



# NORTH-EAST NIGERIA PROTECTION MONITORING REPORT JULY – AUGUST 2020

**STATISTICAL TABLE**


**1,921,903**  
**46% in camps**  
**IDPs (Source IOM DTM)**



**Refugee  
 Returnees**

**1,760 HH**  
**4,850 Ind**  
**(July-August) source**  
**UNHCR)**



**Asylum  
 seekers**

**241 HH**  
**1,324**  
**Ind**  
**(source**  
**NCFRMI)**

Table 1: Population of concern as of end of August 2020

**OPERATIONAL CONTEXT AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT**

The security situation in North-East Nigeria during the reporting period remained precarious with the Non-State Arm Groups (NSAG) sustaining a continued campaign of terror using various tactics such as indiscriminate direct and indirect fires and propaganda in the region. Their attacks continued to focus on soft and hard targets such as civilian and military populations in the field, including neighbouring countries<sup>1 2</sup> and areas close to Maiduguri Metropolitan City (MMC). In an additional shift in tactics, they have declared humanitarian actors as legitimate targets, which further increases the risk in programme delivery<sup>3</sup>. Flood and COVID-19, on the other hand, continued to impact negatively on the lives of the affected population in a fragile protection environment.

In **Borno State**, several attacks, ambushes, and the mounting of illegal vehicle check points (IVCP) by NSAG along the main supply routes linking Maiduguri-Monguno, Bama-Pulka-Gwoza, Maiduguri-Dambo, Maiduguri-Damaturu, among other roads, culminated into killings, kidnappings and abductions of PoCs. Humanitarian workers and civilians, despite efforts by the Security Forces (SF) providing escorts for commuters on the affected routes and providing physical security in the camps and settlements. NSAG infiltration into camps was also reported in Dikwa, Monguno, Bama, Gwoza, Pulka, Ngala, Konduga and Jere.




Figure 1. UNDSS Roads Status in the BAY States as at August

In July 2020, Humanitarian Actors were deliberately targeted when an UNHAS helicopter was attacked in Damasak. Although it returned and landed safely in Maiduguri<sup>4</sup>, this compelled UNHAS to temporarily halt helicopter operation, thereby impacting on humanitarian access. Furthermore, five Humanitarian workers comprising of three aid workers, a government employee and a private security guard were abducted in June 2020 along Maiduguri-Monguno road and were subsequently executed on 22 July 2020.

In **Adamawa State**, Security Forces continued to repel the frequent attacks of NSAG at military checkpoints in Madagali LGA especially in areas located at the fringes of Sambisa Forest. Activities of Organized Criminal Groups (OCG) also resulted in armed robbery, abduction, extortion of civilians, and civil unrest mainly in Jemeta, Demsa, Guyuk, and Lamurde Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the central zone of the state. In Lamurde and Guyuk LGAs, land disputes between Boshikiri and Anguwan Dustse communities and ethnic clashes in Lamza community led to several killings and several houses torched. These clashes led to the

**614**  
 Incidents of SGBV reported

**87,009**  
 Reached by protection interventions in BAY states

**3,077**  
 KII conducted

**121**  
 Protection incidents reported 10 LGAs in Borno state

**20.11%**  
 Screened population are vulnerable

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/25/cameroon-boko-haram-suicide-bombers-strike-displacement-site>

<sup>2</sup> [https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.liberation.fr%2Fdebats%2F2020%2F08%2F19%2Fnon-les-ong-francaises-ne-representent-pas-l-etat-francais\\_1797168&data=02%7C01%7Cbisud%40unhcr.org%7C55cf478714dd405a7f8c08d84501bcbc%7Ce5c37981666441348a0c6543d2af80be%7C0%7C0%7C637335221077675059&sdata=4iVyCNK9by4WBnYvBoJGd%2FLdOU%2FaF%2BxQrNIVjGWeVIU%3D&reserved=0](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.liberation.fr%2Fdebats%2F2020%2F08%2F19%2Fnon-les-ong-francaises-ne-representent-pas-l-etat-francais_1797168&data=02%7C01%7Cbisud%40unhcr.org%7C55cf478714dd405a7f8c08d84501bcbc%7Ce5c37981666441348a0c6543d2af80be%7C0%7C0%7C637335221077675059&sdata=4iVyCNK9by4WBnYvBoJGd%2FLdOU%2FaF%2BxQrNIVjGWeVIU%3D&reserved=0)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/isis-declares-humanitarian-aid-workers-are-legitimate-targets/>

<sup>4</sup> UNDSS Cumulative Daily Situation Report from 1<sup>st</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> July 2020

displacement of people into crowded classrooms, incomplete buildings, and makeshift tents with limited access to basic amenities in Demsa LGA.

In **Yobe State**, NSAG continued to mass up in mostly Julluri village in Tarmuwa, Gujba and Bursari LGAs leading to destruction and theft of property, physical assault, hostage-taking, abduction for ransom and killings. As such, attacks and threats of imminent attacks on the communities<sup>5</sup> continue to cause widespread fear amongst the civilian population<sup>6</sup>.

The Nigeria Government reopened the Maiduguri and Yola airports in July for commercial flight services after their closure for three months owing to COVID-19 preventive measures. This has significantly eased humanitarian movement to these locations in addition to the existing United Nations Humanitarian Services (UNHAS). In August, the Government also announced the partial reopening of schools through the resumption of terminal classes and the commencement of their final exams.

### PROTECTION BY PRESENCE:

Table 1. Number of Individuals reached with Protection Services in BAY states

| Women  | Men    | Girls | Boys  | Total         |
|--------|--------|-------|-------|---------------|
| 43,001 | 31,712 | 7,979 | 4,317 | <b>87,009</b> |

**Presence:** Despite insecurity, the COVID 19 pandemic and floods, general protection actors-maintained presence to deliver **life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection services** to reduce risk and address needs. A total of 87,009 (Men 31,712; Women 43,001; Boys 4,317; Girls 7,979) IDPs, IDP Returnees and Refugee Returnees received protection services and products in July and August 2020. There is a notable increase of persons of concern (PoC) reached as compared to the May-June reporting period where a total of 68,815 PoCs were reached (19,342 Men, 35,463 Women, 8,419 girls and 5,591 boys). This can be attributed to influx of returnees recorded in July into Damasak where protection assistance was provided. Other reasons include significant humanitarian movement due to the eased-on movement restriction thereby enhancing greater presence of humanitarian actors in some of the locations.




Figure 2. UNHCR's presence in the BAY States

**POPULATION MOVEMENT DYNAMICS:** The four categories of movements confirming the internal and cross border nature of displacements as well as the new wave of government-induced returns in the States of Borno Adamawa and Yobe include:

- a) **Internal Displacement:** A total of 14, 571 individuals were displaced in the July-August period signifying an increase from the 11,167 individuals reported in the May-June period. This is due to continuous attacks by NSAG on civilians and counterattacks by the Security Forces. Other reasons for internal displacement include intercamp movements due to difficult access to services amidst economic difficulties and family reunification. For instance, in August, 926 Households (HH) comprising 3,891 individuals were recorded in Bama, Dikwa, Ngala, Gwoza, MMC, and Jere<sup>7</sup>. Also, as a result of the frequent attacks on villages in Gongulung Lawanti Ward of Jere LGA, many residents abandoned their homes for safety in nearby camps and host communities where there is security.




Figure 3. Internal displacement Trends

<sup>5</sup> <https://guardian.ng/news/iswap-drops-leaflets-in-yobe-threatens-war-against-government-officials/>

<sup>6</sup> UNDSS Cumulative Daily Situation Report from 1<sup>st</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> August 2020.

<sup>7</sup> IOM DTM Flash Report | IDP Population Movement Rapid Assessment- New Arrivals into Jere Local Government Area, Borno State. 27 August 2020



**b) Cross Border Movements:** Internal and cross border movements continue to take place through official and non-official borders between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, despite the official closure of the border as a measure to curb the spread of COVID-19. A total of 1,982 HH comprising of 7,883 individuals were recorded by Border monitors, of which 94 % (7,393) were Nigerian nationals, 1.9% (154) Nigerian, 4% (325) Cameroonians and 0.1 % (11) Chadian nationals. The majority of the border movement was recorded in Damasak accounting for 72% (5,670), followed by 13% in Banki (1,025), 13% in Ngala (1,011) while Pulka only had 2% (177). The movements in Pulka, Ngala and Damasak were mostly due to socio-economic difficulties, fear of being abducted, limited access to means of livelihood in the Countries of Asylum (CoA) and refugee returnees in need of family reunification while in Banki, most of the people crossed the Nigeria and Cameroon border for business purposes. The decreased Border movement in the month of August is most likely associated with the constant rains and flooded boarder entry points like Damasak, Banki and Ngala.




Figure 4: Monthly trends for the COVID-19 Border Monitoring

**c) Refugee returnees:** During the months of July and August 2020, a total of 1,760 households Refugee Returnees comprising of 4,850 individuals were captured by Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS) in partnership with UNHCR. This is a significant increase from the **394 households of 1,304 Refugee Returnees<sup>10</sup>** recorded in the May-June period. Of the 1,760 households' returnees captured, returnees per country of asylum registered from Niger were 919 HH/3,487 individuals, Chad Republic 2 HH/11 individuals and Cameroon 839 HH/1,352 individuals. 68 HH/226 individuals were registered in Ngala, 917 HH/3,486 individuals in Damasak, 101 HH/289 individuals in Banki (Bama), and 674 HH /849 individuals in Gwoza/Pulka.




Figure 5: Monthly trends for Spontaneous Refugees Returnees

The movement of returnees to Damasak specifically has been on the rise since the beginning of July 2020. This is attributed to reports of increased insecurity and lack of assistance in the Country of Asylum (CoA), coupled with advocacy for return conducted by the Borno State delegation from Abadam during the mission to the Niger Republic in May 2020.

**d) Return/Resettlement:** The Borno State Government made certain its plans to return/resettle 1.86 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to 19 communities in Borno State.<sup>8</sup> This movement is coming at the period where some locations identified as return areas continue to witness a new wave of NSAG attacks<sup>9</sup> as also fail to meet international standards governing returns, as stipulated in the Borno State Return Strategy.

**Consequences of population movement:** PoCs displaced as a result of the ongoing conflict in the North-East region, particularly in Borno State have been compelled to reside in crowded camps with limited access to basic services. For instance, due to camp congestion in Bama, Pulka and Banki<sup>10</sup>, and no space to construct new shelters, new arrivals continue to sleep in the open or in a crowded reception centers which expose them to protection risks, the rain and COVID-19. This has further exacerbated IDP's protection risks by exposing them to negative coping mechanisms such as survival sex, sexual abuse, and exploitation.

Refugee returnees, on the other hand, continue to face challenges accessing territory due to COVID-19 restrictions, insecurity, and extortion from border personnel. In Banki, Refugee returnees from Cameroon alleged that the Nigerian immigration officers at the entry point collected the sum of 2,000 naira (\$4) per household before they were allowed to access Nigerian territory despite showing their UNHCR Refugee attestation letter issued by the Government of Cameroon. Allegations of extortion by both the Cameroonian and Nigerian border personnel are continuously reported despite the advocacy for free access to Nigerian territory. In Damasak returnees were crowded in Lawanti Primary School due to limited shelters though a minority of the returnees was able to rent houses. In general, returnees end up in IDP camps due to non-conducive conditions for returns in their areas of origin, and limited access to humanitarian aid.

<sup>8</sup> <https://dailypost.ng/2020/08/04/boko-haram-borno-to-return-1-8million-idps-refugees-to-19-communities/>. These communities in these LGAs include Damasak, Bama (Banki), Konduga (Kauwuri, Malari, Dalwa and Mairari), Mafa (Ajiri), Marte (New Marte), Kukawa (Baga and Kukawa), Gwoza (Ngoshe, Kirawa and Warabe), Abadam (Mallam Fatori on the shores of Lake Chad). Others are Ngala (Wulgo and Iogomane), Dikwa (Gajibo) and Damboa (Sandiya and Korode).

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.premiumnigeria.com/2020/08/19/iswap-terrorists-overrun-nigerian-town-of-kukawa-hold-hundreds-hostage/>

<sup>10</sup> Dikwa and Muna Garage

Returns in these circumstances have subjected the PoCs to a new cycle of displacement and additional pressure on the existing limited access to humanitarian aid. PoCs are also exposed to heightened protection risks such as Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), discrimination, and increased vulnerabilities as a result of insufficient empowerment options. Children and persons with specific needs (PSN) comprising of persons living with disability, the elderly, Female-Headed Household (FHH), and pregnant women remain the most vulnerable in this situation.

**SOCIAL COHESION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:** The relationship between IDPs/returnees and communities/villages remains good and excellent according to 76% and 16% key informants respectively.

While this is commendable, sources of conflict at water points (39%), over children (35%), and over leadership (10%) often trigger tensions that threaten the fabric of social cohesion in the communities. In Borno State, tensions between Kanuri vs Shuwa on par, and Gamargu vs Shuwa ethnic groups in GSSS Bama manifested when parents from the Shuwa and Kanuri ethnic groups joined a fight involving their children at the water point. This scenario was also observed in Teachers Village Camp in MMC and GSS camp in Gwoza. In general, the presence in the community of people, including children, formerly associated with NSAG continues to be referred to as a threat to social cohesion. In Yobe State, the prolonged insurgency has caused the rise in crimes amongst youths that tend to threaten the peaceful coexistence of the communities. Continued sensitization and awareness-session are ongoing to educate PoCs on the importance of peaceful coexistence among the various groups, as well as, acting to alleviate pressure on natural resources such as water will reduce the occurrence of such conflicts. Generally, the peacebuilding activities are needed to reinforce the social fabric altered by the crisis.




Figure 6 : Sources of Conflicts

### COMPLAINT AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS:

Community structures and protection desks continue to play a critical role in addressing protection concerns as reported by 27% of PoCs interviewed. They have been proven to be the preferred avenue to access information, report incidents, complain and receive feedback on protection related issues and service delivery. In addition to existing hotlines, 21 protection desks built by UNHCR and used by GISCOR, NHRC, and availed to other stakeholders continued to serve this purpose in Damasak, Dikwa, Monguno, Damboa, Bama, Gamboru Ngala, Gwoza, MMC, and Jere LGAs, so as to allow for meaningful and substantial engagement and accountability to the affected population.




Figure 7: Who do you go to if you have a protection concern

During the reporting period, 1,397 PoCs visited the protection desks across the location to raise concerns and provide feedback on service delivery as per Figure 7. The following are some of the issues reported: Health (33.39%), displacement (23.18%), child labour/begging/hawking (4.09%), specific needs(4.09%), forced marriage (4.03%), denial of resources or opportunities (3.23%), conflict (3.11%), lack of shelter/NFI (2.27%), lack of access to basic services (2.48%), children at risk (2.72%), domestic violence (2.60%), mediation (2.09%), physical assault (1.73%), legal issues (1.25%), lack of food (0.90%), survival sex (0.45%), livelihood(0.42%), sexual abuse (0.42%), psychosocial/emotional abuse (0.36%), abandonment of women and children (0.33%), follow up (1.19%) and others (2.78%),

### INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS :

A total of **3,077 key informant interviews** were conducted to assess the protection environment, identify protection risks and concerns, major needs and their impact on PoCs. **121 protection incidents** were captured and analysed across 10 LGAs in Borno state using the protection monitoring tool. Of the 121 protection incidents: 28% were abductions of civilians, 20% attacks by NSAG, 16% SGBV




Figure 9: Presumed perpetrator of the

incidents<sup>11</sup> and others as presented by **Figure 8**<sup>12</sup>. LGAs mostly affected include Damboa (30), Bama (28), Dikwa (23), Jere (13), Mobbar (6) and 5 each for Gwoza Konduga, Maiduguri and 3 each for Monguno and Ngala. Alleged perpetrators include NSAG 49.30%, Unknown 23%, civilian population 18.31%, family members 5.16%, Army 3.17% and host population 0.47%.

**The impact on the civilian population:** Continuous NSAG attacks and the persistent mounting of illegal vehicle checkpoints on the main supply routes for the purpose of robbing and abducting civilians for ransom and killing has resulted in heightening fear and panic amongst the population. It has also led to the classification of the Gajiram-Monguno Main Supply route from the hitherto “Restricted” to “No go” for Humanitarian actors and cargo. Attacks on innocent PoCs during their daily activities have had a negative impact on returns. Floods and windstorms have led to the destruction of shelters, property and in some instances, the drowning of children. The destruction of shelters has also exposed PoCs to further hardships and risk in Gwoza, Monguno, Ngala, Dikwa, Damasak, Pulka, Banki, Stadium, Bakasi, Dalori 1, Muna, and Teacher Village Camps compelling affected households to relocate to crowded reception centers and shelters amid an additional threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The situation has further heightened existing vulnerabilities such as intimate partner violence, loss of identity documents and loss of food ration cards. As a result of these circumstances, UNHCR and Protection Sector North East (PSNE) developed an advocacy paper requesting for a multisectoral response to address the food and NFI needs arising from the flood.




Figure 10: Relations btw IDPs/Returnees and host community members

**CHILD PROTECTION:** Children with specific needs form 2% (159) of the total population screened as vulnerable in 10 LGAs (8,109 individuals). Of the 159 vulnerable children, 40% were child marriages, 35% child-headed household, 10% unaccompanied/separated minors, 8% adolescent and 7% orphans as shown in **Figure 11**. In addition to the security situation that has led to the increase of unaccompanied/separated children, and orphaned children as the result of the dispersed and death of the parents, other concerns include children forced to become head of households, the closure of schools due to COVID 19 pandemic leading to children being forced to hawk, child labour, beg, exposure to SGBV, abduction and abuse. Also, child and forced marriages as revealed by 28% in the SGBV section and 40% in vulnerability screening show how prevalent these issues are and their serious impact on children, especially on the girl child.

### Children with Specific Needs




Figure 11 : Children with Specific Needs

Cases of child and forced marriages continued to be recorded due to culture and limited access to livelihood in some of the households forcing children into early marriages. Furthermore, the limited presence of child protection actors and specialized government agencies, especially in Monguno, Dikwa, Rann, among other locations in Borno State, remains a concern that needs to be addressed to reduce the risks that children face. General protection actors have stepped up community engagements and awareness sessions to minimize risks.

## SEXUAL AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND RESPONSE



Incidents of SGBV has been reported through Partners



**21%**

Of the incidents were perpetrated on minors

**28%**

Of the survivors identified are the cases of child/forced



**98%**

Of the incidents were perpetrated on female.



**99.5%**

Of the survivors reported/identified are from Borno State

<sup>11</sup> These are SGBV cases reported and captured by the Protection monitoring tools. A broader picture of SGBV cases is provided under the relevant section.

<sup>12</sup> Other typology include 9% destruction of property, 8% others, specify (drown cases), 5% flooding, 4% physical assault, 2% looting, 2% robbery, 1% communal clashes, 1% overcrowding, 1% restricted freedom of movement, 1% torture of civilians, 0.5%, arbitrary detention, 0.5% ethnic clashes, 0.5% fire outbreak, 0.5% forced labour, 0.5% injury or death by IED/ERW, 0.5% recruitment/use of children, 0.5%, secondary displacement and 0.5% torture of civilians

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) has continued to be the most serious protection concern in Borno Adamawa and Yobe states. A total of **614 SGBV** incidents have been identified and reported on July and August 2020<sup>13</sup>, an increase of reported cases compared to May-June report (547 cases). This can be explained by the combined effects of the negative socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 and the persisting insecurity hindering access to livelihood opportunities and putting women and girls at risk during firewood collection.

**98%** of reported SGBV cases were against female PoCs and **2%** of incidents against male PoCs. **21%** of reported incidents involved children with **28%** of reported cases being Child and Forced marriage. Respectively, 99.5% and 0.5% of SGBV




Figure 12. % of SGBV survivors




Figure 13: Breakdown of SGBV Incidents

**(4%) and Rape (2%)**. No cases of Female Genital Mutilation and Human Trafficking were reported.

Focus Group Discussions revealed that cases of rape and sexual assault occurred mostly at night; women and girls were attacked in their shelters, in dark corners of the camps and the latrine areas. The recent surge in attacks by NSAGs has led to massive influx of populations into crowded IDP camps and reception centers. Poor lighting, limited shelters and basic services such as food and NFIs heighten SGBV risks as some stay in shared accommodation while others spend nights in the open.

incidents were reported in Borno and Adamawa States. Borno state continues to be the epicenter of the NSAG crisis and the geographical area where most SGBV cases occur. Major SGBV incidents reported included Denial of Resources, Opportunities and Services (33%), **Child and Forced Marriage (28%)**, **Physical Assault (18%)**, psychological and **Emotional Abuse (10%)**, **Sexual assault (4%)**, **Survival Sex**





Figure 14. Gender disaggregation of SGBV cases

The trends show that women and girls continue to bear the brunt of the protracted Boko Haram conflict. The pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic continues to significantly increase the vulnerability of women and girls to SGBV. Although men have been affected, incidents among them are under-reported due to stigma and socio-cultural constraints such as taboos and toxic aspects of masculinity. UNHCR and partners continue to emphasize on use of male-friendly approaches in prevention and response to SGBV.

Examination of obtainable evidence from Borno State, the epicenter of Boko Haram crisis, shows that the 12 % increase of reported SGBV incidents in July and August 2020 compared to that of May and June 2020 is partly due to increased sensitization by partners on the ground on the existing SGBV referral pathways, available services, and importance of reporting SGBV incidents.

Figure 15. SGBV Trends

#### Trend of SGBV Incidents by Month



The highest number of cases continue to be reported in Bama LGA (31%) of reported cases followed by MMC (18.9%), Jere LGA (8.1%) and Pulka LGAs (8%), a similar trend reported in May and June 2020. The continued increase of reported SGBV cases in Bama and MMC is partly attributed to constant awareness being created by partners and the increased role of community-based structures in mobilization and sensitization on identification and reporting of incidents. In recent times, UNHCR and partners have implemented community-based approaches such as Zero Tolerance Village Alliance and male engagement which emphasize the urgency to speak up and report SGBV incidents.

<sup>13</sup> Cases reported to UNHCR only through SGBV Partners (BOWDI and FHI 360) and during protection monitoring conducted by GISCOR



**PERSONS WITH SPECIFIC NEEDS:** The vulnerability screening exercise conducted in 10 LGAs in Borno State revealed that of the 40,316 individuals screened (18,427 Male and 21,889 Female), 8,109 individuals were identified as vulnerable individuals (20.11%). These include women 62% (5036), elderly 36% (2914) and Children 2%. Of the 5,036 women reported to have specific needs, 53% were Female-Headed Households, 34% lactating mother and 12% pregnant women

**Elderly with Specific Needs**




Figure 17 : Elderly with Specific Needs

as shown in **Figure 16**. **Figure 17**. Of the 2,914 elderly with specific needs, 54% were elderly-headed households, and 23% vulnerable elderly unable to care for self.

Although humanitarian actors continue to provide services to women with specific needs, critical gaps exist at the field level such as insufficient case management services for Women at risk (FHH) and limited access to livelihood opportunities, pushing them to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as survival sex continue to sustain themselves and their family.

**Women with Specific Needs**




Figure 16 : Women with Specific Needs

**FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT:** Freedom of movement remains one of the cardinal objectives of the Humanitarian Country Team Centrality of Protection Strategy. There are multiple reasons for the restriction of movement by the security forces including COVID-19 prevention and self-imposed restrictions as a result of fear amongst the affected population. The continued mounting of illegal checkpoints, abduction, and killing of civilians by the NSAG have also made freedom of movement risky. Other limiting factors include the threat of NSAG attacks, abductions, and UXO contamination. The main limiting factors to freedom of movement, therefore, remain security (77%), including UXO contamination, curfew (14%), and the absence of legal documents 8% reported by **key informants** (see tables below). As the situation remains without significant improvement, the affected population will continue to rely on Humanitarian Aid, which is counterproductive to the finding of durable solutions and to foster self-reliance. In general, freedom of movement within the camps/settlement remains less challenging than freedom of movement outside the camps as presented by **Figures 18 and 19**.

Can people move freely within the site ?



Figure 18; Can people move freely within the site

Can people move freely outside nearby?



Figure 19; Can people move freely outside nearby

Conditions limiting the freedom of movement outside nearby?



Figure 20; conditions limiting the freedom of movement outside nearby

**LEGAL DOCUMENTS:** Limited access to, and loss of legal documents such as national identity cards, and indigene certificates due to conflict and floods continue to impact on freedom of movement of PoCs. It exposes them to other human rights violations and hindering their socio-economic inclusion. Additionally, limited access to birth certificates continues to put children at risk of Statelessness. 18% of Key Informants expressed the need to have identity documents but did not know the process to acquire one. Barriers to legal documentation - the lack of awareness on the process to get one - suggests the need for continuous sensitization of the PoCs on how and where to access documents while advocating the relevant authority to resume presence in the LGAs and facilitate their issuance.

**Barriers to Documentation**



Figure 21 ; Barriers to Documentation



**HOUSING LAND AND PROPERTY:** 21% of 3,077 Key informants reported destruction and theft/fraud of property records as their key concerns. Other HLP issues highlighted by informants are presented in **Figure 22**. As alluded by the majority of the key informants, destruction of houses by insurgents in return areas like Damasak, Gwoza, Pulka, Banki, Bama, among other locations, has been identified as one of the challenges hindering returns, thereby leading to crowded and congested camps and shelters amidst COVID 19 fears. Also, flood and windstorms in Gwoza, Pulka, Ngala, Damasak, Bakasi, and stadium camps have damaged shelters and properties, and in some instances, cost the lives of PoCs in Dikwa and Damboa. All the above has exacerbated the terrible camp situation & exposed PoCs to Protection and health-related risks.

Issues around secondary occupation of lands and/or houses in areas of origin/return have been reported by PoCs during protection assessments and return intention surveys as a major factor hindering returns. In an attempt to find a solution, the Borno State Government has initiated the construction of houses in areas of return such as Banki, Damasak, Gwoza and Baga. These efforts, though commended, have been reported to be insufficient.

**Persistent gaps and priority needs:** Limited access to food has been further exacerbated by insecurity and effort to curb the COVID-19<sup>14</sup> spread. Farmers have been forced to abandon their activities<sup>15</sup>, resulting in the high cost of the food items. PoCs in MMC that benefitted from Cash-Based Interventions for food have reported that due to the high prices of food items caused by cost-push inflation as an effect of COVID-19, they could not feed their families with the current food basket<sup>16</sup>. In August, the general food distribution in Rann, Bama, Gwoza, Pulka and Banki faced logistical delays. The lack of food and high cost of food items continue to push the PoCs to desperation making them susceptible to exploitation: In Bakassi camp a small-time crook devised employment opportunities and swindle IDPs of NGN 5000 each. In North-East, the lack of food aid puts over 10 Million individuals at risk of hunger<sup>17</sup>, of recruitment by NSAG<sup>18</sup>, and other protection associated negative coping mechanisms.

Persistent flood and windstorm in camps and host communities has led to the destruction of shelters, WASH facilities, properties, and Non-food items (NFIs), this particular set of circumstances has also led to hardship and loss of livelihood in some Households posing risks and protection concerns.

Secondary or multiple displacements of IDPs have also continued to put pressure on limited resources in Bama, Gwoza, Damasak, Monguno among other locations. **Food, shelter, NFIs and livelihood** have been highlighted by PoCs as their priority needs as shown in **Figure 23**.

**COVID-19 PREVENTION AND RESPONSE:** The implementation of preventive measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 is ongoing and closely monitored to identify the successes and the challenges in prevention and response. Success includes community involvement and participation in sensitization and awareness sessions, and risk communication activities; it also includes continuous border monitoring and implementation of COVID-19 surveillance at the entry points to promote access to the territory. Some challenges remained the skepticism in the community with regards to COVID-19, risky behaviors, and insufficient isolation centers.

**COORDINATION:** Protection meetings were held at the Local Government Areas (LGA) and the State levels. Protection Sector Working Group meetings were held in Monguno, Dikwa, Rann, Damasak, Bama, Banki, and Gwoza LGAs. Similar meetings were held in MMC, Jere, Pulka, and Damboa where protection issues were discussed, solution-oriented actions recommended for implementation.

Other meetings held at the State level were the General Protection Working Group meeting (GPWG) and the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Task Force (ATIPTF). To ensure compliance with the Borno State Return Strategy, the Borno State Return Task Force met to discuss, amongst others, the Borno State Government's plan to




Figure 22 ; HLP Problems



Figure 23, Priority Needs

<sup>14</sup> SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC AMONG PERSONS OF CONCERN IN NIGERIA, UNHCR, JULY 2020.

<sup>15</sup> <https://guardian.ng/news/78120-farmers-abandon-food-production-in-borno-taraba-others/>

<sup>16</sup> Protection Desk Report from MMC, TVC and Dalori Camps.

<sup>17</sup> <https://punchng.com/10-6-million-people-in-north-east-risk-hunger-un/>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/08/boko-haram-recruiting-fresh-members-idps-may-be-forced-to-join/>

return/resettle IDPs in LGAs including communities in Marte, Mafa (Ajiri), Konduga (Kawuri), and Bama (Banki).

### MAIN CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| S/N | Challenges  | Recommendations  | Affected areas                                  | Responsible stakeholders  | Urgency |
|-----|---|--|---|---|---------|
| 1   | Deterioration of security situation   | Advocacy for the improvement of overall security situation with emphasis on the protection of humanitarian actors  | Borno Yobe and Adamawa states                   | OHCT, HCT   | Urgent  |
| 2.  | Camp and reception center overcrowding due to increased new arrivals.   | Advocacy to State Government and the military, for the expansion of the camp<br>Decongestion of camps, including reception centers   | Bama-Banki, Gamboru Ngala, Gwoza, Pulka and MMC | SEMA/NEMA<br>CCCM<br>PSNE   | Urgent  |
| 3   | Insufficient livelihood/Income Earning Activities experienced by the PoCs exacerbated by limited movements during rainfalls           | Livelihood support incorporating female adolescent and adult males in the camps, settlements and host communities.   | All locations                                   | Government, Food Security and Livelihood and early recovery Sectors, OHCT | Urgent  |
| 4   | Limited access to cooking fuel by PoCs  | Alternative to cooking fuel like the production of briquette among others  | All locations                                   | Food Security and Livelihood and early recovery Sectors                   | Urgent  |
| 5   | Limited support for the most vulnerable groups (elderly and person with disabilities)   | Advocacy for more specialized service providers (including Government ministries, departments and agencies) to fill the existing gap regarding access to services by some categories of vulnerable groups. Resource mobilization | All locations                                   | OHCT, ISWG, NEDC  | Urgent  |
| 6   | Absence of targeted support for male adolescent associated with the armed group who have been released from the rehabilitation center | Advocate for targeted assistance to the individuals to ease their reintegration and minimize their risk of being re-recruited by the NSAG.   | Bama  | PSNE, CP Sub-sector.  | Urgent  |
| 7   | Affected population remain extremely dependent on the humanitarian assistance   | Leverage on the humanitarian - Development-Peace Nexus to strengthen protection and enable sustainable solutions.  | All locations                                   | Government, Humanitarian actors, development actors                       | Urgent  |

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