AGENDA

• Welcome & Introduction
• LCRP 2018 Update
• Partners’ appeal and expression of interest
• Situation and Response Analysis
• Update from field working groups and tension task forces
• AOB
LCRP 2018 UPDATE

- LCRP 2018 adopted by LCRP Steering Committee on 20 November
- Total appeal 2.688 mUSD (-62mUSD / 2017)
- 120 Partners
SOCIAL STABILITY

- Approved by steering committee with slight changes:
  - Separate output for Municipal Police work
  - Toning down language around ‘conflict’
  - Refining targets and indicators at outcome level.

- Final appeal at 109mUSD (-15% / 2017)
- 62 Partners – cumulated appeal of 152mUSD

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![2018 Partners Appeal](image-url)

**2018 Partners Appeal**
Key gaps so far remain municipal support and solid waste.
- Bigger projects mean less municipalities covered in a context of host community fatigue.
- Partners capacity is there.
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE

- Concentration of projects on a smaller number of municipalities.
  - Only 70 municipalities have benefitted from social stability projects so far this year (20% of the sector target, compared to 100 in 2016) – total value 8.5mUSD
  - 75 additional projects are ongoing (worth 14mUSD), to cover an additional 40 municipalities.
    → Only half of the vulnerable communities covered.

- Softer activities are increasing
  - 100 municipalities with functioning dialogue/conflict prevention initiatives
  - 5,000 youth engaged in community initiatives, over 30,000 trained on positive lifestyle
  - 108 local CSOs supported through these programmes
2018 LCRP Protection Chapter Presentation
Key Elements of Situational Analysis

- Access to territory
- Legal residency
- Civil documentation, such as marriage and birth registration
- Protection risks
- Persons with specific needs
Access to Territory

- Admission to Syrian nationals is governed by the border regulations introduced in 2015

- Syrians fleeing persecution, conflict, and violence in Syria only admitted when falling within the exceptional humanitarian criteria

- Continued government commitment to the principle of non-refoulement
Legal residency / Syrians

- 74% of Syrians (15 yrs and above) are without legal residency (2017 VASyR)
- Households with all family members having legal residency has dropped to 19%

% of households with all members having legal residency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>19%</td>
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</table>
Legal residency / PRS

- Procedures for PRS are not communicated publicly and thus application varies across the country

- Approximately 40% of PRS do not hold valid legal residency (Sept. 2016)

- Since July 2017, PRS are able to receive legal residency free of charge for six months (renewable)

- PRS children who turn 15 can renew on the basis of available documentation
Legal residency

Importance of legal residency:
- Freedom of movement (risk of arrest and detention)
- Access to livelihood opportunities
- Access to basic services
- Ability to complete civil status registration

Waiver of renewal fees (*GSO, February/March 2017*)
- Applicable to certain categories of Syrian refugees only – those with UNHCR registration certificate
- Challenges in the implementation of the circular
Civil status registration

- 135,000 Syrian children have been added to files of refugees registered with UNHCR
- Documentary requirements, such as proof of legal stay and/or marriage
- Complex and potentially costly procedure
- Lack of awareness on procedure

Simplification of procedures for birth/marriage registration (PSD, September 2017)

- Valid legal residency of parents not required for birth registration.
- Only one spouse requiring valid legal residency or entry card for marriage registration; legal residency not required if Syrian male marries Lebanese female.

➢ Implementation/impact is being followed.
Protection Risks

- **Arrests/Detentions**: Immigration-related offences remain the most common reason for arrest and detention of Syrians.

- **Evictions**: Growing prevalence of evictions is resulting in protection challenges for displaced persons.

- **Sponsorship**: Sponsorship system may create a power differential that increases risk of exploitation and abuse.

- **Social tensions**: Increasing negative sentiments expressed against displaced persons, perceived competition for jobs and services, and restrictive measures by some municipalities.
Persons with Specific Needs (PwSNs)

- PwSNs constitute the most vulnerable population group and continue to face challenges in accessing basic rights and services.

- 14% of displaced Syrians are persons with physical or intellectual disabilities, a rise of 2% compared to 2016 (2017 VASyR).

- 2.7% of refugees registered with UNHCR are above 60 yrs of age.

- 10% of PRL and 8% of PRS have physical or intellectual disabilities, with one in four older persons affected (2015 Survey); 5% of youth (15-24 yrs) have a disability.

- NPTP assessments indicate that approximately 9% of Lebanese households have a family member with a physical or intellectual disability.
Main Pillars of the Protection Strategy

1. Persons displaced from Syria have their basic rights respected, including protection against non-refoulement

2. Displaced population and host community are involved in addressing the challenges they face

3. National institutions are supported to enhance access to protection and services

4. Resettlement to a third country and other complementary pathways pursued (such as scholarships or labour mobility)
MOUNT LEBANON
INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS VARY BETWEEN DISTRICTS

And how would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?

National average
Wave I
Wave II

Mount Lebanon
Aley
Baabda
Chouf
Jbeil
Keserwan
Matn

- Positive
- Neutral
- Negative
THE CRISIS HAS ALSO IMPACTED INTER-LEBANESE RELATIONS

Since 2011, do you think that relations between different Lebanese groups have improved or worsened?
USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES IS LIMITED IN NORTHERN MT LEBANON

% of people who have not used any public service in the last three months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Aley</th>
<th>Baabda</th>
<th>Chouf</th>
<th>Jbeil</th>
<th>Keserwan</th>
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Massive Eviction Decision in Al Hadath (Baabda District)

- In October 2017, in Hadath (Baabda), The Municipality Mayor announced a massive eviction decision, targeting Syrian refugees with illegal conditions (work, residency...)

- This is the first massive eviction of Syrian refugees that is being applied in BML area, as all previous massive eviction threats haven’t been implemented as of October 2017.
BACKGROUND:

- **Back to February 2017**, a previous Municipal restriction by Al Hadath Municipality took place, by announcing the closure of illegal businesses and shops that were run by Syrian refugees and termination of illegal Syrian employment, and this announcement has been taken based on the decision of the Ministry of Labor.

- **Back to August 2017**, the Minister Bassil, had supported the generalization of the procedures plan implemented by the municipality against refugees during his visit to Al Hadath Municipality

- Competition for jobs as well as political reasons driving the eviction decision allegedly.

- Local community is against this decisions allegedly.

- **There is tension recently regarding the lack or inefficiency of humanitarian and development interventions** at Municipalities to alleviate tension on host communities. Consequently, Municipalities feel currently that Ministries are not able to voice their challenges, so they don’t have authority on their decisions
EVICTED CASES:

- Around 40 families have reportedly left due to pressure as of 27 Nov 2017
- They are moving to the Chouf or to adjacent areas allegedly.
RESPONSE

- UNHCR, UNDP, NGOs and relevant Ministries have been following up, monitoring the situation and coordinating at all levels.

- UNHCR met with the Mayor to prevent the eviction but with no changes in his decision; UNHCR had raised it to the MoIM that declared that they are not responsible of this unlawful eviction decision.

- The Inter-Agency Working Group of Beirut & Mount Lebanon held 2 exceptional meetings in November 2017 as it is the venue currently to discuss and manage assistance of concerned cases of this eviction with partners and relevant Ministries.
RESPONSE AS OF 13 NOVEMBER 2017

- **Reporting:** A master list has been prepared to record reported evicted cases (case numb or phone) aiming to keep track of evicted cases and avoid duplication of reporting cases by all partners.

- **Communication:** A Q&As document has been shared shortly for field staff and hotline officers.

- **Assistance:**
  - Agreed on assisting post-eviction families with one-off cash (more than 500 families with $300 by family) based on agreed criteria and/or on vulnerability assessment.
  - In addition, partners agreed to support cases with PSS and legal assistance and counseling, as well as, shelter repair, and other.

- **Verification of assistance:** Agreed to conduct verification assessment visits to assisted cases with cash. TBC.

- **Monitoring:** Partners agreed to follow up on eviction cases in Al Hadath and other areas and Municipalities.

- **Advocacy:** agreed to continue at all levels notably with relevant Ministries (MoIM, MoSDA, MoSA).
EVICTION THREATS ELSEWHERE

- Several municipalities (Mansourieh, Dekweneh, Kahaleh) announced evictions allegedly in October and November 2017, but didn’t apply it once international organizations, UN, NGOs and the ministries intervened.

- In jbeil the municipality issued a decree in November 2017, asking all landlords and employers to share relevant documents on lease agreement and employed Syrian, and seems that Syrians with illegal stay in Lebanon might be asked to leave. Eviction has not been implemented.

- Evictions are even portrayed as ‘Protection measure’ presumably to protect refugees from exploitative practices by landlords and forcing the latter to respect rules of sheltering and employing.
OTHER TRENDS

- In general, there is general tension and hostile discourse across all areas between host and refugee community since the **30th June incident in Arsal**.
- **On 14 October 2017**, the Lebanese Promise Party held a protest in Jeita *(Keserwen)* with the participation of some municipalities in Keserwen, calling for the Lebanese government to remove Syrian nationals from the country.
- **Keserwan (Jeita and 2 other locations)**: Local authorities communicated in **November 2017** that they prefer not to have any interventions that involve Syrians. For the meantime, updates to be shared when available on the situation.
Access Issues:

- Miscommunication, lack of coordination with authorities and municipalities could be the factor that is leading to some access issues for some partners allegedly e.g. in BSS.
- Response: These issues are being managed at the IA WG of BML.

- All shelter and WASH activities are not accepted in BSS reportedly. Coordination is required before with municipalities. This mainly relates to legal issues of ownership/regulations. (They don’t want any such rehabilitation activities on potentially illegal infrastructure allegedly, but they are fine with protection/education related activities)
NEXT STEPS

- Hold a brainstorming session for the BML Task Force in Jan 2018 to enhance the quality of mapping and updates.
- Prepare for next Quarterly Task Force meeting that will take place in Feb 2018.
- Updates through Tension WhatsApp Group continuously
- Compile data from different resources e.g. Lebanon Support Conflicts Map...
- And analyze results of Tension Map to complement Perception Survey, VASYR and other assessments and surveys.
TENSION MAPPING AREAS

- Bint Jbeil: Rmeish, Ein Ebel, Bent Jubeil, Safad ElBattikh, Barachit
- Hasbaya: Chebaa, ElHebbariye
- Marjeyoun: El Khiam, Dardara 1, Dardara 2 & Wata ALKhiam, Kfar Kila, Marj ElKhokh, Qlaiaa, Touline, Taibe
- Nabatieh: Nabatieh Fawqa, Nabatieh Tahta, KfarRoummane, Sir ElGharbieh
- Saida: Bisarieh & A’aqbieh, Sarafand, Ghazieh, Zrariye, Kharayeb, Saida
- Tyre: Jal AlBaher, Bazouriye, Borj Chemali, Maachouq, Borj Rahhal, Maarake, Chehabieh
TENSION MAPPING - TRENDS

- Bint Jbeil: Strong governance
- Hasbaya: Cultural and social differences
- Marjeyoun: strong local governance
- Nabatieh: strong governance
- Saida: local governance
- Tyre: Raids and pressure on resources
CURFEWS

An increase in the number of villages enforcing curfews in most cazas.
IMPORTANT ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE SOUTH

Recourse to political parties in everyday life

- Would turn to a political party if victim of incident/crime
- Received assistance from a political party

National Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>National Average</th>
<th>Bint Jbeil</th>
<th>Hasbaya</th>
<th>Marjeyoun Nabatiyeh</th>
<th>Sidon</th>
<th>Jezzine</th>
<th>Tyre</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
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<td>Hasbaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marjeyoun Nabatiyeh</td>
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<td>Sidon</td>
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<td>Jezzine</td>
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<td>Tyre</td>
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PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH ARE MUCH MORE DEPENDENT ON PUBLIC SERVICES

I have not used any public services in the last three months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
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<td>41.3%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nabatiye</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
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<td>Sidon</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
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PARTNERS’ INTERVENTIONS

- Support to Municipalities: 2 partners in December, 3 in October
- Support to Gov. Institutes: 1 partner in December, 1 in October
- Local capacity for conflict prevention: 1 partner in December, 1 in October
- Youth Empowerment: 6 partners in December, 7 in October

Legend:
- Dark brown bar: No. of partners/December
- Light yellow bar: No. of partners/October
MOVING FORWARD

- More partners going towards “stabilization” project in the coming year

- Area based programming being encouraged with plans for close follow up and enforcement through inter-agency and sector working groups
QUALITY OF INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IS MORE POSITIVE IN THE SOUTH
BEKAA
INTERCOMMUNITY RELATIONS ARE PARTICULARLY DEGRADING

Evolution of relations in the last three months

- Improved
- Stayed about the same
- Worsened

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National average</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baalbek-Hermel</th>
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<th>Wave II</th>
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<th>Beqaa</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
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TENSIONS RELATED TO COMPETITION FOR JOBS AT EXTREMELY HIGH LEVEL IN BEKAA

Sources of tensions in Bekaa

- Competition for jobs and businesses
- Competition for services and utilities
- Political and cultural differences
- Unfair aid distribution

Wave I | Wave II | Baalbek | Hermel | Rashaya | Western Beqaa | Zahle
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
national average | | | | | | |
In the last three months, have you personally witnessed armed violence, for example, with a knife, gun or explosives in your area?
RECENT TENSION TRENDS

- Situation remains relatively stable after challenging first half of the year (protests, evictions, military operations, returns)
  - Arsal is relatively calm
  - Situation also back to normal in Qaa
  - Partners report increased tensions in Hermel because of lack of livelihoods opportunities.
  - Ghazze fire actually showed good examples of solidarity
SOCIAL STABILITY RESPONSE IN BEKAA

- Strong on soft activities with 15 dialogue/conflict prevention mechanisms set up this year.
- Over 2,000 youth engaged in community initiatives, 10,000 trained.
- 10 municipalities supported by MSAs – 30 municipalities supported in total but only half with tangible projects. 19 more in the pipeline
Northern Lebanon is one of the country’s most deprived regions, with severe poverty levels, high numbers of refugees and some of the worst unemployment rates in the country. Out of a total population of 1.1 million people, 708,000 live under the poverty line: 341,000 deprived Lebanese, over 266,000 Syrian refugees, 88,000 Palestine refugees and almost 12,000 Lebanese returnees.

The area consists of two governorates: Akkar and the North. Tripoli, the capital of the North governorate, is the second largest city in the country, while the majority of the region is primarily agricultural. Akkar Governorate shares a 100km border with Syria and has two official crossing points: El Aarida and El Aboudiyeh.

The two governorates host numerous religious sects including Sunni, Alawite, Christian and Shiite. There is a history of armed violence in the area, notably the 2007 battle in Nahr el Bared camp between non-state actors and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the recurring conflict between Sunni Muslim residents of Bab-al-T’ebbaneh, and Alawite Muslim residents of the Jabal Mohsen, neighborhood of Tripoli.
There are 63 vulnerable localities in northern Lebanon, 14 of which are classified as “most vulnerable” based on low incomes, lack of access to health, education and water, and poor housing conditions. Twenty-eight of the 63 localities are also considered to be “under high pressure” with Syrians outnumbering Lebanese by a factor of 3 to 1. The most vulnerable localities are along the border with Syria and in the areas east and north of Tripoli.
TENSION MAPPING – NORTH AND AKKAR

- 106 total assessed Cadasters= 61 in Akkar and 45 in the North
- Overall, 12 areas are considered as particularly tensed (rated 35 and above):
  - 3 in Akkar: Halba, Machha, Kherbet Daoud.
  - 8 in North – Tripoli: Tebbaneh, Old Souks, Qobbeh, Jabal Mohsen, Zohriye, Beb El Ramel, Wadi Nahle
  - 2 in North – Minieh: Assoun, Kfarhabou.
- Major causes of tensions:
  - Pressure on Resources
  - Competition for jobs
  - Sense of insecurity
  - Concentration of refugees
  - Weak municipality/local authority
- Tension Taskforce members will update this mapping next week.
STARK DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISTRICTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF SYRIAN/LEBANESE RELATIONS

<table>
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<td>improved</td>
<td>worsened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bsharri</td>
<td>stayed about the same</td>
<td>worsened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td>improved</td>
<td>worsened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miniyeh-Danniyeh</td>
<td>improved</td>
<td>worsened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>improved</td>
<td>worsened</td>
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Evolution of Syr/Leb Relations in the last three months

- **Improved**
- **Stayed about the same**
- **Worsened**
COMPETITION FOR JOBS IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF TENSIONS BUT POLITICAL/CULTURAL ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT IN MOST TENSE DISTRICTS
SATISFACTION WITH MUNICIPALITIES STRONG IN THE NORTH BUT WORRIEINGLY LOW IN AKKAR

Agree that the municipality is doing the best it can to respond to the needs of people in this community

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<tr>
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<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Batroun</th>
<th>Bsharri</th>
<th>Koura</th>
<th>Miniyeh-Danniyeh</th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
<th>Zgharta</th>
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<tr>
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<td>62.8%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
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In Akkar, the percentage of people reporting never interacting with members of the other community rose from 22% to 55% between May and September 2017.

This is reflected in a more general sense of powerlessness in Akkar: 91% of respondents said they did nothing when experiencing assaults/incidents up from 49% in May. Confidence that Syrians and Lebanese can work together to solve their problems declined further by 18%. Refugees report that tensions in Bebnine have become prevalent.

Rumours of forced return in Akkar have been circulating among Syrian refugees via WhatsApp. UNHCR and protection partners are trying to reassure refugees through Q&A and leaflet on return.

Pressure on resources being the main reason communicated by municipalities issuing eviction threats. Other political reasons are to be considered. No evictions tool place. (eviction threats including in Bire, Kherbet Daoud, Hrar, Hayzouk, Halba, Miniara, Tak Abbas el Sharki, and Arca)
Kherbet Daoud and Bire statements – mid March- Threatening for evicting Syrian refugees from the villages if the UN and IOs don’t scale up their support in the coming three months.

A day later, a statement was circulated but this time from Drib el Awsat UoM

Couple of days later (host) community members demonstrated against the municipal statements.

IA coordination meeting to discuss mitigation mechanism = 3w across all sectors, SoSt sector conducted a round table discussion with all active partners in the region focusing on the political, social and economic situation in Bire and Kherbet Daoud, and collecting feedback and recommendations.

Early April = advocacy meeting with Akkar governor and the IA secretariat (MoSA, UNHCR, UNDP) resulting easing the tensions in the area.

Through the IA, partners were asked not to respond to municipalities requests, but to report any incident, to prevent the domino effect.
TENSION ANALYSIS/TREND IN THE NORTH

- **Zgharta & Bcharre**: Inter-community relationships are by far the most hostile with 82% judging them to be ‘very negative’ compared to a national average of 12%.

- In the North (and Bekaa), the percentage of people reporting that inter-community relationships worsened in the last three months doubled between May and September 2017, with great variation between district. Absolute majority in **Bcharry, Zgharta and Koura reported that situation have worsened**, while only few minorities reported the same in Minieh- Donieh and Tripoli.

- The percentage of people in **Zgharta** reporting that the perception of safety have worsened comparing three months before (as reported in September), is the highest on the national level, however in the north in general the respondents are feeling more safe.
Triggering incident - Miziara Murder:

- **The most significant incident of the past three months, the Miziara murder, which impaired inter-community relationships across Lebanon.** The murder led to large protests demanding the evictions of Syrians followed by a municipal decision tightening the regulations of the Syrian presence. Most of the 650 Syrians living in Miziara left in the wake of requests by the municipality as well as direct pressure from young men of the village. Physical harassment of Syrians and destruction of their property have been reported, as well as intimidation of INGOs workers.

- **The incident also had strong ripple effects in surrounding areas of Zgharta, Bcharre and Donnieh.** Partners reported that the murder in Miziara raised tensions in surrounding areas. Number of municipalities issued decrees to increase restrictions on Syrian refugees and in many cases to evict them or those who are not sponsored by a Lebanese from the same town.

- **Media & social media monitoring:** Following the Miziara murder, hostile discourse against Syrian refugees proliferated on social media particularly on the Facebook page of the Zgharta Ehden local newspaper. Out of 297 tweets discussing the murder, 83% of tweets called for protests against Syrians, 35% explicitly advocated for the evictions of Syrians from Lebanon, while 18% demanded the execution of the alleged perpetrator.
• Total number of HHs that according to UNHCR’s database used to reside in Mizyara is **214**
• Community demonstrations and Municipal statement (26 Sep) threatening for eviction
• As a result, 138 Syrian HHs were evicted (690 individuals)
• **159** HHs tracked by SI and provided with NFIs
• HHs Relocation: **75** to Zgharta - **59** to Donieh – **16** Minieh – **3** Tripoli - **1** Akkar – **5** Unidentified
• All of them were evicted due to the decision that was taken by the community and the municipality.
Total number of HHs that according to UNHCR’s database used to reside in Bcharry is 441.

On 3 October 2017, Bcharre municipal police conducted door to door visits to Syrian families and informed them that they are not allowed to stay in Bcharre after mid October.

Communal campaigns and demonstrations were initiated against the presence of Syrians in Bcharre.

Series of demonstrations in front of the public school led to the closure of the second shift programme. Demonstrations have stopped but the second shift school has not been opened to date.

The municipality issued a statement on 13 October that aims to regularize the presence of Syrians in Bcharre in accordance with the Lebanese law. The deadline for complying was 15 November.

As a result, 93 HHs relocated (488 individuals)

Advocacy efforts to mitigate the tensions with the north governor, the municipality and faith-based organizations
RESPONSE MECHANISM IN THE NORTH

- Studied on a case by case
- Involves the Inter-Agency and the Inter-sector
- Close coordination between sectors primary between the social stability and the protection sectors to assess/predict the tension level and the protection needs.
- Advocacy and coordination with relevant authorities, mainly the governor.
NORTH SOST SECTOR INTERVENTIONS

- **Major developments**: Conflict prevention mechanisms, and Youth initiatives.
- **Significant gaps**: Tangible Support to municipalities (only 8 municipalities reported having benefiting from completed BS projects- and 21 benefitted from completed CSPs)
- **2018 expression of Interest**: 43 partners appealed under SoSt sector in the north for 2018
PLACES OF CONCERN

Updated every months – focus on areas that the field want to flag to the central level.
- Hotspots: places where violence/collective action has already happened
- Places to Watch: places where tensions factors are high are vulnerable to trigger incidents
- Interesting outliers: places with factors of tensions but no manifestation