Famine in Northeast Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen

**Population Affected**

143,000 people are facing Famine in Nigeria and South Sudan.

9.9 million people are facing Emergency food security outcome levels (IPC 4) in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

Yemen and Somalia could face Famine (IPC 5), if no assistance is provided between May and August.

**Why are these countries affected by famine?**

In all four countries, conflict is resulting in a high level of displacement and limited humanitarian access. Insecurity is preventing food production and driving prices up.

All four countries are experiencing economic problems: falling revenue, currency depreciation, and inflation. Somalia is particularly hard hit by drought. The situation is likely to deteriorate with the lean season.

Longstanding vulnerabilities, such as poverty and chronic malnutrition, are also contributing to the crisis. Households have exhausted their coping mechanisms.

Although the declaration of the possibility of famine has focused some attention on these countries, aid will still be stretched, and funding shortfalls remain significant.

**Food Insecure Population**

As of May 2017

- **Northeast Nigeria:**
  - Crisis food security outcome (IPC 3): 5.4 million
  - Emergency food security outcome (IPC 4): 14.4 million
  - Famine food security outcome (IPC 5): 16.2 million

- **Somalia:**
  - Crisis food security outcome (IPC 3): 1.8 million
  - Emergency food security outcome (IPC 4): 9.8 million
  - Famine food security outcome (IPC 5): 18 million

- **South Sudan:**
  - Crisis food security outcome (IPC 3): 3.6 million
  - Emergency food security outcome (IPC 4): 7.2 million
  - Famine food security outcome (IPC 5): 14.4 million

- **Yemen:**
  - Crisis food security outcome (IPC 3): 1.2 million
  - Emergency food security outcome (IPC 4): 12.6 million
  - Famine food security outcome (IPC 5): 16.2 million

**Humanitarian Coverage**

Jan–May 2017

- **Northeast Nigeria:**
  - 398 reports

- **Somalia:**
  - 457 reports

- **South Sudan:**
  - 574 reports

- **Yemen:**
  - 364 reports

**Funding 2017**

As of 19 May 2017

- **Northeast Nigeria:**
  - Appeal: USD 1 B
  - Funded: 26%
  - Missing: 74%

- **Somalia:**
  - Appeal: USD 1.5 B
  - Funded: 28%
  - Missing: 72%

- **South Sudan:**
  - Appeal: USD 1.6 B
  - Funded: 30%
  - Missing: 70%

- **Yemen:**
  - Appeal: USD 2 B
  - Funded: 32%
  - Missing: 68%
**NORTHEAST NIGERIA**

Conflict and the drop in oil revenues are mainly impacting on food production and safe access to food

- In Borno state, millet production is down 59%, sorghum 44%, and maize 26%, compared to the five-year average.
- Supply markets are a long way from Borno’s cities – 249km on average – and transportation from north-central to northwestern markets is 70% more expensive than last year.
- 77% of IDPs camps are receiving food distribution only once a month, at most.
- Boko Haram is conducting food raids and targeting markets, with at least seven suicide attacks since 2016.
- Inflation is at 18%, with the informal exchange rate more than 60% higher than the official rate.

**SOMALIA**

Drought is the main driver of the food crisis, aggravated by insecurity

- Domestic supplies of staple foods are expected to be 75% below the five-year average.
- Cereal production is forecast to be at the second-lowest in over 20 years.
- Livestock has dwindled, impacting households’ livelihoods and purchasing power. In some areas of south-central Somalia, 60–80% of herds have been lost.
- An increased number of checkpoints and double taxation, by both the government and insurgents, have been reported, constraining supply flows.
- Humanitarian workers are targets: 165 violent incidents were reported in 2016.
- The parallel exchange rate is 35 times the official rate.

**SEVERE ACUTE MALNUTRITION CASES 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Nigeria</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE**

Jan–April 2017

- Northeast Nigeria: 1,500,000
- Somalia: 1,200,000
- South Sudan: 1,800,000
- Yemen: 2,000,000

**SOUTH SUDAN**

Economic factors and insecurity are impacting local food production and access

- The spread of the conflict in the Equatorias led to a 40% national decline in food production in 2017 compared to the same period last year.
- Prices are high due to the macroeconomic crisis as well as taxation and fees at checkpoints.
- Trade balance deficit equals almost one-third of GDP, severely constraining government’s capacity to import.
- 10% of food demand is met by distributions.
- Aid workers are directly targeted.
- Inflation was above 800% in October 2016.

**YEMEN**

Economic factors and conflict leading to infrastructure damage are heavily constraining food access

- The cultivated area fell by 38% in 2016.
- The de facto blockade on the movement of goods in and out of Yemen has heavily constrained imports since August.
- Transporters are reluctant to access volatile areas due to widespread checkpoints and fear of being targeted by coalition airstrikes, driving up the price of insurance and transportation.
- Food distributions are delayed by insecurity and administrative obstacles. Aid workers are directly targeted.
- The cost of living is 40% higher than before conflict escalated and incomes are significantly lower. The parallel exchange rate is 40% higher than the official rate.
The worst-affected local government areas of northeast Nigeria are facing Emergency (IPC 4) food security conditions and GAM levels above the emergency threshold. Areas of Borno with limited access, such as Konduga, Bama, KalaBalge, Mafa, Ngala, Dikwa, and Marte, have between 39,000 and 250,000 people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Famine (IPC Phase 5) food security conditions, according to the Cadre Harmonisé (Cadre Harmonisé 10/03/2017). The crisis is expected to worsen, and the lean season to begin earlier than usual, in April–May, instead of July. 50,000 people will be in Famine from June to August if the affected population does not gain access to adequate food.

Causes

The combination of a large displaced population, mainly made up of farmers or previously self-sufficient, with the restrictions from the government on agricultural activities have led to a sharp drop in planted areas since 2013.

Nationwide, falling oil revenues have led to a depreciation of the naira. This has resulted in decreased regional food imports and income. It has also meant increased cereal exports, in an effort to increase foreign revenues, limiting domestic food supplies (Food Security Information Network 03/2017).
WHAT IS DRIVING THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA?*

*This problem tree simplifies the situation for the purposes of clarity. It does not cover every factor and relationship.
Food availability

**Production:** Most households affected by the Boko haram insurgency only farm fields close to their settlement, for fear of being killed or kidnapped (WFP 03/2017). Security measures also restrict agricultural activities, as there are rules on cultivation, and sales of fertiliser, petrol, and livestock (PI 04/2017). 80% of the population relies on agriculture for their livelihoods, but farmers have been unable to carry out planting for four years in some areas (FAO 28/03/2017). An assessment in Kaga and Kondugu by Christian Aid in December 2016 found that only 2.7% of the population cultivated crops (WFP 03/2017). Only 24% of households produced crops in Borno state, Michika LGA, in 2016 (CA 12/2016).

Nationwide, cereal production in 2016 is expected to be close to the 2011-2015 average. Sorghum is even expected to be slightly higher than last year (FAO 23/03/2017). However in the northeast, wheat production is only 20% of what it used to be, as most of the wheat-growing areas are under Boko Haram control (Bloomberg 20/04/2017). The production of maize, sorghum and millet in Borno State is estimated to have decreased by -26,-44% and -59% respectively in comparison with the five-year average (WFP 03/2017).

**Imports:** Border closures and restrictions limit imports, and currency depreciation has raised the price of imports (WFP 03/2017, WFP 01/2017). Between 2011 and 2015, about 1.5 million metric tons of rice and 4.2 million metric tons of wheat were imported to Nigeria (WFP 03/2017).
Trade and supply routes: Disruptions of market activities have been reported mainly in Borno state (FEWSNET 14/03/2017). Overall, food availability on markets did not appear to be significantly affected in March, except in Gubio LGA (WFP 03/2017). However, lack of capital, insecurity and high transport costs are affecting traders, availability, and prices. Insecurity means that stocks are no longer insured, and fewer drivers are willing to travel to these markets (WFP 03/2017). Transportation between markets in North-Central and Northwest states costs 70% more than last year and double the average (FEWSNET 14/03/2017).

Humanitarian aid: Despite the high level of need 77% of IDP camps receive food distribution at most once a month (IOM 19/12/2016). Aid has been and continues to be diverted by government officials (Channels TV 14/12/2016). Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force allocated aid meant to be distributed to IDPs (ICG 23/02/2017). 16 of 27 local government areas (LGAs) saw regular distributions between August and October 2016. In 10 of the 16, less than half of the affected population’s caloric needs are met (FEWSNET 13/12/2016).
Food access

**Physical:** Physical access to markets is constrained: the average distance between cities in Borno and supply markets is 249km, which is very high compared to other regions of Nigeria (WFP 06/2016).

**Safety:** Frequent ambushes of vehicles and attacks on markets threaten communities and constrain the movement of goods in northern and central Borno as well as the southern parts of Yobe state (WFP 03/2017). Livestock are also killed and stolen (WFP 03/2017). About 1.8 million people have been internally displaced and have been unable to farm their land (IOM 31/03/2017).

Many areas remain accessible only by military escort or by helicopter and three LGAs are still inaccessible – Abadam, Marte, and Guzamala (OCHA 24/02/2017).

Borno state has the highest density of checkpoints: two-thirds are formal. Drivers going to Borno state have to pay an average of USD 127 on their journey (WFP 06/2016).
**Economic factors:** The entire country is going through an economic slowdown. The national inflation rate was 18.44% in March 2017 and persistent currency depreciation since mid-2016 continues to keep prices of staple foods significantly above average (National Bureau of Statistics 03/2017). On the parallel exchange market, the value of the naira depreciated by 43.3% between January and November 2016 (WFP 03/2017).

Food prices increased 177% in Yobe state between January and August 2016, Biu saw a 141% increase, Damaturu 81% and Potiskum 184% (WFP 03/2017). The highest increases were for bread, cereals, milk, meat, potatoes, yams, cheese and eggs (National Bureau of Statistics 03/2017). Local cereal prices have increased since July 2016, despite the harvest; prices were more than double last year’s levels across all regions (WFP 01/2017). Maize prices began a steep increase across Nigeria in May 2016, peaking around September. Since then, prices have fallen, but remain above average (WFP 03/2017).
A pre-famine warning was declared in January, for an even larger population at risk than during the 2011 famine. Gu (April–June) rainfall has so far been below average in most of the country, with famine conditions likely in some areas if humanitarian assistance cannot reach all populations in need (OCHA 17/02/2017).

In May, about 700,000 people are in Emergency (IPC 4) food security, and more than twice as many (2.47 million) are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (FSNAU 09/05/2017). This situation has been rapidly deteriorating: in September 2016, some 43,000 people were in Emergency; by February this had increased tenfold to 439,000. More than six million people, 50% of the population, are in need of food assistance (FEWSNET 02/02/2017).

The crisis has prompted population movement: more than 683,000 people have moved towards urban centres since November 2016 (UNHCR 30/04/2017). Another 200,000 pastoralists migrated in search of better pasture, between January and February (Garowe Online 09/01/2017; OCHA 17/02/2017; Radio Ergo 30/01/2017).

Causes

Drought has resulted in severe crop failures across the country. Food prices have increased, and rural labour opportunities have declined. Shortages of water and pasture have increased the livestock death rate, and reduced pastoralists’ income. Competition for limited pasture, water sources and employment opportunities has raised tensions and led to violence between communities. Insecurity disrupts trade (Food Security Information Network 03/2017).
WHAT IS DRIVING THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA?*

*This problem tree simplifies the situation for the purposes of clarity. It does not cover every factor and relationship.
Food availability

Production: 2017 is the fourth consecutive poor harvest in Somalia. This drought is expected to last at least until mid-2017, but will likely continue until 2018 since gu rainfall levels from April to June have been below average (IGAD 08/02/2017). 80% of the population is dependent on agricultural or pastoral livelihoods (FAO 2010).

Domestic staple food supply for 2017 is expected to be 75% below the five-year average and the second lowest cereal production since 1995 (FEWSNET 02/2017). Poor deyr rains have led to 70% lower cereal production that the five-year average, at 32,000 metric tons (FSNAU 02/2017). The deyr harvest contributes to approximately 60% of annual maize and sorghum production, and domestic production makes up about 40% of total food supply and 50% of population cereal requirements (FAO 28/03/2017; FAO 02/2013).

The gu harvest makes up the other 40% of annual maize and sorghum production (FAO 28/03/2017). However, only 64% of the sorghum-planted area was harvested (FSNAU 19/10/2016). Only 1.6% of Somalia’s total land area is cultivated, and 69% is permanent pasture (FAO 02/2013).

Imports: For wheat and rice requirements, Somalia relies almost entirely on international markets (FAO 28/03/2017). The reduction in exports due to livestock deaths is likely to lead to a decrease in imports, impacting food security.

Trade and supply routes: Insecurity is disrupting trade, especially in some urban areas in southern Somalia (FSNAU 19/10/2016). An increased number of checkpoints and double taxation, by the government and insurgents, have been reported in Bay region, constraining supply flows (FSNAU 28/04/2016). Many checkpoints are reported along the Doolow–Kismaayo route, impacting trade (FSNAU 30/06/2016).
Food access

**Physical**: The poor road infrastructure linking the four major ports in Somalia to interior markets has long had an impact on the price of imported food (FAO 28/03/2017).

**Safety**: Humanitarian access is limited by insecurity, particularly to the areas controlled by Al Shabaab. In 2016, 165 violent incidents were reported against humanitarian workers nationwide (OCHA 03/02/2017). Most security incidents have been reported around Galgudud, Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Banaadir, Bakool, Gedo and Kismaayo (FSNAU 02/02/2017).

**Economic factors**: The Somali currency has rapidly devalued since January, with an unofficial exchange rate reaching 19,000 shillings against the dollar in Mogadishu (FSNAU 02/2017).

Livestock has dwindled, impacting households' livelihoods and purchasing power. In some areas of south-central Somalia, 60–80% of herds have been lost, while the loss of all livestock has been reported in some northern pastoral areas (OCHA 11/05/2016). In February 2017, livestock prices in localised areas of south-central Somalia such as Qorlyoly and Baidoa were up to 60% lower than in January 2016. Elsewhere, prices were up to 30% lower than February 2016 levels (FEWSNET 02/2017).

The livestock sector accounts for 40% of Somalia's GDP and provides food and income to over 60% of the country's population (FAO 28/03/2017). Farmers do not have seeds to plant, and wage labour income has fallen by at least 50% (FAO 28/03/2017). Households have exhausted their coping mechanisms and access to loans has fallen (OCHA 17/02/2017).

Prices of staple cereals have increased significantly since October 2016. Prices of sorghum and maize in January in south-central Somalia were double those of January 2016. In Lower Shabelle, maize prices increased 32–41% over January 2017 (FAO 14/02/2017). Poor households in urban areas are extremely vulnerable to food price increases, as food takes up a high proportion (60–80%) of household expenditure (FSNAU 19/10/2016). The increase of the price is also attributed to stockpiling of local cereal stocks by middle and upper class households (FSNAU 02/02/2017).
4.9 million people, about 41% of the population, were estimated to be food insecure between February and April 2017, 1.1 million more than in January 2016. 100,000 faced Famine food security outcomes.

The highest levels of food insecurity are in Unity state. High levels of food security are also reported in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei, and Eastern Equatoria (IPC 20/02/2017).

**Causes**
Conflict, economic crisis, and low agricultural production have disrupted livelihoods and diminished food stocks. Sudden and sharp currency devaluation has led to hyperinflation and high food prices in a country dependent on food imports. Restrictions of imported food from the south corridor due to insecurity has further reduced food supplies in-country and also contributed to the price increases (Food Security Information Network 03/2017). Transport costs have increased and availability of food on markets has fallen. Purchasing power has decreased.

The spread of the conflict to Greater Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, as well as the renewed conflict in the Greater Upper Nile led to severe depletion of livelihood and agricultural activities, with low crop production and trade disruptions reported across the country.
What is driving the food security situation in South Sudan?*

*This problem tree simplifies the situation for the purposes of clarity. It does not cover every factor and relationship.
Food availability

Production: Most rural households rely on hunting, gathering, and subsistence agriculture (FAO 28/03/2017). Displacement because of conflict has meant many people have not planted any crops since March–April 2014 (WFP 02/2015). Some households have had to consume seeds they would have planted (WFP 02/2015).

About 50% of all harvests have been lost in areas affected by violence (OCHA 13/02/2017). The spread of the conflict in the Equatorias led to a 40% national decline in food production in 2017 compared to the same February–April period in the previous year (Crisis Group 26/04/2017). In the Greater Equatoria region, about 50% of all harvests have been lost (ECHO 02/2017). Western Equatoria used to be the main food-producing region in the country.

National cereal production for the 2016/17 season is expected to be around 10% lower than the previous agricultural year (WFP 02/2017). Maize and millet productions dropped by almost 25% (Crisis Group 26/04/2017). In 2015, the cereal deficit was estimated to increase by 18%. Not counting food distributions, cereal import requirements only reached 19% of total local supply, down from 26% in 2014 (WFP 02/2015). The accumulation of several missed plantations exacerbates the vulnerability of the population who have already exhausted their coping mechanisms.

Cereal production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015 in 1,000 metric tons</th>
<th>2016 forecast in 1,000 metric tons</th>
<th>Change 2016/2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO 21/02/2017

Imports: South Sudan is highly dependent on imports, which are almost entirely financed by oil exports. However, the fall in oil exports has led to a shift in the balance of trade, from a surplus of SSP20.5 billion in 2011 to a deficit of SSP10 billion in 2012. This deficit equals almost one-third of GDP, severely constraining government’s capacity to import (WFP 02/2015). The Greater Upper Nile states import more as they need to compensate for acute food shortages. On average, these states have to import 119% of the volume of cereal obtained from production and aid distributions combined, either from other states or countries. The highest deficit was expected in Jonglei, with 151% import rates in 2015 (WFP 02/2015).

South Sudan mostly imports food products from Uganda and Sudan. 80% of all imports pass through Nimule, the only paved road between Uganda and Juba (Sudan Tribune 21/11/2013). However, the prevailing drought in Uganda since 2015 is impacting on the availability of maize and beans on South Sudanese markets, especially in Eastern Equatoria where cereal prices reached unprecedented high levels. Above-average sorghum production in Sudan, transport constraints meant that food supply on South Sudan markets did not improve (WFP 03/2017).
Trade and supply routes: South Sudan used to have two main trade routes, known as the Western and the White Nile corridors. Both corridors depart from Juba, mainly carrying goods from Uganda. The recent spread of the conflict in Greater Equatoria has disrupted the predictability of supplies from Uganda, compromising food availability on markets, and trade flows through the White Nile corridor have been severely affected by conflict, with looting and attacks on trucks (Xinhuanet 26/10/2016; WFP 02/2017).

The closure of the Sudan–South Sudan border has contributed to disruption of local markets (FEWSNET 08/05/2017).

White Nile and Western trade corridors in South Sudan

The journey to Aweil reportedly can take up to four weeks. Traders move in convoys and wait for government forces to clear the road and provide patrol trucks at night (WFP 02/2017). Taxation, both official and unofficial, at customs and checkpoints, is an obstacle to trade. According to the National Bureau of Statistics in 2011, there were six checkpoints between Juba and Nimule, and 32 between Juba and Aweil (WFP 02/2015).

Humanitarian aid: Food distributions accounted for 13% of total supply for 2014-2015 and met 10% of demand. Between 2012 and 2015, Greater Upper Nile received more than half of all cereal in-kind food assistance in South Sudan (WFP 02/2015). However, many parties in the conflict believe food distributions help the opposing side and therefore tried to limit food assistance, either through bureaucratic impediments or by targeting humanitarian personnel (Crisis Group 26/04/2017).

In July 2014, South Sudan and Sudan agreed to open a humanitarian corridor to deliver food assistance to South Sudanese through the River Nile or by road. On 26 March 2017, Sudan announced it would open a second humanitarian corridor, and at the end of April a third route was opened (Sudan Tribune 01/04/2017, local media 27/04/2017).
Food access

**Physical:** Conflict has destroyed market and transport infrastructure, as well as food storage facilities (WFP 02/2015). Poor road infrastructure also impedes access to markets (FAO 28/03/2017).

**Safety:** Conflict has isolated many communities, especially around the towns of Bor, Bentiu, Malakal and Akobo. Insecurity has limited people’s ability to access their land (UNHCR 31/03/2017). Crossing government and opposition-controlled areas is too dangerous for traders, limiting food availability on markets (WFP 02/2015). Looting is common across the country (Crisis Group 26/04/2017).

Aid workers have been directly targeted: in Unity, eight aid workers from Samaritan’s Purse were abducted by opposition fighters on 13 March and then released, and two IOM aid workers were killed and three injured in an ambush on 14 March in Lakes (Reuters 13/03/2017).

**Economic factors:** Soaring prices are mostly the result of currency depreciation. The South Sudanese was floated in November 2015, and since then the exchange rate has plummeted by more than 2,000% (WFP 02/2017). In October 2016, year-on-year inflation reached 836%, while food inflation was at 1,002%, which meant that prices doubled on average every nine days (WFP 02/2017). As of February 2017, inflation was at 426% (WFP 04/05/2017). Prices of staple food increased by more than five times compared to February 2016, particularly in Aweil and Agok in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Konyokonyo market in Juba, Yida in Unity, and Mingkaman and Rumbek in Lakes (WFP 04/05/2017).
17.1 million people were food insecure and required urgent humanitarian assistance at the end of 2016, which is equivalent to over 60% of the Yemeni population. Among those, approximately 10.2 million people are in Crisis and 6.8 million are in Emergency as of March 2017. The population in Crisis and Emergency has increased by 20% since June 2016 (FEWSNET 01/03/2017). The worst food security indicators are found in Hajjah, Taiz, Ibb, Al Dhale and Raymah governorates, where, 50% or more of the population have inadequate (poor or borderline) food consumption, and an exceptionally reduced coping strategy index (WFP 11/2016).

**Causes**

A de facto blockade on Yemen’s air and sea ports, lack of credit and high taxation limits food imports. Imports that reach Yemen are difficult to transport due to insecurity, administrative blockages, and damage to transport infrastructure (Food Security Information Network 03/2017).

Conflict has caused high levels of displacement, preventing millions of people who relied on agriculture for livelihood from planting. Production has also been impacted by limited access to water, shortages of seeds and fertilisers, and high prices of fuel needed for irrigation and transportation.

Prices have increased and purchasing power has fallen. Shrinking state finances and an acute liquidity crisis means that salaries have gone unpaid. Traders are facing difficulties accessing credit.

Physical damage, loss of capital and increased debt have resulted in a loss of livelihood for more than 50% of the population (IPC 03/2017).
What is driving the food security situation in Yemen?*

*This problem tree simplifies the situation for the purposes of clarity. It does not cover every factor and relationship.
Food availability

Production: Annually, agricultural production makes up 25–30% of Yemen's food requirements (FEWSNET 01/03/2017). The Yemen Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment estimated that 40% of all agricultural households experienced a decline in cereal production in 2016 compared to pre-crisis levels (FAO 12/04/2017). In 2016, agricultural inputs were in short supply and expensive, including seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, and fuel for irrigation. The cultivated area fell by 38% (IPC 03/2017). Agricultural production and livelihoods were also directly impacted by conflict as well as flash floods and landslides in July 2016 (FAO 12/04/2017). About 49,000 people were affected by the floods and 30 hectares of crops were destroyed (FAO 09/05/2016; OCHA 19/04/2016).

Cereal production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 1,000 metric tons</td>
<td>in 1,000 metric tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO 12/04/2017

Total cereal production in 2016 is estimated about 37% below the five-year average. 2016 sorghum production reaches only 59% of 2011-2015 average production, and wheat and millet production is at 67-68% of 2011-2015 average volume.

Imports: Yemen ordinarily imports 55% of its food for consumption, including 90% of its staple foods (WFP 2010). The de facto blockade on the movement of goods in and out of Yemen, as well as fighting in port areas, such as Taiz and al Hudaydah, has heavily constrained imports since August 2016 (WFP 23/02/2017). Imports in Yemen decreased to USD 11 million in 2015, from USD 16 Million in 2014 (Trade Economics 05/2017). Lack of credit and continued depreciation of the currency have also seriously affected the country’s ability to import food.

Trade and supply routes: Damaged storage facilities, high transport costs and limited access to markets are the main challenges for traders. The closure of export routes means fish and livestock exports have dramatically decreased, impacting the income of many households (IPC 03/2017). 8% of households in rural areas and 4% in urban areas rely on livestock sales (FAO 28/04/2017). The fall in credit has also limited traders’ ability to operate inside the country (WFP 2010). Higher insurance costs, increased time at the ports to offload goods, and high currency exchange rate on parallel market brings additional expense to the traders and ultimately increases the cost of goods (Yemen Food Security Information System Development Programme 10/2016).

Humanitarian aid: Food distributions are delayed, particularly at ports. In Hodeidah, damaged infrastructure means offloading goods takes around 20 times longer. Security clearance is also taking time, and insecurity impacts access (WFP 09/2016, Yemen Food Security Information System Development Programme 10/2016).
**Food access**

**Physical:** The majority of fishermen have lost their fishing equipment in the conflict. Key infrastructure has also been destroyed.

**Safety:** About 3.1 million people have been internally displaced by the conflict, preventing them from farming their lands (Task Force on Population Movement 03/2017). Except for informal black-market trade, insecurity means that traditional cross-border trade with neighbouring countries is no longer possible, seriously disrupting the production and marketing chain (IPC 03/2017).

Transports are reluctant to access volatile areas due to widespread checkpoints and fear of being targeted by coalition airstrikes, driving up the price of insurance and transportation (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies 10/2015; Government 05/2016). Fishing areas are limited by the conflict (IPC 03/2017).

**Economic factors:** Oil and gas exports declined by 86% in 2015, ultimately leading to currency devaluation (IRC 20/04/2017). The foreign currency reserve is almost exhausted. It was at USD 0.99 billion in September 2016, compared to USD 4.7 billion in December 2014 (WFP 11/2016).

The cost of living is now 40% higher than before the escalation in violence (FAO 12/04/2017). The food basket is 20% more expensive than in February 2015 (WFP 11/2016). On average, food takes up more than 45% of households' monthly expenditure. In addition, the fuel subsidy that used to account for one-fifth of the total fiscal budget spent on salaries and wages has in practice been abolished, falling from USD 3.2 million in 2013 to USD 0.1 million in 2015, increasing fuel prices (WFP 11/2016).

Incomes are significantly lower. In July 2016, the Central Bank of Yemen suspended public budget expenditures and domestic debt servicing. The entire social protection system has collapsed: 1.5 million people have not received benefits since 2015. Civil servants, who represent 31% of the workforce, are receiving only basic salaries, about 50% of the pre-conflict salary level (WFP 11/2016).

In urban areas, income is less likely to come from trade than it used to – falling from 28% to 20%– and more from casual labour and remittances from abroad. In rural areas, dependence on casual labour and remittances has also increased, and sale of crops and trade contribute far less to income.

While agro-pastoral activities do not represent the main source of income for most households, they complement the income of more than half the population (WFP 2010). Since the escalation of conflict, 45% of agricultural households have reduced their herd’s size, either intentionally to cover other needs or due to animal diseases (FAO 12/04/2017).
Informal social protection mechanisms have impacted on purchasing power (IPC 03/2017). Household debt was already widespread before the crisis escalated, and has now worsened. Before this crisis, 73% of households indicated relying predominantly on informal credit systems; more than 80% of households were reported to be in debt in February 2017 (WFP 2010; Reuters 16/02/2017).