congolese households that arrived before 2012 have access to land compared with just 17% of those that arrived after 2012

Both UNHCR and the Ugandan government are aware of the challenge posed by land scarcity. Monica, the OPM commander of the Nakivale settlement, stated that ‘In Nakivale, self-reliance support is land-based…New arrivals find it hard to become self-reliant due to reduced land size. They need external support.’ A senior official at UNHCR Uganda highlighted the impact on living conditions in Nakivale:

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The general conditions of Nakivale are worsening. There is environmental degradation, and no graduation away from food assistance, with many refugees remaining reliant on food rations. Furthermore, not all refugees are given access to productive and arable agricultural land.

There is a strong consensus, particularly amongst Congolese refugees, that it is increasingly difficult to become self-reliant by doing only farming in Nakivale. When we followed up with informants from our 2013 research, they frequently referenced deteriorating living conditions in Nakivale; one of our former research assistants noted:

In Nakivale, things have been getting worse. The major change from the last time is that there are even more refugees in Nakivale. This means that everyone has less land with more people.

Among the households that reported ownership rights on land, 64% said they own all of their plots. However, formal documentation was available for only 36% of all plots in our sample. The households claiming ownership said that they either bought the land (47%); inherited the land (25%); received the land from OPM (25%); or took it because it was 'free land' (3%). It therefore appears that a significant proportion of refugees misunderstand that they do not have ownership rights on land allocated by OPM.

The combination of increasing population pressure on the land and the misunderstandings relating to land rights may explain the prevalence of land disputes in Nakivale (Fig.13). Among the refugee and Ugandan households that have access to land for cultivation about 32% have experienced a land dispute at least once. The main reasons for land disputes are conflicting claims relating to land ownership and land boundaries (Fig.14).
Access to Public Goods

A striking feature of our data is that educational access appears better for refugees in Kenya than Uganda. On average, refugees in Kenya have received more years of education that their co-nationals in Uganda (Fig. 15). This, of course, could be for a variety of reasons. In a regression analysis, and controlling for pre-determined characteristics, we examine the variables that correlate with the number of years of education received for refugees who arrived in the host country before the age of 16 (i.e. those who are likely to have had at least part of their education in the country of asylum). Factors such as gender, parental education, and being educated in a rural rather than urban context are important determinants. Within this analysis, being in Uganda is negatively correlated with number of years of education, and is associated with an average of two years’ less education. When we disaggregate the data to just look at Nakivale and Kakuma, we find that the difference between Kenya and Uganda is almost fully explained by the Nakivale and Kakuma contrast: being in Nakivale is associated with three years’ less education than being in Kakuma. In contrast, the difference between Kampala and Nairobi, when controlling for other variables, is almost non-existent (Appendix Table A.2).

Our suggestion that there is a gap in terms of educational access between Nakivale and Kakuma is corroborated by UNHCR’s enrolment data. In Nakivale, there is a 54% primary school enrolment rate compared with a 92% rate in Kakuma. However, it is unclear from the data exactly what explains this difference in educational access. To what extent is it explained by differences in the quality of service provision or by other sociocultural factors at the community level? One plausible proposition is that there is higher quality education provision in Kakuma than in Nakivale. Indeed, in Kakuma education is delivered by UNHCR and a range of implementing partners in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. Although teacher to pupil ratios are around 1:200 in primary schools and there is pressure on resources, results in the Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education are better than the national average. In Nakivale, in contrast, refugees are integrated into national schools, albeit financed with some international support. Our qualitative research, though, also reveals that refugees in Uganda experience a range of other constraints in accessing education, including cost, geographical distance, language barriers for Congolese and Somali refugees, and the greater requirement on children to engage in agricultural work.11

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Refugees in Uganda certainly report challenges relating to accessing public goods. In Kampala, refugees are supposed to enjoy equal access to social services as Ugandan nationals. However, in practice, this means that refugees usually have to pay to access services that Ugandan nationals also have to pay for. One Congolese refugee told us:

For some minor diseases, seeing doctors can be free but in most cases we have to pay… Also there are a good number of Congolese refugees who are out of school. Many parents fail to pay school fees. At a primary level, one term at public school costs about UGX 200,000 (equivalent to USD 54) and there are three terms per year. Imagine if you have multiple children. At secondary school, each term costs UGX 400,000.

Meanwhile, refugees in Nakivale complained about access to healthcare and education. According to Congolese refugee representatives in the Rubondo zone in Nakivale, there is only one clinic in the entire Rubondo zone, and often there is not enough medicine or treatments for diseases like typhoid. Access to education was also a common challenge for refugees in Nakivale. Participants in a focus group discussion in the Rubondo zone observed:

We have only two public primary schools and three private primary schools in Rubondo. Classrooms are packed with more than 100 students in one class… There is only one secondary school for all of Nakivale but it is far away, 20 km from the camp.

UNHCR staff members in Nakivale were certainly aware of this limited access to education in Nakivale.

In the entire Nakivale settlement, there is only one secondary school in Base camp zone. It is 23 km away from Rubondo…. Although it is a public school, it requires tuition – UGX 200,000 per term and there are three terms per year. For public primary school, the term fee is about UGX 100,000.

In all contexts, Somalis have significantly fewer years of formal education than Congolese refugees, and fewer than the host community everywhere except Kakuma, where the Turkana receive virtually no education. Somalis’ lower access to formal education is likely to be partly for cultural reasons. Somali refugees often run and attend Madrassa schools, which meet a demand for Koranic education and offer lower tuition fees. For example, Hassan, a Somali refugee who came to Kampala in 2012, established a Madrassa school in 2015 with donations from Somali refugee parents in Kampala. At the time of the research, his school had about 120 students, who were all Somali refugees. At his school, in order to offer educational opportunities to wider refugee populations, the tuition fee is set according to one’s ability to pay:

The tuition depends on students’ circumstances. We have no fixed fee. From the poor and orphans, we don’t take any fees. But normally, each student should pay UGX 30,000 per month.

According to Hassan, there are around 30–40 Madrassa schools in Kampala. These Madrassa schools aim to fill in gaps in educational access amongst refugees, and are also viewed as important to build religious and cultural identity.

For some minor diseases, seeing doctors can be free but in most cases we have to pay… Also there are a good number of Congolese refugees who are out of school. Many parents fail to pay school fees. At a primary level, one term at public school costs about UGX 200,000 (equivalent to USD 54) and there are three terms per year. Imagine if you have multiple children. At secondary school, each term costs UGX 400,000.
We already know that Somali refugees tend to receive far higher levels of remittances than most other refugee populations in Africa. That pattern emerges clearly across all of our research sites; they also receive significantly higher remittances than host nationals (Fig. 18). However, what is more striking is that Somalis in Uganda, whether in Kampala or Nakivale, report receiving higher levels of remittances. We know that levels of remittances are correlated with access to networks. In this case, though, the contrast between Uganda and Kenya may be due to the greater struggle of the refugees in Uganda to be fully autonomous within the self-reliance model. Our regression analysis (Appendix Table A.1) suggests a negative correlation between the size of family network abroad (Fig. 19), as a proxy measure for the importance of remittances, and the likelihood of having a job. The exogeneity of our proxy measure suggests that it is more likely that access to remittances reduces the incentive to have a job than that the lack of work leads to an increase in remittances12.

Within the Somali community, variation in access to remittances is a significant source of inequality. The Somali chairperson in Nakivale explained:

For most recipients, remittances are a crucial means to start a business, and they result from having extensive transnational networks. One Somali refugee in Kampala who runs a joint-business with others, arrived in Uganda in 2010, but he also lived in Eastleigh in Nairobi for five years previously. In Kampala, he lives in the Nakalabi area, which is considered to be a relatively well-off area. He rents a spacious house for USD 300 per month. Describing the origins of his business, he stated:

According to this Somali refugee, he started this business by combining his and his Somali partner’s savings and remittance support from abroad. His relatives reside in the US and Sweden, and they assisted him through cash remittances.

For many refugees in Kampala, remittances are a matter of survival. Fadumo, a Somali refugee single mother in Kampala, receives money from her son, but still struggles to make ends meet. While her family receives USD 100 every two months from her son, who lives in Germany, when we asked her whether it covers expenditures, she lamented: ‘USD 100 is not enough. Rent for one room is UGX 360,000. Electricity and water UGX 100,000. My daughter is 20 years old but she is not in school due to high school fees.’

12 The current socio-economic situation of refugees may influence the amount received in terms of remittances but is very unlikely to have a direct effect on the size of family network abroad.
Amongst the Congolese population in Uganda, the number of those receiving remittances is widely recognised to be much smaller. In a focus group discussion with Congolese refugee community leaders, the consensus was that access to remittances is not common for their communities; they estimated that ‘only 5% of entire Congolese refugees in Kampala have access to remittances’, noting that this privileged minority were some of the only people enjoying a relatively good standard of living.

Social Protection

In both Uganda and Kenya, refugees rely significantly upon their own communities as a supplementary source of social protection. While it is important to acknowledge that international organisations and NGOs provide a social protection base in Kakuma and Nakivale, notably through food assistance, non-food items, and public goods, refugees’ perception is that community sources (e.g. religious institutions) and family or friends are by far the most important sources of social protection in situations such as an emergency or food shortage (Figs. 20 and 21). Interestingly, the most important social protection role for international organisations and NGOs is identified as supporting employment, and this was felt most strongly by refugees in Kakuma, where ‘incentive work’ is offered (Figs. 22 and 23).

Refugee-led social protection takes on a variety of forms, whether provided by registered community-based organisations or networks. In Kampala, there are over 20 refugee-led community organisations providing a variety of services, despite receiving little recognition or funding from international organisations. In addition, a range of other informal structures provide sources of support.

In Somali refugee communities in Kampala, for example, ayutos represent an important source of collective savings and social insurance, especially amongst female refugees. One ayuto organiser explained why there are so many ayutos:

‘In Kampala, having an independent business is our lifeline for survival. We have to take care of ourselves…. We are not familiar with banks. I don’t even have a bank account.’

Other similar systems exist in the Somali community. A Somali leader of the Dir clan explained that his clan operates an insurance system for clan members, named Qaran:

Qaran means ‘help each other’ in Somali. Every month, we collect UGX 10,000 from all 60 members. We put this money into a bank account. Any diaspora members of our clan must contribute at least USD 50 when they come to Uganda. If any members fall into trouble or face major disasters such as severe illness, arrests, or the death of someone, we give the saved money to them.

For Congolese refugees, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are frequently used. These member-only groups have credit and savings functions, and some have expanded to provide skills and business management training. They can even give loans to non-members as long as they carry collaterals and guarantors. The manager of one such scheme, Hope Development, based in Kampala, explained how the group has evolved over time:

Initially we started as a savings group. We just put money together and gave it to someone…. In 2016 we got formally registered as a saving and credit cooperative and started credit services. The current members are 132 in total (50 Congolese, 40 Rwandans, 20 Ugandans, and some South Sudanese and Burundians) but we provide services to non-members with more strict conditions.

Although such schemes are particularly prevalent in Kampala and Nakivale, they are not unique to Uganda, and are also found in Nairobi and Kakuma.

“In Somali refugee communities in Kampala, for example, ayutos represent an important source of collective savings and social insurance, especially amongst female refugees”
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Fig. 20: Who would you ask in case of an emergency?

Fig. 21: Who would you ask if you did not have enough food to eat?

Fig. 22: Who would you ask if you were looking for a large amount of money to start or expand a business?

Fig. 23: Who would you ask if you were looking for a job?

© N. Omata Congolese Saving and Credit Cooperative Organisation office in Kampala
5. Refugee–Host Interaction

Uganda’s self-reliance model has an emphasis on integrated service provision. Its combination of rural settlements and the right to reside freely in cities means that, in theory, refugees and host community members can interact freely. Furthermore, public services like health and education are generally provided by the national government and available to both refugees and hosts.

As a settlement, Nakivale has porous borders. Refugees come and go freely, and many Ugandan nationals come to the settlement to buy and sell goods and services. Some even run businesses in the settlement. Meanwhile the main Nakivale schools and hospitals serve both refugee and host populations.

As a camp, Kakuma operates on a slightly different basis. While Kenyan nationals do come to the camp for business, entry is more controlled and it is more challenging for refugees to venture out to towns and cities without applying for a Movement Pass. Furthermore, Kakuma operates a system of parallel service provision, in which NGO implementing partners provide health and contribute to education services, for example, albeit while allowing Kenyan nationals to also use those services. Put crudely, in Nakivale refugees are integrated into national services; in Kakuma nationals are integrated into refugee services.

The two contexts are also different in terms of the degree of economic inequality between refugees and host nationals. In Kakuma, both Somali and Congolese refugees have higher levels of income, expenditure, assets, and food security than the local Turkana, although the Turkana have higher employment rates than the Somalis. In Nakivale, Ugandan nationals have far higher rates of employment (90%) than refugees (47% for Congolese and 23% for Somalis). They have comparable levels of income, assets, and food security compared with Congolese refugees, albeit with generally worse outcomes than Somalis. Since the host community in Nakivale are generally subsistence farmers with low incomes, there is therefore less inequality between refugees and hosts in Nakivale than in Kakuma.

Put simply, Nakivale is characterised by greater opportunities for interaction and lower levels of refugee–host inequality than Kakuma. These observations lead to the question: what different outcomes can we observe in terms of refugee–host perceptions?
Perceptions and Opinions

Host community opinions of refugees in Uganda are generally fairly neutral. On average, Ugandan communities in the areas surrounding refugee settlements in Kampala and Nakivale neither strongly agree nor disagree that refugees are 'friendly' or 'trustworthy', nor that their presence significantly increases employment or insecurity (Figs. 24 and 25), although they are likely to be seen as economic competitors. In Nakivale, refugees generally have neutral views of the host community, with Somalis having a more positive perception than Congolese. In Kampala, refugees are more likely to be suspicious of the host community, the Congolese more so than Somalis (Figs. 26 and 27).

Although the differences are small, host communities in Kenya appear more likely to have positive perceptions of refugees than in Uganda. This is especially the case for the Turkana around Kakuma and ethnic Somali Kenyans in Eastleigh. In both cases, the difference seems to be based on a perception that their presence brings a positive economic contribution, notably through employment. Ugandans, especially those in Kampala, were less likely to recognise this type of contribution (Fig. 24).

A Ugandan government official in Isingiro district also highlighted the peaceful co-existence of refugees and host communities in Nakivale, although he pointed to some recent, albeit low-level tensions relating to land access, sparked by the large influxes of refugees. Similarly, the relationship between refugees and surrounding host communities in Kampala was described as peaceful by most. Feisal, a member of a local council in Kampala, commented:

We have not had any major conflicts with refugees. They are good people. When Al-Shabab was active, tension (with Somalis) emerged due to insecurity. But now this no longer exists.

When we asked about Ugandan attitudes towards refugees, one elderly local government official in the Mbiro area (where many refugees reside) responded: 'I feel sympathy for them. I myself spent seven years in Sudan as a refugee so I know what it means to be a refugee.'
Refugees may be more likely to be perceived as a boon for the economy when they bring different sets of skills and activities than those already available within the host community.

Overall, this suggests that refugee–host community relations in Kampala and Uganda are cordial, a view corroborated by interviews with UNHCR and OPM staff. However, comparison with Kenya suggests that the self-reliance model is not yet widely perceived as bringing significant economic benefits to the host community, and neither is there a strong perception of positive interdependence in the way perceived by the Turkana living close to Kakuma.

A further reason for the more positive refugee–host perceptions in Kakuma compared with Nakivale may be that the skills and activities of refugees and hosts are complementary in Kakuma, whereas refugees and hosts in Nakivale often undertake the same economic activities, leading to a greater perception of competition. In Kakuma, for example, the local Turkana tend to specialise in areas such as livestock, charcoal, and firewood, which are prohibited areas of activity for refugees. In Nakivale, the host community is growing the same set of crops as the many refugees involved in agricultural work. This observation has wider implications: it suggests that refugees may be more likely to be perceived as a boon for the economy when they bring different sets of skills and activities than those already available within the host community.

**Winners and Losers**

Nevertheless, there are clearly perceived winners and losers within the host community. For instance, Ugandan landlords in refugee-concentrated areas in Kampala benefit significantly from the presence of refugees as tenants. A Ugandan landlord in Mengo, where many refugees reside, owns a compound in which the majority of tenants are refugees:

> In my compound, there are 23 single or single self-contained rooms…. All rooms are occupied and 19 of them are refugees. 18 Somali refugees and one Congolese refugee. The other four are Ugandans…. Refugees are good tenants. I never had any problems caused by refugees in my compound. Ugandans tend to delay payment more often. But refugees pay on time. I think they receive money from abroad.

Furthermore, some Ugandan business models have been built in response to the refugee market. In Katwe, a major Congolese refugee hosting area in Kampala, some Ugandans run shops that sell mainly to refugee customers. Lucy, a female Ugandan business owner, started a tailoring and bitenge shop there in order to target Congolese refugee bitenge hawkers:
Refugee Economies in Uganda

Football pitch in Kampala used by refugees and Ugandans

Refugee and host community housing in Kisenyi, Kampala
Given her business model, her sentiment is that she ‘want[s] Congolese refugees to stay here as long as possible.’ In fact, in areas where a large number of refugees reside, this type of business model is common, including butchery, phone credit, grocery, and pharmacy businesses, which have high percentages of refugees as daily clients and whose revenues are largely dependent on the purchasing power of refugee residents. A Ugandan butchery owner in Mengo stated:

Somali refugees are the biggest group in my customers. I receive around 50 customers a day and most of them are Somali…. They are not patient but are important customers for me because they spend a lot. For instance, during Ramadan, our sales go down…. Many businesses here are very dependent on their purchasing power.

In some cases, Ugandan nationals are employed by refugee business owners. In Kisenyi, we interviewed Ugandan casual labourers who work at restaurants or grocery shops owned by Somali refugees. Similarly, some female Ugandans work for Somali refugee families as housemaids. In these areas, refugees are generally perceived as ‘contributors’ to the local economy, rather than competitors.

Economic engagement is the most common and visible form of interactions in Nakivale. Godfrey is a Ugandan farmer of Kabatumba village, located inside the Base camp zone, and he has been living there for 25 years. He explained how regularly he engages with refugee settlement residents in his commercial farming business:

My main crops are banana, cassava and sweet potato. Refugees come to the village and purchase from us. The rest is sold to Kampala…. Perhaps 60% goes to Kampala and 40% to the camp refugees…. Sometimes refugees help me dig the land and cultivate. I pay them with bananas.

As this implies, there are constant trade and labour exchanges between refugees and host communities in Nakivale. Similarly to the relationship between the Turkana and refugees in Kakuma, refugees and hosts have forms of complementary, interdependent economic activities that do not compete for limited resources such as land and vegetation.

Ugandan community leaders are mostly aware of the positive economic impacts of hosting refugees in the area. A Ugandan village chairperson in Nakivale stated frankly:

The presence of refugees is positive for local villages. Refugees have money and buy our crops from us. We can access social services in the camp…. If the camp disappears, locals will suffer from that. We cannot survive here without the camp.

On the other hand, for some people in Nakivale land competition has recently become a source of tension. The number of refugees living in Nakivale has increased more than 60% in the last five years but the size of the settlement has remained the same. The increased number of refugees in Uganda is clearly affecting their relationship with host populations. In 2017, for example, there was a demonstration led by Ugandans against refugees in Nakivale relating to land disputes. Local protesters demanded a clear boundary between camp and non-camp areas. According to refugees in Nakivale, this demonstration lasted about two weeks, making some refugees feel threatened. As one Congolese refugee commented: ‘During the demo, we all stayed at home and did not send children to school. We stopped farming.’

However, some Ugandan villagers near Nakivale felt that responsibility for the tensions lay with OPM rather than the refugees themselves. On condition of anonymity, one Ugandan trader who lives in Nyarugusu village located in the Base camp of the Nakivale settlement, critiqued OPM as a source of the land conflict with refugees:

We have problems with OPM. Not with refugees. OPM don't have any clear planning about land allocation to refugees…. Our village has contested the boundary issue with OPM. As far as I know, at least there are three different boundaries…. Locals are marginalised by the increasing number of refugees.

About 10% to 15% of households that reported the experience of a land dispute recognised that the dispute emerged after an intervention of OPM (Fig. 14, p.23).

While some conflicts are emerging, most Ugandans seem aware of the economic interdependence with the settlement and the surrounding areas. As one Ugandan local said: ‘Now refugees are too many, taking too much space from Ugandans. But at the same time refugees are our main customers.’
6. Conclusion

Uganda’s refugee model has been widely regarded as exemplary. In many ways, it has served as the template country for UNHCR’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Recently, though, advocacy group such as the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) have called for ‘a more honest conversation about the Ugandan model’, suggesting it may have both strengths and weaknesses. In this report, we have provided empirical evidence to examine which aspects of the model actually work, for whom, and under what conditions.

The report is only a starting point for assessing what difference Uganda’s self-reliance model makes to refugees and host communities. Our data is not representative of the entire country. We only focus on Nakivale and Kampala, and we notably do not cover the northern Nile Valley region at all. However, the report represents the first systematic, evidence-based assessment of the model, and it has three methodologically distinguishing features: it covers urban areas and settlements, as well as refugees and host communities, and offers a comparison with Kenya in order to benchmark our analysis against a contrasting legal and policy context. The data is representative for the populations and contexts on which we focus.

The first contribution we make is to distinguish three different elements of the Ugandan model: its regulatory framework, its assistance model, and its approach to refugee–host interaction. This distinction is important because all three areas are often lumped together when discussing the Ugandan self-reliance model, but they may well have different implications for refugee and host community welfare.

We identify some of the positive outcomes of the Ugandan model. When compared with Kenya, it appears to lead to greater mobility, higher incomes, lower transaction costs for economic activity, and more sustainable sources of employment. These positive welfare outcomes appear to be...
We identify some of the positive outcomes of the Ugandan model. When compared with Kenya, it appears to lead to greater mobility, higher incomes, lower transaction costs for economic activity, and more sustainable sources of employment.

attributable to the regulatory framework and offer a positive endorsement of the right to work and freedom of movement. However, a series of possible weaknesses emerge within the assistance model.

First, the land allocation model currently operating within the settlements has limitations. While land allocation within the settlements is widely promoted as the core of the self-reliance model, our data raises questions about whether it offers a viable basis for self-reliance. While Congolese participate in the scheme, Somalis do not. With rising refugee numbers, plot sizes have deceased over time, and there is a lack of arable land available to new arrivals. Although it is clear that for refugees from an agricultural background, having access to more land leads to better food security outcomes, participation in subsistence agriculture is generally associated with low income levels.

Second, refugees’ access to public services such as education appear to have limitations in Uganda. Refugees in Uganda have on average received fewer years of formal education than refugees in Kenya. Somalis have the lowest number of years of education but Congolese households in Uganda are disproportionately more likely to have children who are outside formal education. Most strikingly, refugees who arrived in Uganda as children appear to have fewer years of education than those in Kenya. This difference is especially the case in Nakivale, which is associated with an average of three years, less education than Kakuma. It is unclear from the data to what extent this education gap can be attributed to the quality of services in the host country.

Third, employment rates for refugees in Kenya are surprisingly higher than for those in Uganda. In the camp/settlement context, this is mainly because Kakuma provides a large incentive work model for refugee employment, which is much smaller in Nakivale. In the urban context, it may well be that Nairobi simply represents a larger labour market. While questions can be asked about how sustainable incentive work for NGOs is, it is a model that appears to contribute to higher employment rates and generally better welfare outcomes than the subsistence agriculture model. While overall employment levels may be higher in Kenya, the sources of employment in Uganda may be more sustainable. In particular, refugees in Uganda are more likely to be employed by other refugees, while refugees in Kenya are more likely to be employed by the host community or the international community.

Recommendations Relating to Uganda

A series of initiatives are underway to support refugees and host communities in Uganda.

The government’s Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) and its ReHoPE strategy, for example, both focus on achieving integrated development for refugee-hosting districts. They are being supported by the United Nations and the World Bank, including through the CRRF.14 Our research endorses the value of an integrated development approach that improves welfare outcomes for both refugees and the host community. However, it also offers insights into areas in which more reflection is needed.

1. Rewarding the Right to Work

Providing refugees with the right to work and freedom of movement makes a difference. It appears to lead to greater mobility, higher incomes, lower transaction costs, and more sustainable sources of employment when compared with a context in which refugees do not have the right to work or freedom of movement. Our regression analysis reveals that refugees with a job enjoy on average 16% higher incomes in Uganda than refugees with a job in Kenya, even though host communities tend to have lower incomes. Uganda deserves praise and international support for continuing to embrace that model. While by no means perfect, its regulatory framework can be regarded as positive in terms of its emphasis on socio-economic rights. In this regard Ugandan refugee policy deserves to be seen as exemplary.

2. Revisiting Land Allocation

The Ugandan government has generously provided plots of land for cultivation to generations of refugees. Subsistence agriculture has benefits. It works with the resources that are available in the south-west of Uganda. It aligns with the backgrounds of a significant proportion of refugees, and it is consistent with the economic activities of the surrounding host community. Our data also reveals that the more land farming households have access to, the better they do in terms of dietary diversity, food security, and calorie intake. Put simply, a functioning land allocation system can be an effective means to support refugees from agricultural backgrounds. However, there are two qualifications to this. First, Uganda’s current land allocation model is not working effectively. Due to growing refugee numbers, the quantity and quality of land available to new arrivals is inadequate. Strikingly, 80% of Congolese households who arrived in Nakivale before 2012 have access to land, compared with 17% of Congolese households who arrived after 2012.

Land scarcity is in turn contributing to land disputes. The implication is that if refugee numbers continue to remain high, a rethink may be needed in terms of how finite land is allocated and cultivated. Second, the land allocation model should only be considered an option for some groups of refugees. Somali refugees do not engage in subsistence agriculture, and refugees who engage in agriculture generally have lower incomes and welfare outcomes than refugees who work in other sectors such as commerce. The implication is that agriculture should be promoted alongside a range of other pathways to self-reliance.

3. Enhancing Access to Education
Access to public goods is an integral aspect of self-reliance. More years of education, for instance, is correlated with higher incomes for refugees. However, there is some evidence that access to education for refugees may be more limited in Uganda than in Kenya. In regression analysis based on our pooled data from Uganda and Kenya, and controlling for other variables, being in Uganda is associated with two years’ less education for refugees who arrived before the age of 16. Disaggregating this data suggests that while there is no significant difference between Kampala and Nairobi, the difference increases to three years for Nakivale and Kakuma. This finding is corroborated by UNHCR data, which shows that overall primary school enrolment rates for refugees are 54% in Nakivale compared with 92% in Kakuma. Our qualitative research suggests two possible reasons for the contrast. First, Congolese and Somali refugees report greater practical challenges relating to education in Uganda, including as a result of distance, language, and cost. Second, the international community has a greater role in education provision in Kakuma than in Nakivale. Indeed, in Kakuma, schools are mainly run by UNHCR and its implementing partners, while in Nakivale they are mainly run by the national government. The implication is that Uganda’s integrated service provision model may need greater international support, particularly in relation to overcoming practical barriers to access.

4. Strengthening Urban Assistance
Urban refugees have, on average, higher incomes and better socio-economic outcomes than those in camps and settlements. However, having given up access to most formal assistance, many struggle to access basic services. In particular, the urban Congolese population has far worse outcomes than the urban Somali population. Social protection and economic opportunity tend to come from within the community or are underwritten by remittances. These findings suggest there is a need to revisit the presumption that refugees who choose to reside in urban areas are necessarily able to support themselves. They indicate that a better level of social safety net may need to be available to some urban refugees.

5. Considering Incentive Work
The comparison between outcomes for Congolese refugees in Nakivale and for those in Kakuma is striking. Congolese in Nakivale mainly work in agriculture and those in Kakuma are mainly employed as incentive workers by NGOs. The latter have far better welfare indicators across the board. Although incentive work may well be less sustainable than sources of employment that can be supported by local and national demand, it appears to offer a stable and secure source of employment to many refugees in Kakuma. For refugees in Uganda who are unable to make an adequate livelihood from cultivating small, low-fertility plots of land, it may be worthwhile for international organisations to consider a structured programme of incentive work. Incentive work schemes for both refugees and hosts could be in areas relating to the gaps we have identified in this report such as supporting more sustainable agricultural methods.
6. Funding Refugee-Led Social Protection

The United Nations system and the national government provide the underlying social protection base to refugees in Uganda. However, our data shows that community structures and personal networks offer an extremely important supplementary source of social protection. A large range of refugee-led community-based organisations operate in Kampala and Nakivale. Some have considerable capacity and others are based on small networks. In Kampala, refugee-led organisations such as YARID, Bondeko, and HOCW are operating at such a significant scale that they should merit both international recognition and opportunities to apply for funding. Furthermore, refugees’ own institutions often provide ways to address market imperfections through providing culturally specific sources of insurance and finance. International donors should consider piloting direct funding to refugee-led community-based organisations. Meanwhile, organisations such as UNHCR should consider ways to offer more refugee-led organisations in Uganda implementing or operating partner status. Priority should be given to organisations that address identifiable gaps in social protection, for example in relation to access to education.

Recommendations for Global Policy

Uganda has frequently served as a source of inspiration and best practice for global refugee policy. Although our findings are context specific and cannot be generalised beyond the sites in which we work, our research has several wider implications beyond Uganda, including for work relating to the Global Compact on Refugees and the CRRF.

1. Promoting the Right to Work and Mobility

The right to work and freedom of movement do make a difference. This report provides empirical evidence that Uganda’s regulatory framework has significant economic benefits when compared with Kenya’s regulatory framework. The legal framework is correlated with greater mobility, higher incomes, and lower transaction costs for economic activity. International actors should continue to advocate for socio-economic rights for refugees. Although it is methodologically harder to specify benefits to the host community, it is also clear from our qualitative research that many Ugandan nationals appreciate the economic benefits that come from refugees’ greater socio-economic autonomy. Put simply, socio-economic freedom for refugees not only is a right under international refugee and human rights law but it also leads to better welfare outcomes for refugees and may contribute to improved outcomes for host communities.

2. Nuancing Idealised Models

International public policymakers need examples of good practice. The Ugandan model has justifiably been promoted as an example of generosity and hospitality. The example has served a useful political function in supporting advocacy for the economic inclusion of refugees; it has helped to advance a development-based approach to refugee assistance within and beyond Africa. However, it is important that we also nuance country-specific ‘models’ through more precise evidence relating to exactly what works, for whom, and under what conditions. Having a stronger empirical basis on which to interpret examples of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ can ensure that policymakers can reflect on their assumptions, replicate the elements of a model that actually lead to success, and avoid replication of elements that may in fact lead to comparatively inferior outcomes.

3. Benchmarking against Comparative Data

This report highlights the value of comparative data relating to refugees. Often when impact evaluations are undertaken or policy models are debated it is on the basis of single-country data. Having access to comparable data, collected on the basis of common methods, can allow measurable outcomes to be ‘benchmarked’ against comparable contexts. The international refugee system does not currently have agreed-upon benchmarks for many key performance indicators. While a range of rights and needs-based standards exist in areas such as adequate nutrition and shelter, most indicators
of refugee welfare lack clearly specified benchmarks, metrics, and key performance indicators. Comparative data of the kind analysed in this report offers a first step towards being able to make evaluative judgements relating to the relative ‘performance’ of a particular protection context.

4. Rethinking the Role of Parallel Services

The dominant assumption within refugee policy is that, wherever possible, integrated public service provision by the host government is a better option than parallel service provision by the international community. Assuming equal quality, there are many reasons to support this perspective. However, our research provides some, albeit qualified, indication that parallel service provision may sometimes be associated with improved outcomes for refugees. While the distinction is blurred in reality, Nakivale’s model is based broadly on integrating refugees into national service provision, while Kakuma’s model is based on integrating nationals into refugee service provision. And yet in areas such as education and health, in which parallel service provision takes place in Kakuma, there is some evidence of better outcomes.

5. Distinguishing ‘Self-Reliance Policies’ from ‘Self-Reliance Outcomes’

Uganda’s refugee model has become synonymous with ‘self-reliance’. But the language relating to self-reliance is often used without precision or clear definition. Most formal definitions focus on outcomes. UNHCR defines it as ‘the social and economic ability of an individual, a household, or a community to meet essential needs in a sustainable manner’. In academic work, it is often taken to mean refugees’ degree of autonomy from humanitarian assistance. But in both cases, it remains unclear why these are the salient welfare outcomes we should be most interested in, what thresholds of what metrics indicate sustainability or autonomy, and how we should measure them. In the Ugandan context it is not uniformly clear that all policies and practices subsumed under the label of ‘self-reliance’ necessarily lead to better welfare outcomes for refugees. Analytically, it is important to recognise that both welfare and autonomy are necessary but insufficient conditions for self-reliance.

6. Creating Population-Specific Enabling Environments

One of our key findings is that not all refugee populations perform equally well within the same model. UNHCR has recently embraced the language of ‘enabling environments’, long promoted by our programme. The phrase relates to the creation of a context within which refugees can be empowered to help themselves and contribute to their communities, through for example having access to employment, education, health facilities, connectivity, and infrastructure. Although there are some universal elements to an enabling environment, what empowers one community, may be different from what empowers another community. Our research suggests that the same policy framework leads to different outcomes for Congolese refugees compared with Somali refugees. For example, in Uganda they relate differently to policies such as land distribution, freedom of movement, sport and social participation, and education. Put simply, policy interventions that support welfare improvements within one community may lead to different outcomes for another community. The way we conceive enabling environments should be population-specific.

“International donors should consider piloting direct funding to refugee-led community-based organisations”

© UNHCR/Frederic Noy

Burundian refugee passes by cattle belonging to a Ugandan citizen in Nakivale
We use regression analysis (i) to explore whether different regulatory frameworks make a difference for key economic outcomes, (ii) to assess the strength of the relationship between personal socio-economic characteristics and key economic outcomes once the national regulatory frameworks are accounted for, and (iii) to assess the determinants and impacts of access to land in Nakivale. We emphasise that the regression results should not be interpreted as causal. They can, however, provide useful insights on the correlates of economic success among refugee and host populations.

In Table A.1, we consider two key economic outcomes: (i) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has a job, and (ii) the monthly income (converted to USD using the Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate) from economic activities, provided the respondent has a job.

Explanatory variables are grouped in three categories: capital, networks, and identity. As part of the ‘capital’ variables, we consider the number of years of education, a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent pursued vocational training, and a variable measuring physical and mental health issues. The number of brothers and sisters who live in Western countries is used as a proxy for access to ‘networks’. This variable is preferred to the amount of remittances received by the respondent, as it is less likely to be affected by reverse causality. Indeed, the current socio-economic situation of a respondent may influence the amount received in terms of remittances but is very unlikely to have a direct effect on the number of brothers and sisters living abroad in a Western country. This helps us assess the direction of the relationships we intend to analyse. The correlation between the amount of remittances received by respondents and the number of brothers and sisters living abroad in a Western country is equal to 0.33. The category ‘identity’ includes gender, age, and its square. In all regressions, we introduce a country fixed effect to account for the non-measurable/non-observable differences between countries, which include the regulatory frameworks.

We also introduce an environment fixed effect (rural vs urban), and regressions with refugees include a nationality fixed effect as well (Congolese, Somali, or Host populations). In odd columns, we test whether the effect of education is different in Uganda compared with Kenya by including interaction terms between the country dummy (that is equal to 1 for Uganda) and the number of years of education. Standard errors are clustered to account for the survey design.

From Table A.1, it appears that the number of brothers and sisters living abroad (a proxy for remittances) is negatively related to the likelihood of having a job, but only amongst refugees. Our interpretation is that refugees who receive remittances are less likely to work because they are less in need.

Years of education are significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood of having a job. Once this variable is interacted with the dummy ‘Uganda’, it appears that the positive correlation between education and employment only exists in Kenya. This might be due to the nature of the labour market in the districts in which refugees live in Uganda, where the demand is mainly for low-skilled workers. However, in Kenya, NGOs and international organisations play a more important role in the job market as the main employer, and they often require a minimum level of education.

Years of education are significantly and positively correlated with income. This is true both in Kenya and Uganda. Vocational training is significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood of having a job. The effect is more important for refugees, suggesting that they are involved in different types of economic activities compared with hosts. Vocational training is not correlated with income.

Health issues are significantly and negatively correlated with the likelihood of having a job for refugees but not for hosts. The same correlation exists with income for refugees (people with more health problems tend to have a lower income).

Women tend to be less likely to have a job in all groups (13 percentage points for refugees in Uganda and Kenya, and 15 percentage points among hosts). We observe a gender gap in terms of income amongst both refugees (26%) and hosts (60%).

The rural environment does not seem to be systematically related to a lower probability of finding a job (no robust relationship) but people in rural areas have a lower income. Somali people are less likely to have a job (with respect to the reference group, which is composed of Congolese people), and have higher incomes.

The host population is more likely to have an economic activity (compared with the Congolese) but have lower incomes on average. The latter relationship is shaped by the specific situation of the Turkana in Kakuma, who have very low incomes compared with all groups.

Being a refugee in Uganda is associated with a 9 percentage point lower likelihood of having a job, while host communities in Uganda are 20 percentage points more likely to have a job compared with Kenya. However, being a refugee with a job in Uganda is associated with a 16% higher income, and being a member of the host community with a job is associated with a 10% lower income, compared with Kenya.

In Table A.2, we explore the factors affecting the educational level of refugees who arrived in the host country at a young age (<16). The dependent variable is the total number of years of education. Column 1 considers all contexts, while column
2 focuses on rural areas, and column 3 on urban areas. We observe that education is positively related to the education of parents. Girls tend to be less educated than boys. This gender gap is stronger in urban areas: it accounts for 1.9 fewer years of education than those living in the capital cities. Refugees who live in Uganda receive on average 2.1 fewer years of education \textit{ceteris paribus}. This last result is largely explained by the difference in rural (camp/settlement) areas. We therefore conclude that refugees arriving before the age of 16 tend to be more educated in Kakuma than in Nakivale \textit{ceteris paribus}; a difference of about three years of education on average. Regression analysis alone cannot determine whether this sizeable difference is due to selection bias (i.e. refugees in Kakuma were already better educated before exile) or whether it is due to better access to education in Kakuma compared with Nakivale.

In Table A.3, we study access to land amongst the Congolese living in Nakivale. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the household reported to own land or has been allocated land. This is a measure of access to agricultural land. In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the log of the total area of land in the household (questions were asked at the individual level and then aggregated at the household level). These dependent variables are regressed on three explanatory variables. (i) the number of years spent in Nakivale (all households in our sample arrived between 2005 and 2018, so this variable takes a value between 0 and 13). (ii) The household size, that is, total number of household members. (iii) A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if households use land that was not allocated to them (with a renting or sharecropping contract, for example). This latter variable can obviously impact the area of land they exploit.

We observe that households that spent more time in Nakivale are more likely to have access to land, and the area of land that they exploit is larger (positive and significant coefficient in all regressions). These effects are economically important. One more year spent in the camp increases the likelihood of having access to land by 7 percentage points. As a matter of fact, 80% of the Congolese households that arrived before 2012 have access to land, but only 17% of those that arrived after 2012 do. One more year spent in the camp is associated with an 18% increase in land size. We conclude that there is a double discrimination against the newcomers, both in terms of access and in terms of land size. This is robust for controlling for renting or sharecropping arrangements.

In Table A.4, we explore whether access to land has an impact on a series of nutritional outcomes for Congolese refugees in Nakivale. The outcomes are the following: (i) dietary diversity,\textsuperscript{15} (ii) food consumption score,\textsuperscript{16} (iii) food insecurity,\textsuperscript{17} and (iv) weekly calories at the household level. The independent variables of interest are (i) access to land (dummy), and (ii) the area of land exploited by the household (log). These two variables are highly correlated (coefficient of correlation = 0.73). To prevent multicollinearity, we consider both variables separately in the present analysis (similar results, albeit less precise, are obtained when both variables are included in the same regression). We observe that across all regressions access to land and the area of land exploited are associated with better nutritional outcomes (note, however, that the relationship is not statistically significant for calories). Most importantly, it appears that the use of land for agricultural purposes is the explanatory factor that is most consistently related to the outcomes. Another factor that seems to have a consistent explanatory power is the number of people who have a remunerated economic activity in the household. Interestingly, remittances do not play any significant role, which makes sense given that Congolese refugees are generally not recipients of remittances.

\textsuperscript{15} The dietary variety measure is a composite indicator of the types of food eaten over the last seven days. For 12 categories of food, an index takes value 1 if the food category was consumed over the last seven days, and 0 otherwise. The ‘dietary variety’ measure is the sum of the 12 indices.

\textsuperscript{16} The food consumption score (FSC) is a composite index aggregating the types and frequencies of foods eaten seven days before the interviews.

\textsuperscript{17} We use the HFIAS score. Nine statements about difficulties to access food were read to respondents, who were then asked to state whether those happened rarely (=1), sometimes (=2), often (=3) over the last four weeks. The food insecurity measure is the sum of the nine scores. The higher the variable, the more food insecure is the household.
### Table A.1: Explaining employment and income (considering only those with an economic activity)

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<tr>
<td>NB Brothers/sisters in Western countries</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.06*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.06*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00* (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.03* (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health problems score (log)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.11*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.10*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.08** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.08** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.05)</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.14*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.14*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.43*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.43*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.61*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.60*** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.01)</td>
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<td>0.10*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.10*** (0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.14*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.42*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.16* (0.09)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.63*** (0.20)</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
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<td>-0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.07** (0.03)</td>
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<td>-1.05*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.61*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.61*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-1.56*** (0.18)</td>
<td>-1.51*** (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>-0.17*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.17*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.77*** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.77*** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.77*** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.78*** (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.20* (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.20* (0.11)</td>
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<td>Host</td>
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<td>0.13*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.02*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.20* (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.20* (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education *Uganda</td>
<td>-0.48*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.55*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.43*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.51*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.55*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.60*** (0.09)</td>
<td>3.60*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.71*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.89*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.86*** (0.27)</td>
<td>3.56*** (0.40)</td>
<td>3.72*** (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.48*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.55*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.43*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.51*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.55*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.60*** (0.09)</td>
<td>3.60*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.71*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.89*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.86*** (0.27)</td>
<td>3.56*** (0.40)</td>
<td>3.72*** (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
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<td>7623</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>3143</td>
<td>3143</td>
<td>4003</td>
<td>4003</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>2111</td>
<td>2111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.320</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01)
Congolese refugees are the reference group for the nationality dummies.
### Table A.2: Education of refugees who arrived in the host country at a young age (<16 years old)

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<th>(3)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: years of education</td>
<td>(rural=1)</td>
<td>(rural=0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education of the father</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>0.164***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education of the mother</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>0.061*</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.832***</td>
<td>-1.562***</td>
<td>-2.362***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.104***</td>
<td>-0.234**</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.949***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (dummy)</td>
<td>-2.161***</td>
<td>-2.967***</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>1.088*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.626)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.150</td>
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</table>

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).

### Table A.3: Explaining access to land among the Congolese living in Nakivale

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to Land (dummy)</td>
<td>0.077***</td>
<td>0.182**</td>
<td>0.192**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land area (log)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use land belonging/allocated to other households (dummy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.433***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>4.73***</td>
<td>4.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.171</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Sample of Congolese households in Nakivale. Regression estimated at the household level.
Table A.4: Nutritional outcomes and access to land among the Congolese living in Nakivale

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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dietary variety</td>
<td>0.578**</td>
<td>4.523**</td>
<td>-1.144</td>
<td>0.111</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(1.818)</td>
<td>(0.861)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food consump. score</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
<td>-0.240*</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food insecurity</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calories</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to land (reference group)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area of land (log sqm)</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.240*</td>
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<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
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<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.240*</td>
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<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max level of education in the household</td>
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<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of household members with jobs</td>
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<td>Remittance (log)</td>
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Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01)
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In addition to the main authors, this report is the result of a significant number of contributions. Rashid Mwesigwa and Clarissa Turwino worked effectively as our national research coordinators, helping to manage our data collection in Uganda. Louise Guo, Jordan Barnard, and Jana Kuhnt provided invaluable support and made significant contributions to our research in the field.

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